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Abstract 
 
 
Whilst much of the world has been formally decolonised, the ways we think 
about international relations often remains Eurocentric. This is evident in the 
critical debate on the liberal peace, which problematises the politics of post-
war intervention. In this debate, it is argued that donors conduct invasive 
liberal social transformations in the name of conflict management and good 
governance. Although insightful, these critiques have tended to ignore the 
target society as a subject of history and politics in its own right.  
 
In response, the thesis turns to anti-colonial thought for strategies to 
reconstruct the target society as a subject of politics and source of critique. 
Drawing on the thinking of Césaire, Fanon and Cabral, these approaches offer 
philosophical re-orientations for how we understand the embodied subject, 
how we approach analysis, and how we think about political ethics. I use these 
insights to look at the liberal peace in Mozambique, one of intervention’s 
‘success stories’.   
 
First, ‘Mozambique’ is itself re-constituted as a subject of history, in which 
the liberal peace is contextualised within historical forms of rule.  Second, 
political subjecthood is reconstructed through thinking about ‘double 
consciousness’ on issues of governance and corruption. Third, I look at forms 
of conscious transactionality and alienation in the material realities of the 
liberal peace. Finally, I explore the historically ambivalent relationship of the 
peasantry with the state, which highlights alternative responses to neoliberal 
policy. 
 
The conclusions of the thesis suggest that the problem with the liberal peace is 
not so much that it is an alien form of rule which is culturally unsuitable but 
an alienating form of rule which is politically and economically exclusionary. 
The kind of critical ethical response that this demands is not based on the 
assumption of unbridgeable ‘difference’ between the West and its Others, but 
of the potential and actual connections between embodied political subjects 
who can listen to and hear each other. 
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Introduction 
Renewing the critical imagination in world politics 
 
 
  
This thesis is written with a purpose in mind: to address a gap between a 
kind of anti-imperial, inclusive ethic that seems to motivate critical inquiry in the 
study of world politics, and the ways in which this inquiry is conceived and 
conducted that respond to the demands of this ethic. The core contention of the 
thesis is that projects which are serious about interrogating forms of domination, 
hegemony and imperialism in world politics need to take seriously the subjecthood 
of those who are targeted by these forms of rule. In doing so, it is necessary to 
articulate a position which is more coherently connected to a democratising, 
decolonising project of political engagement, and which can provide the resources 
for imagination and change.  In this project, this position entails the ‘reconstruction 
of subjecthood’.  
 
Such optimistic and generic ambitions however are best grounded in specific 
contexts and questions in order to make sense. The disciplinary site for this 
investigation is the critical debate around the ‘liberal peace’ that has been taking 
place amongst scholars studying world politics in various ways over the last ten to 
fifteen years. This debate is both significant and interesting, in and of itself and in 
terms of what it represents for contemporary global structures of power. The main 
intellectual resource for the critique mobilised in the thesis is twentieth century anti-
colonial thought, a crucial inspiration for the world-shaking events of decolonisation 
in that century. This kind of thinking exposes the imaginative shortcomings and 
political blind spots in the ongoing discussion around the liberal peace. Finally, the 
illustrative reference point of the thesis is the geographical-historical space of 
Mozambique, through which these alternative ways of thinking are explored and 
illustrated.  The introductory discussion will articulate the importance of these and 
other choices, in and of themselves, and in terms of the wider purpose of the project. 
As a whole, the project seeks to establish how a critique of intervention inspired by 
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anti-colonial thinking can analyse and interpret the experiences of Mozambique’s 
recent post-war interventions. 
 
 Although the project is focused on these specific areas, it is hoped that its 
concerns and preoccupations may resonate more broadly amongst readers, 
particularly those who share its general intuitions as to what the world might look 
like and to whom, and how we should try to think about it.  In making the 
intellectual journey towards the completion of this project it has been particularly 
encouraging and inspiring to come into contact with many such people both within 
and beyond traditional academic communities, although no doubt such journeys are 
self-selecting in this way. Nonetheless, these encounters have led at least to a small 
personal sense that the thesis may also be working within a particular kind of 
political zeitgeist, in which the globally and locally unequal distributions of power 
and wealth are increasingly under active and visible contestation on the streets of the 
world, and more people are talking about different possible futures. As such, I hope 
the thesis may add in a small way to this growing conversation. 
 
 
I. What is critique, and who are its subjects? 
 
In this thesis, I understand ‘critique’ to mean the unpacking, challenging and 
contradicting of ways of thinking and knowing that assert social and political 
authority over a space or community. As may be indicated by the comments just 
made, ‘critique’ is something that can and does happen, and has happened, 
anywhere and everywhere, and is in no way the preserve of the academy. 
Academics may sometimes usefully challenge society’s common sense on various 
issues; yet more often than not they are also inclined or strongly encouraged to 
reproduce and reinforce it. As such, they are often not the vanguard of critical 
thinking but the trailing wagon. Critique is here understood as a normal practice 
within a political world full of plurality, unevenness and creativity.  
 
There is however a more specific sense in which ‘critique’ is used here, and 
this relates to people who self-identify as ‘critical scholars’ or ‘critical theorists’, 
particularly within the discipline of International Relations, which has been the 
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intellectual base for the development of the thesis. This community has recently 
marked the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of two major articles which 
encouraged scholars studying world politics to unpack, challenge and contradict the 
common sense within the discipline, which had naturalised and reified a power-
centric inter-state view of world order.
1
 As the history of such thought and its 
various trends is relatively well-known, I will not rehearse it here.
2
 Nonetheless, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that the thesis is a response to a particular debate that has 
come out of this community of critical IR scholars, and is mainly addressed to 
concerns raised within this particular site of conversation. Specifically, I have been 
interested in the promise within critical thinking to offer grounds for democratising 
and pluralising interpretations of world politics, and it is to this aspect that the 
project is oriented. 
 
This site of conversation has over the years generated a lot of fascinating 
accounts of how to deal with ontological questions in the discipline, such as the 
primacy of the state over other units of analysis, or of material power rather than 
ideas or norms, or of the imaginary state of anarchy. It has generated 
epistemological questions over the stability of knowledge about the international 
and the power relations implicated in the production of this knowledge. Of course it 
has also raised ethical questions about the values embedded in particular kinds of 
knowledge, and in particular whether they can be assumed to be ‘universal’.  As 
Hobson has provocatively argued in the context of a recent appraisal, however, 
many of the most popular approaches within critical IR, for which he takes 
Gramscian, postmodern and feminist scholarship as exemplars, have appeared to 
retain Eurocentric foundations in their accounts of world order.
3
  
 
Whilst his reading of the various authors may perhaps be too abrasive, what 
Hobson usefully gestures towards in this discussion is the placing of Europe as the 
                                                 
1
 These articles are commonly identified as  Ashley, R. K. (1981). Political realism and human 
interests. International Studies Quarterly: 204-236 and Cox, R. W. (1981). Social forces, states and 
world orders: beyond international relations theory. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
10(2): 126-155. ‘Thirty Years of Critique’, Panel at the British International Studies Association, 
Manchester, April 27-29
th
 2011.  
2
 See Rengger, N. J., & Thirkell-White, B. (2007). Critical international relations theory after 25 
years. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
3
 Hobson, J. M. (2007). Is critical theory always for the white West and for Western imperialism? 
Beyond Westphilian towards a post-racist critical IR. Review of International Studies 33(S1): 91-116. 
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implicit reference point within the grammar of critical IR, either as embodying 
‘enlightened’ values for the feminists he identifies, or as representing an inexorably 
powerful expression of advanced capitalism in world politics, as for the neo-
Gramscians.
4
  Thus, the conversations tend use a particular articulation of so-called 
European experiences or ideologies as the central referent of critique, even if the 
goal is to challenge this dominance. Hobson’s provocation is thus a very important 
one in the context of critical projects that are self-consciously about challenging 
various forms of hierarchy in world politics. 
 
Across the last ten years however, ‘decolonising’ approaches directed at 
some of the critical debates within International Relations have emerged in 
increasing numbers.
5
 Although diverse in their specific sites of inquiry, conceptual 
concerns and, often, conclusions, collectively they have, I have argued elsewhere, 
constituted a series of challenges to “the exclusionary premise of an imagined 
Western subject of world politics”.6 However, the idea of a ‘subject’ of politics is 
multi-faceted in social theory, and in decolonising thought this is reflected in the 
development of multiple strategies for challenging this exclusion. These include 
questioning the subject-object relations embedded in Orientalist political discourses, 
challenging Eurocentric historiographies and the imagined universal subjectivity of 
the post-Greek European man.
7
 Importantly, however, the project has not just 
comprised deconstructive elements. Rather, reflective and careful attempts at 
reconstruction have also been made in terms of alternative world historiographies, 
different accounts or visions of the political subject and different articulations of 
political rationality.
8
 
                                                 
4
 Ibid, 93. 
5
 Recent texts include Grovogui, S. N. (2002). Regimes of sovereignty: International morality and the 
African condition. European Journal of International Relations 8(3): 315-338, Inayatullah, N. and D. 
L. Blaney (2003). International relations and the problem of difference. New York, London, 
Routledge, Hobson, J. M. (2004). The Eastern origins of Western civilisation. Cambridge, UK ; New 
York, Cambridge University Press,  Jones, B. G. (2006). Decolonizing international relations, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Agathangelou, A. M. and L. H. M. Ling (2009). Transforming 
world politics: from empire to multiple worlds, Taylor & Francis, Bhambra, G. K. and R. Shilliam 
(2009). Silencing human rights: critical engagements with a contested project, Palgrave MacMillan. 
Nayak and Selbin (2010) Decentering International Relations, (London: Zed Books). For an 
overview of this orientation see Sabaratnam, M. (2011). "IR in Dialogue... but Can We Change the 
Subjects? A Typology of Decolonising Strategies for the Study of World Politics." Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 39(3): 781-803, 782. 
6
 Sabaratnam, ‘IR in Dialogue’, 785. 
7
 Ibid., 785-6. 
8
 Ibid., 788-793. 
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This thesis articulates its own distinctive account of what a decolonising 
reconstruction needs to do in the context of the liberal peace debate, but is inspired 
and influenced by this range of decolonising intellectual strategies. The concern for 
‘subjecthood’ in the debate in particular is central to this endeavour. In the thesis I 
hope to show that this mode of critical thinking is both productive and illuminating, 
not just for those with an expressed interest in dealing with the particular legacies of 
European colonialism but for thinking more generally about how to make 
conversations about world politics less narrow and more dialogical. In the next 
section, I discuss why the liberal peace debate is an important place to stage such a 
conversation. 
 
II. The ‘liberal peace’ debate as intellectual terrain 
 
If scholars often describe policy-oriented ‘problem-solving’ and 
emancipatory ‘critical’ scholars as existing in their respective ‘camps’, then the 
liberal peace debate can be metaphorically understood as an expansive terrain upon 
which many have pitched tents and which is relatively well-served by the amenities 
and infrastructure of large funding streams and wide political interest.  Many 
dedicated conferences and journals serve as large and small campfires around which 
to passionately discuss points of view, share stories and to bond intellectually, 
although there are uneven patterns of attendance and inclusion at such events.  
Without wanting to stretch the metaphor too far, it is worth asking what all these 
people are doing here, and indeed if or why any more contributors might be needed.  
 
The ‘liberal peace debate’ relates, broadly speaking, to a discussion of the 
theory and practice of intervention in poor post-war countries by international 
institutions, supported by or alongside wealthy Western governments and NGOs, in 
order to stabilise, develop and generally free them from the scourge of war. Such 
intervention includes everything from the deployment of peacekeeping forces, 
support for multi-party elections, economic liberalisation and development 
programmes, state and institution-building, governance reform, the promotion of 
particular legal arrangements, health and education provisions, justice and 
17 
 
reconciliation and other meliorative social programmes. As Chapter One will 
elaborate, these rapidly increased in size and complexity from relative quick 
election-holding missions in Central America to multi-year statebuilding operations 
in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
 
For interveners in particular, the stakes are very high for getting this kind of 
intervention ‘right’ in the first place in terms of shared ambitions for preventing 
further violence and death amongst interveners and those targeted by intervention. 
Moreover, in terms of the monies spent on such interventions, interveners are under 
pressure to show ‘results’ in bureaucratic terms. Beyond this, however, there are 
political stakes in terms of the reputations of intervening countries and institutions 
who consistently claim expertise in getting this kind of social engineering right, and 
in generally knowing how to rule populations – to a certain extent the stability and 
hierarchy of the global distribution of authority is also at stake in the politics of 
intervention. As such, post-war intervention is a unique kind of mirror for important 
aspects of world politics, including the separation of countries into ‘responsible’ and 
‘irresponsible’ agents, stabilising a statist world order whilst simultaneously 
involving non-sovereign forms of rule and management, and creating particular 
kinds of political and ethical relationships between interveners and those targeted by 
intervention.  
 
On the surface, it is relatively easy to see why so many ‘problem-solving’ 
scholars are present in the camp set aside for such affairs, insofar as the issue of 
understanding how to carry out such interventions has been in great political vogue 
for at least twenty years now amongst these policymakers. This has created a 
popular intellectual market for work which reflects on how and why this has gone 
wrong and how to do it better.
9
 Much of this has been grounded in a sincere belief 
and faith in the broader validity of the ‘liberal peace’. As prominently re-articulated 
by Michael Doyle some years previously; this is the argument that polities based on 
liberal political and economic arrangements are less likely to go to war with each 
                                                 
9
 See Rotberg, R. I. (2003). When states fail: causes and consequences. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press; Fukuyama, F. (2004). State-building : governance and world order in the 21st 
century. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Dobbins, J. (2007). The beginner's guide to nation-
building (Vol. 557): RAND Corporation; Ghani, A., & Lockhart, C. (2009). Fixing failed states: a 
framework for rebuilding a fractured world: Oxford University Press, USA for examples of the 
genre. 
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other.
10
 As Chapter One will discuss further, these beliefs were consistently 
challenged by events that took place in the course of interventions, requiring an 
almost constant tweaking and contorting within ‘liberal peace’ thinking to make it 
better fit post-conflict environments, whilst leaving the core belief of the general 
validity of the ‘liberal peace’ untouched.  
 
If it has been the self-declared vocation of ‘critical’ thinkers in IR and 
elsewhere to expose and disrupt the implicit violence embedded within various 
structures of power in the world, then their encampment on the terrain of the liberal 
peace debate is perhaps also unsurprising. After all, liberal peace interventions are 
extraordinary events which seemed to demonstrate and reinforce the power of 
Western liberal imperialism in its various faces, including the forced induction of 
countries into free market capitalism, the arrogant spread of liberal political values 
and the intrusive forms of social regulation. Over the last ten years an equally 
vigorous literature has sprung up around the ‘liberal peace’ developing these lines of 
argument.
11
 Many of these have leant on and contributed to the resources for critical 
thinking emerging from critical IR scholarship, including the use of neo-Gramscian 
and Foucaultian concepts to understand the nature and character of liberal peace 
operations. Many of the thinkers also self-identify as critical IR theorists and work 
at the intersection of the liberal peace debate and critical IR theory, such as 
Duffield, Pugh, Richmond and Chandler. I am therefore taking them to stand in for a 
debate with critical IR in general and representing many of its main conceptual 
frameworks. Chapter Two will focus in more detail on the kinds of critique these 
have given rise to and their contributions to re-thinking the politics of the liberal 
peace.  
 
As such, the liberal peace debate, between and within these various camps, is 
an important terrain of contestation within the discipline around several connected 
                                                 
10
 Doyle, M. W. (1983). ‘Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs’. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
12(3), 205-235. 
11
 For example, Chandler, D. (1999). Bosnia : faking democracy after Dayton. London ; Sterling, 
VA.: Pluto Press; Duffield, M. R. (2001). Global governance and the new wars : the merging of 
development and security. New York: Zed Books; Richmond, O. P. (2005). The transformation of 
peace. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Pugh, M., Cooper, N., & Turner, M. (2008). Whose 
peace?: critical perspectives on the political economy of peacebuilding: Palgrave Macmillan; 
Tadjbakhsh, S. (2011). Rethinking the Liberal Peace: Taylor & Francis; also special issues of 
International Peacekeeping, 11:1 (2004) and Global Society, 21:4 (2007).  
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issues which have wider consequences for our understanding of world politics, but 
which tend to sharply divide ‘problem-solving’ from ‘critical’ scholars on several 
fronts. These include the nature and character of international intervention, its 
effects on societies affected by war, the values and legitimacy of its transformative 
agendas, and the ways in which these produce or reproduce forms of global order. 
Moreover, it is very much a live debate, pertaining to contemporary practices that 
are ongoing and often renewed. Thus it is expected that this would be a noisy terrain 
of discussion.  
 
Yet, despite the noise, and perhaps as a result of excursions to other 
campsites, it has been impossible not to notice various kinds of silence in the 
discussions. This has been the silence if not the invisibility of those people who are 
targeted by such interventions. Discussions about the legitimacy, effectiveness or 
significance of intervention have in this sense only discussed and examined an 
extended Western subject of world politics. Whilst this might well be expected from 
those ‘problem-solving’ scholars who are principally occupied with the task of 
improving Western foreign policy, it is something of a surprise amongst those 
‘critical scholars’ who are preoccupied with critiquing it and the kinds of political 
exclusions it instantiates. In the spirit of the new wave of decolonising critiques in 
the discipline, this thesis explores whether it is possible in some way for other forms 
of subjecthood to break through the enclosure of the camp and extend the 
discussion.  
 
 
III.    Anti-colonial thought as a resource for critique 
 
To do this, however, we need some alternative intellectual resources for 
developing critique which can get us beyond the current frameworks. In the thesis I 
turn to a trio of thinkers who articulated some compelling indictments of 
colonialism which were closely bound up with particular anti-colonial struggles in 
the twentieth century. These are Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), Amílcar Cabral (1924-
1973) and Aimé Césaire (1913-2008).  In Chapter Three in particular I draw on a 
number of intellectual moves they made when articulating the demands of their anti-
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colonial postures, and explore how these insights might generate alternative ways of 
thinking about the liberal peace.   
 
In the first place, however, it is useful to think about why anti-colonial 
thinkers per se would have any bearing at all on the present debate and critique in 
IR more generally. In the main, this derives from sharing elements of the 
problématique around the nature and character of imperial power. It is fairly clear 
that the question of ‘retrieving the imperial’12 has had an increasingly prominent 
place in the controversies within the study of world politics more generally, and 
specifically within the liberal peace debate. In the former, the discussions and 
controversies around Hardt and Negri’s Empire were indicative of how critical 
theorists in IR were articulating responses to globalisation and to the ways that it 
had re-constituted the international.
13
 This discussion however extended well 
beyond the critical traditions of the Left – many other scholars had also begun to 
think ‘imperially’ about America’s place in the world in relation to its size, structure 
and whether it might be able to avoid the fate of other empires.
14
 The anti-colonial 
tradition of thought which was developed in the context of such other empires and 
their eventual collapse might well be pertinent to taking the discussion forward. 
 
As noted in the previous section, within the liberal peace debate itself, the 
question of its ‘imperial’ character has also stimulated broad discussion in the 
context of the issues raised.
15
 Moreover, the debate has begun to draw many more 
direct analogies with not just imperial behaviour but colonial practices within 
interventions themselves. Whilst Paris has noted similarities to the ‘civilising 
missions’ of European colonialism, Richmond has described elements as being 
‘colonial’ or ‘neocolonial’, and Duffield has argued that both liberal peace 
interventions and colonial Native Administrations have sought to exercise 
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 The phrase is taken from the title of the article Barkawi, T., & Laffey, M. (2002). Retrieving the 
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127. 
13
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 For example, see Chandler, D. (2006). Empire in denial : the politics of state-building. London ; 
Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press; Ignatieff, M. (2003). Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo 
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biopolitical control over ‘under-developed’ populations.16 As such, anti-colonial 
thought might be understood as even more precisely relevant to developing a critical 
perspective on such practices, particularly if, as Chandler has argued, the present 
order is a derogation of norms of sovereignty and self-determination that were the 
outcome of decolonisation processes.
17
 The questions raised by anti-colonial 
thinkers around the legitimacy and operation of colonialism, seem, at least in the 
first place, highly relevant to the present critical debate on the liberal peace and its 
discussions around global re-ordering. 
 
Whilst they are relevant, however, this is not where my discussion of anti-
colonial thought ends. Taking this relevance as a point of departure, I suggest that 
anti-colonial thought is of most interest to the debate because of the types of 
philosophical re-orientations to the questions of social being that it endorsed, which 
underpinned its critiques of colonialism and its reconstructions of the colonised as 
human subjects. As such, I am reading the chosen thinkers not as prescient 
commentators on the present juncture, but as people forced to confront similar kinds 
of intellectual traps in the effort to get beyond and see through the colonial present. 
By thinking about their particular intellectual and political struggles, it is possible to 
think differently about how we critique the interventions understood as the liberal 
peace. 
 
It is with this general orientation in mind that I have chosen to focus on these 
three thinkers in particular – Fanon, Cabral and Césaire – rather than some of the 
later thinkers often grouped together in the ‘post-colonial’ canon.18 Fanon, Cabral 
and Césaire on the other hand were not ‘post-colonial’ insofar as for the most part 
they were writing and thinking against contemporary practices of European 
colonialism in the period before and during decolonisation, and active participants 
in the political movements which took these aims forward. None of the three 
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 Paris, R. (2002). International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’. Review of 
International Studies, 28(04), 637-656; Richmond, O. P. (2009). ‘A post-liberal peace: Eirenism and 
the everyday’. Review of International Studies, 35(3), 557-580, 577; Duffield, M. (2005). ‘Getting 
savages to fight barbarians: development, security and the colonial present’, Conflict, Security & 
Development, 5(2), 141-159;   
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 Chandler, Empire in Denial, Chapter 1. 
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 These canons can be read as brought into being through projects such as Ashcroft, B., Griffiths, G., 
& Tiffin, H. (1995). The post-colonial studies reader: Burns & Oates. 
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actually lived to see the decolonisation of the territories in which their struggles 
were focused.
19
 As such, their thought was oriented towards the active unpicking of 
the intellectual foundations of colonialism as well as the attempt to develop a space 
for the subjecthood of colonised peoples within the context of a European Left 
which was threatening to smother or absorb it. It was thus incumbent upon these 
thinkers to begin to articulate some grounds for resistance and reconstruction in the 
decolonisation project as a whole. 
 
Some of the later famous thinkers in the ‘post-colonial’ canon, such as 
Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak are perhaps less immediately relevant 
in this sense. Writing in the decades after decolonisation, with specific reference to 
the Indian and Middle Eastern contexts, and in the knowledge that things had not 
quite turned out as had been hoped, this later work tends to be somewhat more 
ambivalent and cautious towards the possibility of an anti-colonial reconstruction 
that is not itself potentially hegemonic and violent. I simplify enormously here, but I 
think this is one of the major differences.  
 
Whilst there is not space to discuss and unpack the complex issues involved 
in the generational and philosophical shifts towards a more deconstructionist 
tendency in thinking about colonialism,
20
 I would argue that the use of the earlier 
generation of thinkers remains useful for this project on at least two counts. First, 
although it is useful to be appropriately cautious about the effects at reconstructive 
thinking, this does not in itself invalidate the possibilities of reconstruction but only 
how we understand the limits of this practice. Second, as I will argue further in 
Chapter Three, in pursuing a critique of the liberal peace along the question of the 
politics of recognition, a more reconstructive line is essentially required given the 
state of the present debate. Throughout however, I will use the terms ‘anti-colonial’ 
or ‘decolonising’ rather than ‘post-colonial’ to distinguish these aims. This is not a 
justification that may necessarily satisfy those sceptical of the value of anti-colonial 
thinking – particularly those that see its affirmative tendencies as smacking of 
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romantic anachronism. For these readers, I can only plead patience to the point 
where these thinkers are used within the project, as to a judgement of their value to 
helping to understand the liberal peace.  
 
One final note needs to be made regarding other anti-colonial thinkers who 
might equally have been included as being of a potentially similar generation and 
bent, such as CLR James. On this issue, I must defer in part to the space and time 
available for doing the research – James’ position is sufficiently complex and 
different from the concerns of the others that inclusion would not necessarily have 
helped complete my argument. This is not to say at all that Fanon, Cabral and 
Césaire did not have some major differences in their philosophical outlooks, and to 
a large extent their intellectual and political journeys were quite different. However, 
as I hope Chapter Three will demonstrate, there are some very interesting areas of 
legible overlap which can provide an inspirational basis for critically analysing 
intervention. I do not doubt that I might have reached a similar position using 
different thinkers altogether; although presently I am not in a position to say who 
these might have been, nor how this might have ended differently. Moreover, that 
would not have been as transparent a representation of the journey that has actually 
been made. However, I do hope that the arguments and discussions in the following 
chapters do at least define and illuminate some of the issues at stakes in a 
sufficiently interesting and useful manner to have made the journey worthwhile. 
 
IV.     Pursuing critique through an extended illustration 
 
Whilst many of the core concerns in the thesis are established through the 
anti-colonial critique of the liberal peace debate and the philosophical reconstruction 
of subjecthood, an important aspect of this reconstruction is the single extended 
illustrative example of Mozambique and the experiences of intervention. In this 
section, I will briefly discuss why such an illustration is required and why 
Mozambique is an appropriate site for doing so.  
 
The major point that will become clear through Chapters Two to Four is that 
the majority of the existing critiques of the liberal peace have systematically failed, 
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for various reasons, to engage the histories, views, experiences and political 
responses of those who are the targets of intervention. I suggest that this is both a 
problem for the politics of critique, which is in danger of reinforcing the primacy of 
the subjecthood of the West, and for its analytic assessment of intervention, which 
either focuses on interveners’ own assessments of what has taken place or assumes 
that intervention has broadly succeeded in its goals. It is difficult to see how such 
narratives can provide a basis for a radical critique of the liberal peace which 
recognises the target populations as political subjects and authoritative interpreters 
of the experiences of intervention.
21
 Such a critique is, I argue, more powerful in 
dislodging the claims to authority of intervention practices. 
 
As such, an integral part of a critical alternative which argues for a 
reconstruction of subjecthood is to illustrate some of what this misses in political 
and analytic terms with reference to actual interventions. However, given the space 
constraints of the thesis and the need to engage as deeply as possible with the site in 
question, only one national site of intervention is used. This is consistent with the 
need articulated in the discussion in Chapters Three and Four to reflect on 
intervention from a necessarily situated rather than abstract perspective. This 
requires a certain amount of intellectual commitment and engagement which would 
have been difficult to divide between several sites in this project. Moreover, it is 
helpful in being able to explore the multiplicity of dimensions of both subjecthood 
and intervention in any one place. 
 
Mozambique was initially selected on two related grounds. As a example 
selected to develop a critique of intervention, in the language of methodology texts 
it represented a ‘hard case’ in which to make the argument – one where the 
intervention of the international community has coincided with the cessation of 
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improved the depth of critical engagement with intervention and in Heathershaw’s case offered 
interesting theoretical departures as well. 
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violent conflict, the holding of regular elections, the rebuilding of state institutions, 
impressive rates of economic growth and macroeconomic stabilisation, an increase 
in the numbers and sizes of civil society organisations, the attraction of foreign 
investment, the awarding of a ‘good governance’ prize to its former President, a 
sizeable fall in the level of absolute poverty and so on.  It regularly gets cited within 
policy documents as a representation of precisely what can be achieved through the 
correct type of engagement,
22
 and for others can be seen to represent the ‘new 
African state’.23 Yet, Graham Harrison has argued that Mozambique is a 
‘governance state’, meaning one with a constitutive penetration of the international 
institutions of neoliberalism in the state structure.
24
 Therefore, to engage with 
Mozambique as a place with its own history, forms of political consciousness and 
experience is to potentially upset the account of the liberal peace as a whole in terms 
of a key success story.  
 
Other critics agree on this to the extent that for them, Mozambique is also 
representative of the wide-ranging power of the liberal peace. However, compared 
to a much larger number of books and articles dealing with Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Cambodia and East Timor,
25
 there are only a few examples of extended engagement 
with it within the literature which speaks to the debate. In one such example, 
Duffield reads Mozambique as a major site of the unfolding of the liberal peace, 
emphasising in particular the role of NGOs being part of the governmental process 
and the visions of the peasantry that these organisations relied upon.
26
 Cahen also 
provides a chapter in the Making States Work volume, and Paris provides a short 
analysis in At War’s End.27 Cahen, a specialist on Mozambique rather than 
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intervention, asked by the editors to provide an analysis of its success story for the 
volume, argues for an only qualified success with regard to societal involvement in 
reconstruction. In his treatment, Paris argues that given the shallow domestic roots 
of the war, it does not provide a basis for assessing the outcomes of liberal 
peacebuilding, although it can be considered largely successful in general terms. 
Finally, in the recent Whose Peace? volume, Cramer argues that its labour markets 
have been roundly neglected by intervention policies and the imaginaries of 
interveners.
28
 Collectively, these book chapters (or half-chapter for Paris) offer 
much in the way of comment and insight on liberal peace interventions in 
Mozambique but are necessarily short and specific in terms of their focus. As such, 
there appeared to be space in the literature for a more extended engagement. This 
provides a second reason for engaging with it in this thesis. 
 
Putting the rationale thus, I am aware, makes it sound as if the illustrative 
effort with regard to Mozambique has been subordinate to, or worked in after, the 
conceptual work around the liberal peace. This is, however, not a true reflection of 
the genealogy of the ideas, nor of its role in the thesis. It was partly the strong sense 
of disjuncture between the existing literature and the site of intervention brought on 
by the first visit to Mozambique that shaped the critiques developed in Chapters 
Two and Three. As Chapter Four will elaborate further, the situations and peoples 
being researched have a tendency to push back against the researcher’s 
preconceptions and ideas. I have certainly felt this push from the material gathered 
in Mozambique as building pressure on the conceptual framework, which seemed to 
demand that the reconstruction of subjecthood occupy a central place. I have tried as 
far as possible to keep faith with this pressure in the writing process and in the 
argument of the thesis. In particular, the ways in which I reconstruct some different 
aspects of subjecthood within Mozambique reflect dimensions of the research that 
seemed to sit awkwardly with the narratives that had been developed in the critical 
literature thus far.  
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V. The central question and structure of the thesis 
 
To return to the issues raised at the outset of this introduction, the central 
question of the thesis can be stated simply thus:  
 
‘What can an anti-colonial perspective contribute to critiques of liberal 
peace interventions?’  
 
The answer that I offer might be also be simply summarised as ‘A reconstruction of 
subjecthood in target societies’.  These issues represent the primary preoccupations 
of the research. Over the course of the thesis, both the question and the answer are 
unpacked and developed into various subordinate questions and answers, both 
conceptually and empirically. The obvious subordinate questions will ask what 
critiques of liberal peace interventions consist of, what is missing from them, how 
one can define an anti-colonial perspective, and how this can be understood to relate 
to the liberal peace debate.  In terms of the answers, I will seek to elaborate what 
subjecthood is and why it is important to an anti-colonial perspective, what its 
reconstruction involves, and what results from such reconstructions. I hope by the 
end of the thesis to have demonstrated the importance of both question and answer 
in terms of the liberal peace debate specifically, as well as to have explored issues 
relevant to how we think about world politics more generally. The main contribution 
of the work, I hope, is to articulate where the limits of the present critical 
imagination are and to offer a worked-out perspective as to how these limits might 
be exceeded. In the remainder of this introductory discussion, I will briefly cover the 
structure of the thesis which will provide a route map for the arguments to come.  
 
The thesis begins with a brief history of recent Western thinking about 
practices of conflict management in the last two decades. The promised containment 
of violence and the bringing of peace fundamentally underpinned much of the 
political and ethical legitimacy that practices of intervention claimed around the 
world. In this first chapter I show how this ambitious agenda was informed by a 
range of different ideas which evolved over time to reflect a changing political 
environment, and which became manifested in a particular constellation of ideas and 
practices known as the liberal peace. The genealogy shows that this constellation 
28 
 
was not consistently a ‘liberal’ set of ideas but a particular combination of 
discourses of developmentalism, therapy, humanitarianism, securitisation and 
bureaucratisation, informed and influenced by contemporary political events.  
 
The second chapter engages with important works in the critical debate on 
the ‘liberal peace’ that have problematized the liberal peace as a system of 
ideologically driven interventions seeking social transformation and domination 
over its intended subjects. In this chapter I seek to draw out some of the core 
conceptual wagers of the critical literature and explore its limitations and 
exclusions. Despite a strong anti-imperial and anti-hegemonic ethic emergent in this 
literature, I argue that it has systematically marginalised the societies targeted by the 
liberal peace as potential subjects of politics. As such, it has reproduced some of the 
Eurocentric tendencies of the intervention it critiques. Across the first two chapters, 
in laying out the debate around intervention, the ground is then prepared for 
thinking about what an anti-colonial approach might contribute. 
 
In the third chapter, I offer a reading of insights from Fanon, Césaire and 
Cabral, noting in particular and how they responded to the conceptual Eurocentrism 
that underpinned previous critiques of imperialism.  Specifically, these emphasise a 
distinctive understanding of the political subject as embodied, the need for multi-
dimensional frameworks of analysis and a new humanist ethics that re-centre the 
subjects of domination themselves as a better point of departure for critical inquiry. 
These aspects speak to some of the problematic aspects of critique within the liberal 
peace, reframing some of the issues in hand. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I develop more defined strategies for reconstructing 
subjecthood that emerge from the conceptual insights of Chapter Three. These are 
reconstructing historical presence, engaging with complex forms of political 
consciousness, and exploring concrete dimensions of material experience. This 
approach aims to re-position the target society of the liberal peace as the primary 
subject of analysis, which uses many different sources to develop a ‘situated’ 
understanding of social and political relations.  In this chapter I also discuss the use 
of sources and confront some of the issues around interpretive research that may 
have inhibited other people working on the liberal peace from venturing too far into 
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it. The third and fourth chapters thus provide the conceptual grounding in anti-
colonial thought as a philosophical orientation and as also providing specific 
strategies for reconstructing subjecthood in a study of liberal peace intervention.  
 
The next four chapters of the thesis aim to reconstruct various dimensions of 
subjecthood in Mozambique with respect to its experiences of intervention. The fifth 
chapter is dedicated to a reconstruction of Mozambique’s historical presence, which 
I argue substantially undermines the a-historical narratives of both liberal peace 
interventions and the critiques of those interventions. Beyond the general 
importance of ‘decolonising Mozambique’s history’ and making this history visible, 
there are specifically interesting dimensions of continuity in aspects of political 
authority, public administration and political economy which can be read across 
different periods, and which undermine the claim that the liberal peace represented a 
radical agenda of social transformation. This historical chapter also provides a 
platform for the discussions in the following chapters.  
 
The sixth chapter aims to reconstruct people in Mozambique as situated 
political subjects, and does so through elaborating an account of non-unitary 
political consciousnesses around the issue of corruption. I argue that in discussing 
questions of corruption, people draw creatively on a range of historical and 
contemporary ideas and resources for making political claims. These often 
ultimately exceed the boundaries of the debate established by interveners, and 
undermine the assumption in the critical liberal peace debate that they have been 
‘co-opted’ by intervention. Rather, by actually engaging with what is expressed 
through different forms of political consciousness, we must re-think the ways in 
which critique sets up political divisions between the ‘liberal’ and its ‘locals’, and 
instead confront the substance of the political contestation.  
 
In the seventh chapter, I reconstruct some of the dimensions of the concrete 
material experiences of the liberal peace as given through interviews and other 
forms of sustained engagement. Whilst the critical debate on the liberal peace has 
focused on the liberal peace intervention as a global promoter of neoliberal policy, 
here I focus on the consciousness of highly unequal material relations that underpins 
the negotiation of this policy and the industry supported by it. Through 
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reconstructing the subject experiences of these relations, I suggest that it is may be 
necessary to move towards a sharper critique of its underlying distributive dynamics 
and disturbing redistributive impacts, which are indicative of particular systems of 
entitlement within intervention. 
 
The last empirical chapter reconstructs the concrete material experiences of 
the peasantry as subjects under intervention. Some of the critiques of the liberal 
peace have argued that ‘welfare’ or social insurance, implicitly or explicitly to be 
provided by the state, is what is missing under liberal peace interventions for the 
masses. However, in exploring the responses and strategies of the ‘non-insured’ 
populations in rural Mozambique there appears to be much ambivalence about what 
can be expected from the state and from interveners, based on the chequered history 
of such interventions. As such, a desired antidote to the neoliberal policies for 
agriculture may not be the construction of a welfare state but a de-centred 
understanding of political authority and autonomy, such as that elaborated via the 
‘food sovereignty’ movement. Engaging the peasantry as a situated subject thus 
requires a reckoning with the ambivalent character of distant forms of power and 
authority.  
 
In conclusion, the final chapter reflects and builds on the insights that an 
anti-colonial engagement with intervention contributes to the liberal peace debate 
through the reconstruction and rethinking of subjecthood. It argues that in 
reconstructing the subjecthood of societies targeted by interventions, it is possible to 
go beyond the introverted and Eurocentric discussion of its politics that has thus far 
characterised the debate, and get more directly into the specific forms of 
contestation, alienation, accumulation and distribution that intervention practices 
engender.  Such an approach asks critics to think again and think harder about what 
is at stake when looking at relations between a wealthy set of countries and 
institutions, and the societies targeted by their improvement agendas. Such stakes 
also change the possibilities for solidaristic, humanist engagement on such issues, 
and open up a future-oriented agenda for critical thinking. 
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Chapter One 
The liberal peace? A brief intellectual history of international 
conflict management, 1990-2010
29
 
 
 
 
The term ‘the liberal peace’ refers to the dominant intellectual framework 
currently applied to post-Cold War policies and practices of post-conflict 
intervention.  As Heathershaw observes, its use within academic and policy analysis 
has sometimes tended, misleadingly, to claim that the liberal peace has had only a 
singular logic or set of assumptions.
30
 However, as both he and Call and Cousens 
note, there are gradations of this logic entailed in the ‘liberal peace’ most clearly 
evident in the shift between peacebuilding and state-building as modes of conflict 
management.
31
 Building on this theme, this chapter develops an alternative 
historical overview of the ways in which the ideas and practices of international 
conflict management evolved over the last twenty years within the policy 
communities of intergovernmental organisations, NGOs and wealthy governments. 
These shifts and expansions reflect something rather more complex, and perhaps 
more opaque, than a hardening or deepening of an obviously ‘liberal’ logic in 
intervention – rather they reveal a reflexive anxiety about the inadequacy of this 
logic to address seemingly intractable challenges of conflict, insecurity and 
underdevelopment. By tracking the recent evolution of these discourses and the 
critiques of the paradigm, this chapter unpacks the political and intellectual 
backstory to the ideas and practices of ‘the liberal peace’. 
 
The chapter begins by exploring the intellectual and political climate of the 
early 1990s and the founding principles of ‘peacebuilding’ as articulated by the UN, 
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before showing how these were lost almost immediately in the mid-1990s to both 
unfolding global events and new discourses about the chaos and anarchy associated 
with failing states. This had important linkages with changing discourses in other 
aspects of institutional intervention, including the turn within the international 
financial institutions towards the question of ‘governance’. Connected to a resurgent 
interest in ‘grassroots’ and ‘bottom-up’ interventions, therapeutic discourses and 
practices dealing with trauma, healing and reconciliation became a strong element 
of discourses around peacebuilding. At this time an increasingly broad set of actors, 
including humanitarian and transitional justice agencies, became involved and the 
consolidation of ‘liberal peace’ practices was enabled. In the last ten years, however, 
renewed interest in the question of state fragility and the principles of state-building 
has become pervasive not just in responses to conflict but the governance of the 
global South more generally.  In conclusion the chapter offers some reflections on 
the current historical juncture and how this might shape understandings of conflict 
management. 
 
I. UN Peacebuilding, the early years:  from social justice to state collapse 
 
In the late 1980s, third-party post-war interventions were seen as the basic 
preserve of the UN. The end of the Cold War was a watershed moment for the 
organisation, and in particular for its Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 
Having been paralysed from all but minimal activity due to the exercise of Security 
Council vetoes, it found itself launching fourteen new operational missions between 
1988 and 1992, compared to none in the previous ten years.
32
 Whilst some of these 
operations followed the logic of traditional peacekeeping – mainly ceasefire 
monitoring – others began to foreshadow the more comprehensive, 
multidimensional and transformative operations that would become the hallmark of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. Early apparent successes in Nicaragua (1990) and 
Namibia (1990), involving relatively light-touch and well-defined missions in 
already-post-conflict environments emboldened the UN to take a more proactive 
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stance in not just deterring violence but in shaping the nature of the peace to come, 
through shepherding elections and demobilisation.  
 
It was in this context that Boutros-Ghali’s groundbreaking 1992 Agenda for 
Peace statement was delivered. Taken widely as the foundational text for the policy 
of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’, it defined it as “action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence 
and well-being among people”.33 In this text could clearly be seen an understanding 
of conflict that was based on structural violence and social grievance as the 
generative causes, with economic development and political freedom intended as the 
appropriate remedies: 
 
Our aims must be:  
…; 
- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: 
rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war 
and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations 
formerly at war; 
- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: 
economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.
34
  
 
Indeed, Agenda for Peace was, in defining the term ‘peacebuilding,’ about re-
envisioning a role for the UN as a progressive, autonomous agent of peace, 
development and global justice after years of marginalisation. This theme is 
reinforced in the text itself through an explicit connection of the peace agenda to the 
contemporaneous Rio Summit and the proposed World Forum for Social 
Development. Establishing ‘peacebuilding’ as a defined and distinctive activity 
grounded in the apparently universal aspiration of solving conflict was intended, 
perhaps successfully in the short-term, to channel the growing Western attention 
towards these issues into a blossoming multilateral progressive consensus for 
peacemaking, development and social justice. 
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However, this new mandate became almost immediately besieged by events 
which demonstrated the split between its transformative ambitions and the shape of 
political events. Even as Boutros-Ghali gave his speech in June 1992, the violence 
in Bosnia was accelerating, and five months later Savimbi would defect from the 
UN’s carefully-chaperoned electoral process in Angola, prompting extensive 
caution and delay in the Mozambique mission. In 1993, UN troops and 
humanitarian workers would be ambushed in Somalia, leading to the re-deployment 
of US troops and the Black Hawk Down incidents, resulting in the US withdrawal 
and little appetite to involve itself in international peacemaking. The tragic and 
egregious failures of UNAMIR in Rwanda in early 1994 seemed to underscore the 
gulf between Boutros-Ghali’s projections for building peace and the mood of the 
contributing states, whilst the massacre at Srebenica in 1995 seemed to call into 
question the point of UN peacekeeping altogether. In particular, cracks were 
beginning to show between the expanded mandate for peacekeeping forces and their 
ability to deliver humanitarian and political projects, which were clearly limited.  
 
These peacekeeping failures had a knock-on effect on the ideas governing 
the expansion of peacebuilding, as the implications of a more ambitious peace 
operations agenda became clearer. Strangely, however, this did not produce a pull-
back from the extended agenda, but a ramping-up of activity, ambition and 
response. More actors were involved, and asked to undertake a wider range of tasks. 
As reflected in the rather less exuberant Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, 
failures were rationalised through the perception that the nature of conflict was 
changing, from interstate to intrastate, and into chaotic, unmanageable situations 
where state institutions had collapsed:  
 
Another feature of such conflicts is the collapse of state institutions, 
especially the police and judiciary, with resulting paralysis of 
governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and 
chaos. Not only are the functions of government suspended, its assets are 
destroyed or looted and experienced officials are killed or flee the 
country. This is rarely the case in inter-state wars. It means that 
international intervention must extend beyond military and humanitarian 
35 
 
tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and the 
re-establishment of effective government. 
35
  
 
Nonetheless, Boutros-Ghali attempted to maintain and protect a traditional UN 
General Assembly discourse that these were necessary precursors to addressing the 
injustices that underlay conflict:  
 
As I pointed out in "An Agenda for Development" (A/48/935), only 
sustained efforts to resolve underlying socio-economic, cultural and 
humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable 
foundation.
36
  
 
As such, the ideological and political foundations for an altogether more 
comprehensive, wide-ranging and co-ordinated effort at the transformation of state 
and society through multilateral multi-dimensional peace operations were being 
laid, even at this early stage, in the political arena. What we see in the Supplement is 
Boutros-Ghali trying to maintain the GA’s Third Worldist vision whilst accepting 
this more pessimistic account of conflict dynamics, which produces the idea that 
intervention has been insufficient rather than overambitious. This movement 
towards a comprehensive reform agenda in post-conflict societies was noted at an 
early stage by academic commentators, who pointed out its potentially radical 
implications.
37
  
 
II. Managing Global Chaos? The emergence of a field  
 
Simultaneously with this new departure in UN thinking, the silos that that 
had been established in academia between ‘peace studies’ and ‘security studies’ 
through the 1970s and 1980s had also begun to break down. In particular, peace 
studies was rescued from its political obscurity and engaged with in the service of 
this new international agenda for peace, in particular with theories of human need
38
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and social grievances
39
 informing these early, Third World-friendly readings of 
conflict held by multilateral organisations. These readings of conflict held out the 
promise of peaceful resolution of conflict along just and politically emancipatory 
lines. These were seen to correspond with the democracy and development agendas 
of the UN that underpinned the Agenda for Peace and provided a basic rationale for 
the how and why of peacebuilding envisaged as progressive social transformation.  
 
Avenues of research based on broadening the intervention agenda along 
these lines also emerged from this tradition. They began to generate a 
comprehensive account of peace-related interventions that would be facilitated by 
this more expansive peacebuilding programme. Academic debates about conflict 
prevention and early warning,
40
 the management of mediation processes,
41
 the 
involvement of humanitarian actors,
42
 and the importance of human rights 
underpinned the increasingly comprehensive and holistic role peacebuilding 
practices were beginning to assume around conflict. Slowly, this set of concerns 
began to develop independent momentum as an industry, with various funding 
streams and research streams coalescing around this agenda. For example, large 
collaborations such as the UNRISD’s War-Torn Societies Project (1994-1998) and 
the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1994-1999) were tasked 
with developing and bringing together work on conflict prevention and resolutions 
specifically to address what was seen as the worrying increase in the prevalence of 
intrastate conflict.  
 
The substance of the first United States Institute for Peace collected volume 
Managing Global Chaos gives us an interesting snapshot of the moment and 
captures some of the core intellectual trends which supported this expansion of the 
notion of peacebuilding, as understood by the peace studies community.
43
  The 
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volume itself is divided into sections on the sources of conflict, with prominence 
given both to ‘structural’ explanations and social-psychological explanations, a 
large second section on traditional means of diplomacy, collective security, 
peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, a sizeable third section on conflict 
management via mediation, conflict prevention and problem-solving, and a final, 
briefer section on the consolidation of peace and the need for custodianship of the 
post-settlement phase. The drawing together of these questions in a single textbook 
volume announced assertively the presence of a coherent, professional and focused 
field of conflict analysis and peace-based interventions, and strongly echoed the 
political climate in which it was believed that improving knowledge of conflict and 
peace processes would enable a willing international community to resolve these 
problems. At the time, critique of the paradigm, such as it existed, was highly 
focused on the technical questions of sequencing and speed, albeit with some 
consciousness of its politics.
44
 
 
However, even as the field began to cohere, the optimism of these 
approaches in foreign policy circles was also tested by the events of the 1990s. The 
intellectual and policy climate in Washington in on conflict and post-conflict 
situations grew darker, beginning to reflect a growing perception of global collapse 
and chaos. A parallel worldview began to emerge in this period, particularly from 
the security community during and after the problems of Somalia and Rwanda, in 
which it was argued that the UN apparatus was ill-equipped to deal with conflict. 
Publications in this vein included ex-US Government advisers Helman and Ratner’s 
influential and provocative Foreign Policy  article on ‘Saving Failed States’,45 
Robert Kaplan’s ‘The Coming Anarchy’46 and Zartman’s edited volume Collapsed 
States: the disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority.
47
 Although 
arguing in different modes, they collectively signalled a belief in a world that was, 
outside the West, subject to deep disorder and spinning further adrift from the state 
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authority and order of the Cold War era. Rather, these states were seen as no longer 
‘transitioning’ but ‘failed’ or ‘failing’, presenting a threat to regional and global 
security.  
 
 Although ostensibly coming from different places, these different intellectual 
traditions – peace studies and security studies respectively – nonetheless pushed 
international multilateral policy on conflict in a more or less consistent direction. 
Broadly speaking, it was a view that based on superior knowledge, deeper 
involvement, more commitment and the use of force where necessary, the 
international community could and should undertake more comprehensive and 
extensive interventions to secure global peace.  This broad consensus became a 
basic truism of what came to be understood in later years as ‘the liberal peace’, 
based on an underlying faith in the links between ‘development’ and ‘security’.  
 
 
III. Institutionalisation: the turn to governance 
 
 Whilst the new preoccupations with peacebuilding and state failure were 
beginning to animate the academic peace and security communities during the 
1990s, the economic development community was also beginning to move in a 
similar direction. As Williams and Young note, in the early 1990s the international 
financial institutions, and particularly the World Bank, became quickly and deeply 
interested in questions of ‘good governance’, which it characterised as pertaining to 
the technical functional requirements of modern statehood, moving the institution 
towards a much more maximalist interpretation of its mandates for promoting 
‘efficiency’.48 This allowed it, in the framework of articles forbidding involvement 
in non-economic affairs, to become involved in legal reforms, bureaucratic reforms 
within the state, the promotion of civil society and so on. These were significant 
departures in terms of both the ideas and practices of the Bank that underscored the 
end of an uncontrolled market orthodoxy and a shift towards a more regulatory 
approach. This shift precipitated a rapid expansion of sectoral activities and a much 
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deeper embedding in the governments of recipient states, such that they became 
perceived in some quarters as part of the permanent state apparatus itself.
49
  
 
There were clear parallels between the expansion of this agenda and the 
expansion of the peace and security agendas, which connected the phenomena of 
conflict and underdevelopment to having their roots in a malfunctioning political 
society in need of detailed and externally-driven reform. Indeed, in practice these 
structures of external governance were deeply connected at the level of national 
missions, with powerful co-ordination mechanisms being established, such as the 
International Committee for the Reconstruction of Cambodia, which brought 
together the peacekeeping mission structures with the international financial 
institutions and other donor governments’ agencies.50 Although in theory these 
mechanisms were subordinate to national governments, in practice they were often 
the centre of political decision-making in the post-war periods. 
 
Connected with this practical merger between conflict management and 
economic reform was also the growth of international political discourses about 
sovereignty as responsibility, which sought to provide a legal-political orientation 
for the increasingly interventionist climate.
51
 A symptom of this new discourse was 
the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty. Apparently informed and justified by the need for 'no more Rwandas', 
this eminent group of lawyers and experts represented the attempt to find a way to 
square the problem of the norm of non-intervention with the apparent moral need to 
intervene, and as such provide a standing basis for humanitarian and other forms of 
intervention.
 52
 These conceptual adjustments to the political status of sovereignty 
followed on from, amongst other events, the rapid growth of the de facto role of the 
Office of the High Representative in Bosnia from 1995, which took on an increasing 
number of binding governmental powers as part of the Bonn Agreement in 1997, 
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and the establishment of the UN protectorates in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. 
The mandates for the presence in Kosovo and East Timor were unprecedented in 
terms of powers being comprehensively and indefinitely devolved to the UN SRSG 
until such time as self-government could be established.
53
 Yet they were continuous 
with – and perhaps the logical conclusion of – the discourses that had been 
developing over the previous years, both in terms of the primacy of the 
‘governance’ agenda within the peace, security and development institutions and the 
notion of sovereignty as responsibility.   
 
IV. Turbulent Peace? Reconciliation and healing in the wake of conflict 
 
 Whilst the lofty discourses of the duties of liberal internationalism and 
changing sovereignty norms took place on the stage of ‘high’ state politics54, other 
themes of trauma, illness and healing informed a parallel and more doveish 
academic and practitioner discourse towards conflict emerging during the 1990s, 
which sought a more conciliatory, at times therapeutic, approach to intervention. 
Indeed, this discourse was also present in the Supplement, which referred to the 
potential for peacebuilding for “healing the wounds after conflict has occurred”.55 
This began to inflect the core peacebuilding literature. For example, Krishna Kumar, 
writing from within the United States Agency for International Development, 
framed peacebuilding essentially as the political, economic and social 
‘rehabilitation’ to address the needs of “countries shattered by war”, reflecting very 
much how certain kinds of practitioners saw their role.
56
  
 
The notion of 'rehabilitation' was consistent with the medicalisation of 'war-
torn societies' as patients or wards of the international community, essentially 
incapacitated and unable to manage.
57
 In these discourses, the international 
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community's presence was also viewed as curative and restorative in the wake of 
conflict – a position which resonated with the way that NGOs in particular had 
come to see their expanded presence in the global South. This conceptualised 
peacebuilding as being essentially continuous with humanitarian assistance, 
administered to the needy out of an ethic of care and based on a human security 
framework.
58
 This then became compatible with the tradition whereby 
peacebuilding, alongside humanitarian assistance and other forms of care work had 
roots in a sense of practical moral vocation as well as, or perhaps instead of, a 
political intervention. In many senses this was a substantive critique of the 
geopolitics that had determined Western assistance strategies in the past. 
 
 A cognate emphasis on reconciliation and healing also emerged from 
practitioners such as John Paul Lederach who had come from a Christian humanist 
background and worked at ‘grassroots’ levels in Central America. Lederach in 
particular advocated for a multi-modal and multi-level form of peacebuilding in 
which all levels of society, comprising the elites, mid-level and grassroots, would 
engage in different forms of peacebuilding and reconciliation.
59
 This kind of 
rationale was applied by many practitioners to their interpretations of Rwanda’s 
famous gacaca trials, which could be seen as a form of community-level healing 
process.
60
 More generally, these kinds of discourses provided the basis for an 
increased role for transitional justice and human rights mechanisms under the 
umbrella notion of ‘sustainable peace’, which emphasised a need to remake social 
relations in a more just way in the wake of conflict, in a way which would deter 
future human rights abuses.
61
   
  
 For a brief time this approach was included more prominently in mainstream 
thinking about conflict management. The second edition of the USIP textbook 
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Turbulent Peace amended its last section to reflect this new focus, calling it 
“Peacebuilding: From Settlement to Reconciliation”, and included pieces from 
Lederach and others working on the reconciliation and rehabilitation paradigms.
62
  
Although motivated by a distinctive view of conflict and the needs of post-conflict 
societies, these ideas of peacebuilding fit with existing deliberations on conflict 
management insofar as they tended to validate in a different way a need for third 
party involvement in post-conflict societies, whilst simultaneously emphasising the 
need for this to be a ‘grassroots’ affair. In this vision, third parties play the roles of 
counsellors or therapists, facilitating a process of self-knowledge, or of advocates in 
the search for justice. Importantly, this was not received in practice as intellectually 
or operationally incompatible with the existing views that third parties should be 
seen as experts in conflict management, governance and political order. Rather, the 
emphasis on holism underpinned a diversification of third party approaches and the 
expansion of opportunities for intervention.  If Managing Global Chaos was a 
disciplinary intervention to reinforce the potential of conflict management 
strategies, Turbulent Peace seemed to demonstrate that approaches from different 
traditions might nonetheless be brought together under the same intellectual and 
practical umbrella. With the publication of the first edition of Ramsbotham, Miall 
and Woodhouse’s Contemporary Conflict Resolution in 1999 we also see an 
affirmation of this as a multi-dimensional humanitarian agenda.
63
 
 
 
V. The consolidation of ‘liberal peace’ interventions 
 
These various developments – a belief in the potential for conflict 
management through peacebuilding, an emphasis on reform of institutions and 
governance, an identification of sovereignty as responsibility, a belief in the 
interconnections between security and development, and the possibility of healing 
social divisions therapeutically – collectively constituted the intellectual foundations 
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of the practices understood in the debate as ‘liberal peace interventions’ or the 
liberal ‘peacebuilding consensus’.64  As noted, in the earlier days of peacebuilding 
missions themselves, practices appeared limited to demobilisation, the relatively 
quick holding of elections and the monitoring of ceasefires, which ran alongside IFI 
activities to liberalise the economy. Paris argues that these were driven by a single 
ideological paradigm of liberal internationalism.
65
 Yet, as the agenda became 
rapidly more complex, flexible and politically prominent, a much wider set of 
activities were rolled into a very broad conception of conflict management in 
‘fragile’ states, including more extensive governance reforms, more multi-
dimensional development strategies, transitional justice mechanisms, legal reforms, 
strategies for grassroots empowerment and so on. While these retained a broad 
adherence to a ‘liberal internationalist’ agenda, they became much more diverse and 
flexible. Naturally, given the itinerant character of many personnel involved in 
intervention missions, these missions began more and more to resemble each other 
programmatically; it would not have been unusual to see programmes and strategies 
recycled more or less directly from one context to another. Thus the pursuit of the 
liberal peace maintained much practical as well as ideological cohesion in various 
missions across the world. 
 
Importantly, such interventions and practices often became open-ended; 
missions in various countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Cambodia became 
basically permanently deployed and normalised into relations of co-operation 
between international institutions, Western donor agencies and host governments. 
These showed some evidence of a trend of what Paris endorsed as 
institutionalisation before liberalisation (IBL)
66
 – that is, a much greater emphasis 
on international stewardship of governance reform, although in practice this was 
before, during and after any relevant liberalisation processes. By the end of 1990s 
and the beginning of following decade, the practice and theory of liberal peace 
interventions had perhaps reached their most ambitious point, whereby conflict 
management was understood to be a complex task requiring very precise and expert-
led sequencing of a wide set of reforms within state and society in order to prevent 
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future violence. Even in those cases where the risk of renewed violence was not 
necessarily seen as immediate, such as in Mozambique for much of the 1990s, the 
occasional ‘scare’ over contested elections or public protests seemed to reinforce the 
need for further political and electoral reform.
67
 As such, there was little evidence of 
interventions diminishing in terms of ambition, even once the initial UN missions 
had apparently completed and wound up their missions. For example, the UN in 
Mozambique has maintained the presence of at least twenty distinctive agencies to 
the present day despite the end of mission in 1994.
68
 
 
VI. Leashing the Dogs of War! 9/11 and state-building reloaded 
 
9/11 and the subsequent official securitisation of “failed states” in the US’s 
National Security Strategy 2002 had a definitive effect on the intellectual and 
political direction of the intervention debate. Whereas in the immediate run-up to 
this period, the conflict management field had taken a turn towards the conciliatory 
and holistic, in its aftermath there was an almost comprehensive turn towards the 
ideas of ‘state-building’. As shown earlier, concerns about ‘failed states’ had formed 
part of academic and institutional conflict management discourses since the mid 
1990s and in this sense were not ‘new’. What was different in this period was their 
rapid ascendance to prominence through their clear integration in the interventionist 
policies of the United States in.
69
 Furthermore, this was now compounded through 
an apparent expansion of expertise in questions of governance amongst the IFIs. As 
such, discussion of ‘state-building’ as an independent object of concern greatly 
expanded. Although this change initially corresponded with a depiction of the 
regimes in pre-invasion Baghdad and Kabul as ‘failed’, it was the experience of 
suddenly disbanding Iraqi state personnel and watching the ensuing chaos that 
renewed interest in how to ‘fix’ failed states.   
 
                                                 
67
 Weinstein, J. M. (2002). Mozambique: a fading UN success story. Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 
141-156. 
68
 These can be viewed on UN Mozambique, (2011) Delivering as One, Retrieved 12
th
 December 
2011 from http://mz.one.un.org/eng  
69
 See Mallaby, S. (2002). The reluctant imperialist: terrorism, failed states, and the case for 
American empire. Foreign Affairs 81(2): 2-7 for a widely circulated and clear exposition of the 
political rationale connecting state failure and US interventionism.  
45 
 
This new focus on state-building and governance was pronounced amongst 
the policy community, with governmental agencies such as USAID and the UK’s 
Department for International Development both issuing new guidelines and 
frameworks about engaging with ‘fragile states’, which came to dominate their 
political activity across all cases of engagement and funding streams for research.
70
 
The World Bank adopted ‘state-building’ as one of the principal objectives for the 
organisation, and also began to fund initiatives that would extend its competence in 
the area.
71
 In a move that symbolised the new hierarchy, the OECD began to define 
state-building as an overarching process of developing state-society relations which 
it needed to support beyond peacebuilding.
72
  
 
 Quite suddenly, the field of conflict management became overwhelmed by 
rapidly proliferating literature on the question of state-building, state failure and its 
implications for potential interveners.
73
 In this literature, there was a general 
consensus that ‘state-building’ meant constructing “effective, legitimate institutions 
of governance”,74 though there were disagreements about the meaning of each of 
these terms, and what constructing them would entail. For example, Rotberg defined 
governance as “the effective provision of political goods to citizens”.75  Such a 
reading seemed to be at odds with standing definitions used in organisations such as 
the World Bank, which defined it as “the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised”.76 As the state-building debate continued, more 
sociologically-informed thinkers reacted to the co-optation of Weber’s definition of 
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the state into a more narrowly defined conception of legitimacy based on liberal 
democracy.
77
 This was perhaps unsurprising given the ongoing failures of the new 
regimes in Baghdad and Kabul to win popular support despite the widely-touted 
electoral processes.   
 
 Once more this change in intellectual direction in the field was reflected in 
USIP’s compendium on conflict management.78 In its content, this third volume, 
Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, somewhat 
echoed the turn that had been occurring intellectually and political regarding the 
preoccupation with state-building as the appropriate response to crises. The last 
section, entitled ‘The Uses and Limits of Governance in Conflict Management’ 
focused on the compromises between democracy, stability and sovereignty in 
dealing with failed states, and tellingly jettisoned any reference to ‘peace’ or 
‘reconciliation’. Indeed, this turn away from ‘peace’ was a self-conscious one, 
according to the editors, based on the challenges of a new security environment 
characterised by “terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, rogue states and 
conflict”.79 In exploring these phenomena as primary drivers of conflict and pushing 
issues such as political grievances, resource scarcity and economic opportunities 
further down the list, the volume captured the mood of an intellectual climate that 
was altogether more focused on the perceived security threats to the West than the 
‘resolution’ of conflict. Yet, on the other hand, competing texts such as the second 
edition of the Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse volume sought to preserve the 
more cosmopolitan agenda of conflict resolution against the political tide of 
neoconservative discourses of state-building.
80
  
 
  This new framing of conflict management techniques and concerns had a 
clear knock-on effect for understandings of peacebuilding, where they still existed, 
which sought to maintain the historic discourse that had framed past actions, whilst 
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keen to capture evolving understandings of conflict. This can be seen most clearly in 
the way in which the new UN Peacebuilding Commission (from 2005) framed its 
missions. Whilst on the one hand this body was the inheritor of the older doctrines 
of peacebuilding from Boutros-Ghali, its latest orientations show the changes in the 
intellectual environment. For example, in the strategy document for Burundi, one of 
its few selected cases for sustained activity,  ‘good governance’ is the first listed 
priority for peacebuilding, coming above even the maintenance of the ceasefire, and 
above concern for economic and social reform to address political grievances.
81
 As 
Le Billon notes, concern to fight corruption in particular became mainstreamed in 
peacebuilding practices following high-profile arguments from the IFIs that linked 
governance, security and conflict.
82
 This was a key move in the concretisation of the 
new governance agenda and became a hallmark not just of peacebuilding operations 
but the developmental agenda more broadly.  
 
Since 2001, the overt re-configuration of mainstream academic and political 
discourses and practices of conflict management away from peace and 
reconciliation towards governance and state-building has been substantial and 
systematic, in no small part catalysed by a new post-9/11 security agenda, the 
substantive political problems faced by the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
changing political discourses about the origins of conflict. In this sense, earlier 
critical discussions of the security-development merger proved somewhat prescient 
of the trend which would come into fruition in state-building discourses, although 
they could not have anticipated the urgency with which this would accelerate. 
Historically speaking though, it is consistent with the trends in conflict management 
as a changing set of lenses through which international elite actors have sought to 
diagnose the sources of instability in the South. 
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Conclusions 
 
What we have seen over the last twenty years has been a series of changing 
ideas and discourses about the liberal peace as conflict management, which have 
been premised on the basis of the global North bringing peace to the South through 
various modes of social and political transformation. Many analyses of these 
approaches have identified them in large part as ‘liberal’ in orientation, although as 
we have seen there has been a changing emphasis on what this means in practice. 
This chapter has shown that particular historical and intellectual junctures were 
influential in shaping both practices of conflict management and their critiques. 
 
The fourth USIP volume by Crocker, Hampson and Aall– Rewiring Regional 
Security in a Fragmented World, indicates a lateral step away from the themes of 
the first three volumes.
83
  Whereas these set out analysis and policies premised on a 
global, Western-led form of conflict management and political transformation, the 
fourth volume sets out a more minimalist and fragmented set of regional security 
regimes. This may be an indication that the peacebuilding project has fallen out of 
political favour amongst Western policymakers as the international community feels 
increasingly unable to commit to its demands and objectives. Signs are that the US 
in particular feels itself in a mode of transition and is retrenching its prospects and 
priorities. Even the third edition of Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse recognises 
that the ‘liberal peace’ has undergone a substantial ‘backlash’ or battering over the 
last decade, and that their endorsement of cosmopolitan peacebuilding will have to 
operate in new realities and regional power structures.
84
 
 
Despite the backlash, however, the ‘liberal peace’ as a set of practices has 
also proved itself tenacious and adaptable to various challenges – both to its general 
ideological precepts and to its implementation problems. In each instance, the 
retrenchment seemed to mandate ostensibly longer and deeper interventions into 
state-society relations, with a more extensive programme of reform activities being 
undertaken. The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a historical overview of 
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the emergence of the ‘liberal peace’ as an idea and set of practices. As discussed in 
the Introduction, it is perhaps unsurprising that such a set of activities has provoked 
much in the way of scholarly engagement, both from supportive and more deeply 
critical camps. The next chapter will focus in on the debates amongst the critical 
scholars, which have sought to expose and challenge the self-proclaimed ‘liberal’ 
politics of interventions. 
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Chapter Two 
Critiquing the liberal peace: anti-imperialism and the non-entity of 
the non-Western subject 
 
 
 
Over the last decade, critiques of the ‘liberal peace’ within International 
Relations have provided compelling – and in some cases damning – analyses of its 
political contours and significance. In stark contrast to the technical discussions of 
international policy makers and the reassuring tenor of their academic colleagues 
who research conflict management strategies, the critical literature has 
fundamentally called into question the political significance and legitimacy of the 
liberal peace as a form of global order. Drawing on a variety of ideas and framings 
from critical international relations theory, they have argued broadly against the 
unquestioning pursuit of liberal peace transformations by interveners. Rather they 
have tended to view the liberal peace as the problematic expression of a Western 
hegemony which aims to fundamentally transform political, social and economic 
structures in the non-West into its own image. These critiques have been suspicious 
of the various policy developments outlined in the last chapter, which imagine 
liberal peacebuilding strategies to be more technically knowledgeable, and efficient 
solutions to the linked problems of violent conflict, underdevelopment and state 
weakness. 
 
It is perhaps so obvious that it is rarely acknowledged, but these critiques are 
fundamentally ‘anti-imperial’ in orientation and ethic; that is to say that they derive 
much of their intellectual significance from exposing the tensions between norms 
and ethics of self-determination and sovereignty, and the interventionist discourses 
and practices that constitute the liberal peace. The common charge within the 
critiques of ‘neocolonialism’ or ‘imperialism’ is thus understood as being very 
serious as it implies direct association with an illegitimate form of control and 
exploitation of other peoples which violates the basic political rights and norms of 
the international order. Of course, this is one indictment which defenders of the 
51 
 
liberal peace have felt the need to address urgently in their responses. For example, 
Paris argues that although there are similarities to be drawn between colonialism’s 
civilising mission and the promotion of ‘good governance’, the liberal peace is not 
equivalent to colonialism since it is not undertaken for the direct economic benefit 
of the intervening powers, and that it does more obviously seek to establish the 
conditions for self-government.
85
  Nonetheless, he and others such as Richard 
Caplan acknowledge that the liberal peace amounts in various cases to a form of 
trusteeship.
86
  
 
Needless to say, this has not put to rest critiques of the liberal peace and their 
suspicion of its neo-imperial agenda. Despite a recently growing interest in the 
resistance of the everyday local or subaltern,
87
 what the critiques have failed to 
engage with  is the equally important analytic question of ‘Euro-centrism’ in how 
we frame and research the politics of the liberal peace. This chapter will explore the 
ways in which the critical literature on the liberal peace has thus far, albeit to 
different degrees, tended to reproduce the marginalisation of intervened-upon 
subjects in they it formulates its understanding of the character of political 
hegemony and the appropriate ‘emancipatory’ response to it.88 As such, although the 
critical literature’s perspectives are ‘post-colonial’ or ‘anti-imperial’ in a political 
sense, they could go further in trying to ‘decolonise’ the framework of analysis. In 
this sense, the primary concern in this thesis to decolonise critiques of the liberal 
peace can be seen as a sympathetic but critical extension of post-colonial concerns 
which are already immanent within this debate.  
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This chapter leads off with an examination of the work of several authors 
whose mutually influencing works represent incisive and important contributions to 
the liberal peace critiques – Mark Duffield, Michael Pugh, Oliver Richmond and 
David Chandler.  They are also selected because their contributions have a 
resonance beyond this narrower debate in that they reflect important contemporary 
turns in IR theory. As such this analysis of them may also be understood as an 
intervention in this broader debate on how to conceptualise and understand 
international political space. The discussion will focus on their contributions to the 
critical debates on the ‘liberal peace’ and ‘liberal peacebuilding’ and the ways in 
which their theoretical approaches are constructed and informed – in particular in 
the uses of Foucault, the interpretation of liberalism, the ethics of engagement, the 
question of hybridity and the significance of political economy factors. I will then 
build on the authors’ own concerns and preoccupations to develop a more 
progressive anti-imperial analysis by discussing the problem of Western-centrism in 
the existing critiques, which specifically manifests itself in the silence, invisibility or 
non-entity of people targeted by interventions. Whilst recent work by Roger Mac 
Ginty has gone some way to redressing some of these issues, it has simultaneously 
reproduced others. I argue that we can identify important blind-spots in how the 
debate has unfolded which creates space for a new kind of analytic framing of the 
problem. 
 
 
I. The liberal peace: from discourse to technology of power  
 
 Although the term the ‘liberal peace’ had already had a long history in IR, 
specifically in the context of the neo-Kantian debates on the incidence of war 
amongst democracies,
89
 it was arguably Duffield’s 2001 book Global Governance 
and the New Wars that gave it life as a framework for critically interrogating the 
form of power that had been established by a constellation of Western governments, 
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aid agencies, international financial institutions, security establishments and 
militaries over the global South.
90
  
 
The idea of liberal peace, for example, combines and conflates ‘liberal’ (as in 
contemporary liberal economic and political tenets) with ‘peace’ (the present 
policy predilection towards conflict resolution and societal reconstruction). It 
reflects the existing consensus that conflict in the South is best approached 
through a number of connected, ameliorative, harmonising and, especially, 
transformational measures. While this can include the provision of immediate 
relief and rehabilitation assistance, liberal peace embodies a new or political 
humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and 
prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and 
representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector 
reform in the context of a functioning market economy. In many respects, while 
contested and far from assured, liberal peace reflects a radical developmental 
agenda of social transformation. In this case however, this is an international 
responsibility and not that of an independent or single juridical state.
91
  
 
One of Duffield’s primary arguments is that under the impetus and mandate of 
conflict management strategies for ‘peace’, deep and wide-ranging social 
transformations which are broadly ‘liberal’ are undertaken and legitimated.  Taken 
in isolation, there is not much in this argument with which defenders of the liberal 
peace could necessarily disagree – indeed, as noted in the previous chapter, the 
notion of ‘peacebuilding’ in its original formulation envisaged it as a project of 
social transformation to eliminate the structural causes of violence.
92
 What Duffield 
emphasises however is the specifically political and systemic character of this 
programme for transformation: ‘While the initiatives that make up liberal peace are 
usually understood as being a response to specific needs and requirements, liberal 
peace is a political project in its own right.’[emphasis added] 93 For Duffield, then, 
even though the structure of the liberal peace is disaggregated and its agents 
uncoordinated, it nonetheless represents a recognisable and radical political agenda 
for interventionary transformation. 
 
 Duffield’s complex unpacking of the content and nature of liberal peace as a 
particular kind of political project is what makes his critique especially compelling.  
He understands the liberal peace as an emerging strategic complex between different 
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Western actors, including NGOs, multilateral organisations, donor governments, 
military establishments and multinational corporations, who interact and overlap 
with each other in different ways.
94
  In this complex, various agendas contribute to a 
merging of security and development concerns, the latter of which are themselves to 
be understood as continuous with humanitarian relief. This new strategic complex 
sees these actors’ mandates as becoming broader and more inter-connected in the 
context of this new consensus. These mandates and agendas are also subject to 
constant reinvention in the face of failures which are nonetheless projected as 
success.
95
 In this way, Duffield substantiates the vision of the liberal peace not just 
as a political project but a political project undertaken by a community of strategic 
agents who collectively define the broad space for intervention through a set of 
ever-evolving mandates.  
 
 These mandates reflect conceptual discourses which are themselves in flux. 
As Duffield argues, the meaning of development embedded within liberal peace 
changes the idea from involving a large-scale and state-led process of rapid 
modernisation, more historically prevalent amongst post-colonial governments in 
the Third World, into the promotion of a liberal model of self-management, 
appropriate to a vision of free-market integration.
96
 As such, previous and 
alternative visions of development are de-legitimised as political projects, and 
interveners increasingly tend to promote attitudinal and behavioural change in their 
actions.
97
 This is coupled with a changing vision of the concept of sovereignty, 
under which the nation state is increasingly seen as lacking the competence and 
capacity to carry out the duties of government, and a more politicised and 
developmental conception of humanitarianism.
98
 These discourses emerge in the 
context of a shared political analysis linking conflict and political violence in the 
global South to the problem of underdevelopment, which is a fundamental 
dysfunction in need of remedial liberal intervention. As such, the liberal peace does 
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not tend to differentiate its prescriptions for analysis and intervention in conflict 
situations from developmental situations more broadly.
99
  
 
Within Global Governance and the New Wars, Duffield’s conceptual apparatus 
shows clear signs of influence from Foucaultian frameworks of analysis.
100
 
Specifically, Duffield pays particular attention to the co-constitution, through 
discourse, of the regimes of power and regimes of knowledge that underpin the 
liberal peace. This is a particularly important theme in his conceptualisation of the 
liberal peace, and one which has been deeply influential on subsequent critiques 
including those to be discussed below – namely the idea that the liberal peace is a 
global power-knowledge complex, one which constitutes and incorporates particular 
actors, and enables them to command legitimacy, authority and competence in 
conflict and post-conflict spaces by dominating the discursive and epistemic terrain 
of engagement.
101
 This is an important shared starting point for all the other 
critiques discussed here, particularly those of Richmond and Pugh. This is one of the 
pillars of shared understanding within the critical debate that has allowed a 
discussion to take place. 
 
Duffield also uses Foucaultian concepts to inform his account of the ‘paradox’ 
of liberalism that underpins the liberal peace.
102
 This understanding frames it as a 
form of rule which nonetheless must be carried out through the volition of the ruled 
– that it to say, it must work upon them as subjects. It is this which he believes 
distinguishes it from an imperial peace: 
 
People in the South are no longer ordered what to do – they are now expected 
to do it willingly themselves. Compared to imperial peace, power in this form, 
while just as real and disruptive, is more nuanced, opaque and complex. 
Partnership and participation imply the mutual acceptance of shared normative 
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standards and frameworks. Degrees of agreement, or apparent agreement, 
within such normative frameworks establish lines of inclusion and exclusion.
103
 
 
This theme of liberalism as a technology of self-regulation is extended further in 
Development, Security and Unending War, in which Duffield engages more closely 
with Foucault’s work to draw out an analysis of development as a form of 
biopolitics.
104
 Biopolitics is understood as a modern form of power that seeks to 
regulate life at the level of the population, using the mass instruments of 
demography, epidemiology and statistics.
105
 It is simultaneously an intimate and 
powerful form of regulation. This supports the reading of liberalism as “a 
technology of governance that supports freedom while governing people through the 
interconnected natural, social and economic processes that together sustain life.”106 
Development is a way of dealing with the excess of freedom produced by liberalism 
which reinstates forms of trusteeship in the post-colonial world and operates through 
a biopolitical division of the world into insured and non-insured forms of life.
107
  
 
 The understanding of liberalism that emerges in this later work makes a 
number of departures from that in Global Governance, where it is understood in 
more conventional terms as a set of ‘political and economic tenets’ that push 
towards free-market principles and individualism. By contrast in Development, 
Security, Duffield argues that liberalism is not to be understood as a ‘substantive 
doctrine’ but an ‘ethos of government which attempts to govern life through its 
freedom’108, albeit one which is able to critique its own excesses of rule.  This more 
governmental view of liberalism is complemented with a similar view of 
development as a ‘state-led technology of security’ embedded in culturally-encoded 
forms of racism.
109
 Again here Duffield is moving away from the views of 
liberalism and development as forms of ideology – i.e. ideas about how the world 
does or should work – and moving towards them as constituting technologies of 
power, that is, modes through which power is expressed or maintained.   
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Underpinning this conceptual shift is a shift in who or what the central 
agents of power are – whereas in Global Governance the principal protagonists are 
the various actors who comprise the strategic complex of the liberal peace, in 
Development, Security these are present but not prominent. Indeed, Development, 
Security is remarkable for the seeming absence of identifiable protagonists of 
power, although analyses of power relations are everywhere. Where they do emerge 
they are much less specific and disembodied – the West/Western humanitarianism, 
liberalism itself and neoliberal capitalism for example are all associated with being 
the force behind the new configurations of rule.
110
 This expansion and diffusion in 
the conceptions of power and agency is also reflected by the absence of the ‘liberal 
peace’ framing in this later work. Indeed it is an important part of the framework 
that the biopolitical technologies of liberalism and development greatly exceed the 
boundaries of the conflict management strategic complex of the liberal peace and 
represent overarching structures of rule that are both increasingly internal to the 
West and to its external relationship with the global South. Duffield’s work has been 
significant in substantially challenging conventional understandings of the status of 
humanitarian and developmental interventions as particular instantiations of 
systemic power in the world rather than altruistic add-ons. His breadth of practical 
experience is used to support a sophisticated and compelling Foucaultian conceptual 
reading of international interventions’ discourses and practices – in many senses the 
work also represents a high point in post-structural theorising of contemporary 
world politics.  
 
Yet, there are also important political economy aspects to the analysis, which 
seek to account for the persistence of poverty and inequalities at the level of the 
international system rather than as failures of development. The ‘uninsured’ ‘surplus 
populations’ which require the regulatory structures of the liberal peace are thus the 
product of predatory forms of capitalism. Duffield reads the structure of neoliberal 
predatory capitalism through David Harvey, who emphasises strongly the need for 
surplus populations within the system if capitalism is to reproduce itself, stabilise 
itself and overcome its crises.
111
 For Duffield, the difference between the way that 
surplus populations are dealt with in the global North and global South is through 
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systems of state-provided social insurance and welfare entitlements in the North, 
which provide more extensive support for human life.
112
 Whilst he never approaches 
the issue directly, Duffield’s deliberations concerning social insurance indicate 
sympathy for a greater role of state provision as a way to buffer the impact of global 
capitalism rather than the continued exposure of populations to its effects.
113
 Yet he 
also shows ambivalence towards social insurance itself as a ‘powerful instrument of 
governance within mass consumer society’.114 
 
Duffield’s contribution to the critical conceptualisation of the ‘liberal peace’ 
has been formidable. He comes as close as anyone to a complete account of global 
power that is driven by an overarching logic of political economy, and expressed in 
programmes of liberal reform and technologies of power. In connecting systemic 
trends and pressures to particular instances of control and regulation, in Sudan, 
Mozambique, Afghanistan and elsewhere, Duffield makes a series of coherent 
linkages between discourses and practices of intervention, as well as with some of 
the historical precedents of these practices. His theoretical contribution however 
emphasises the novelties of these modes of rule, which are seen to operate through 
their impact on volition and the shaping of a biopolitical governmental framework, 
which functions to support neoliberal forms of capitalism. As will be discussed later 
on, however, the emphasis on the diffusive and productive character of liberal 
power has tended to limit the ability to look beyond this endorsement of the 
‘solidarity of the governed’.115 
 
II. The liberal peace, critical theory and life welfare 
 
Michael Pugh’s work draws on Duffield’s analysis but integrates it within a 
Coxian critical theory account of world order. This defends and extends the case for 
seeing the liberal peace as the systemic expression of a dysfunctional neoliberal 
system seeking to contain its resulting disorders at the periphery.
116
 In developing a 
more emphatic political economy focus, Pugh argues that the component parts of the 
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liberal peace, including post-Washington consensus neoliberal economic policy, 
humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping, amount to a form of ‘riot control’ to 
stabilise the international order in favour of global capitalism.
117
 This systemic 
orthodoxy is followed through in problem-solving theories of international relations 
which accept and seek to uphold the broad contours of the international system in 
terms of its state-centric and capitalist form. Critical theory, such as that of Cox, 
rejects these parameters for theorising and instead challenges the structural 
economic conditions that inhibit emancipation, understood as social and political 
transformation.
118
 Pugh’s account of the liberal peace consistently seeks to 
contextualise it in terms of this structural framework which is understood to account 
for its key characteristics.  
 
Pugh’s critique emphasises the particular kinds of dysfunctions that result 
from the contemporary state of global capitalism. One of these is the current regime 
of trade subsidies and barriers that protects industries in the global North whilst 
exposing Southern economies to instability and unjust market conditions.
119
 Another 
is the prevailing economic orthodoxy that seeks to reduce the size of the state and 
spending on social benefits in the periphery.
120
 Collectively these factors tend to 
compound poverty in the global South. Although it is recognised that ‘Sachs 2’ 
revisionist development strategies such as the Millennium Development Goals and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers have aimed to pay more attention to the specific 
alleviation of poverty and to issues such as participation, they are nonetheless 
constrained by their ultimately globalising and integrative economic logic.
121
 For 
Pugh, these economic models specifically militate against alternatives such as state-
led development and welfare programmes which it is argued could otherwise 
redistribute spending more effectively in order to reduce inequalities. These are 
particularly important in ‘war-torn’ economies where jobs and other forms of 
economic survival have been destroyed, leaving populations vulnerable to both 
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criminality and poverty.
122
 Pugh also invites us to read the informal economy as 
providing an important form of social insurance for those alienated by the neoliberal 
economic model, through informal employment and patronage.
123
 
 
In Pugh’s later writing, increasing attention has also been given to the 
political effects and dimensions of liberal peace projects.  In a detailed engagement 
with the case of Bosnia, co-written with Boris Divjak, Pugh argues that the 
externally-imposed structural adjustment programmes have undermined the 
emergence of a liberal social contract between the state and citizenry, which reduces 
democratic accountability, promotes opportunities for corruption and enables 
clientelist politics.
124
 In addition to the economic failure of the neoliberal model to 
provide means of sustenance for the ‘surplus’ populations produced by capitalism, 
then, it also works against the kinds of social protections and rights that can be 
demanded under a liberal social contract. In particular, these include employment 
and labour rights, which Pugh argues have been downgraded in post-war 
environments by both formal and informal channels of employment, and are no 
longer well-supported by the ILO.
125
  
 
Although the structures of political economy within the liberal peace are the 
main focus of Pugh’s analysis, an emerging concern is also demonstrated for the 
ethics of engagement and the imagination of alternatives.  This position takes up 
emerging concerns regarding the issue of alterity and Duffield’s invocation for 
‘unscripted conversations’ which are for Duffield based on a form of ‘solidarity of 
the governed’126:   
 
There is a need, then, to develop a new, unsecuritised language and 
contemplate a paradigm that takes local voices seriously, rejects universalism 
in favour of heterodoxy, reconceptualises the abstract individual as a social 
being and limits damage to planetary life – in short, a ‘life welfare’ perspective. 
Such a perspective would lead to a two-fold paradigm shift: from the ‘liddism’ 
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of liberal peace to political economies of life welfare; and from universalist 
panaceas (which result in dysfunctional hybrid forms of political economy) to 
engaging with heterogeneity.
127
 
 
In this analysis, joint with Mandy Turner and Neil Cooper, Pugh brings together 
neatly several important themes emerging from the critiques of the liberal peace: 
namely that it encourages and perpetuates forms of economic, political and social 
exclusion, and silences dissent and alternatives. The suggested ‘life welfare’ 
approach both argues for a new global orientation in political economy and in the 
treatment of ‘local voices’ and ‘heterogeneity’.128  
 
Pugh’s analysis is important in emphasising a structural interpretation of the 
apparent failings of the liberal peace, particularly with regard to its promises of 
development and the alleviation of poverty, which are to be met by an ethic of ‘life 
welfare’. Simultaneously however he emphasises the collusive elements of 
interventions in allowing public impoverishment and private corruption to flourish 
as part of neoliberal economic strategies.
129
 This account of the liberal peace seems 
to be grounded openly in an egalitarian and pluralist political ethics, and in this 
sense is less tentative than Duffield about the grounds for ethical engagement.  
 
Yet, there are some emergent tensions between Pugh’s treatment of 
‘universalism’ and ‘heterogeneity’. On the one hand, what Pugh’s analysis 
envisages for the post-conflict environments seems to be a re-engineering of social 
and economic conditions in line with those enjoyed by European countries in terms 
of state control of the economy, social protection, and a liberal social contract. This 
seems to point towards a particular kind of universalist response to the systemic 
problems caused by neoliberal economic policy. In more recent writing, however, 
Pugh has emphasised that ‘welfare’ should be understood as ‘well-being with roots 
in local societies’130, and as such ‘heterogeneity’ is to be preferred to ‘universalism’. 
This tension manifests itself directly in Pugh’s account of ‘resistance’ in post-war 
                                                 
127
 Pugh, M., Turner, M. and Cooper, N., ‘Conclusion: The Political Economy of Peacebuilding – 
Whose Peace? Where Next?’ in Pugh et al, Whose Peace?, 394. 
128
 Pugh, M. (2009) ‘Towards life welfare’ in Newman, E., Paris, R., & Richmond, O. P. (2009). New 
perspectives on liberal peacebuilding. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. 
129
 Divjak and Pugh, ‘Corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina’  
130
 Pugh, ‘Towards life welfare’. 
62 
 
economies, in which he includes both non-participation in the formal economy and 
unionised activism.  
 
  Both Pugh’s structuralist critique of the liberal peace and his more detailed 
work on the actual functioning of war and post-war economies have certainly 
articulated important shortcomings and dilemmas for liberal peacebuilders which 
undermine many of the policies promoted. Yet, at times they do not necessarily 
amount to a critique of liberal developmentalism as much as an invocation to do it 
better and with better respect for job creation and employment rights. Pugh seems to 
be aware of this, and in recent work has certainly placed rather greater emphasis on 
some reckoning with or acknowledgement of ‘local voices’, although to date he has 
not developed this at any length. Yet Pugh is keen that it be developed, a task which 
he indicates is becoming most pronounced in the work of Oliver Richmond. 
Richmond has certainly attempted to grapple at much greater length with the politics 
and ethics of engagement between the liberal peace and its recipients, and it is to his 
work that we now turn to explore the debate. 
 
 
III.  The ethics of liberal-local engagement and a post-liberal peace 
 
 The critique of the liberal peace’s structure and significance has also given 
rise to an important debate around the ethics of engaging in liberal peacebuilding, in 
which the work of Richmond has been particularly influential. Like Duffield, 
Richmond uses a conception of the liberal peace which, referencing Foucault, 
emphasises its epistemic contours, but also has a range of other conceptual 
influences which are brought to bear on the issue. As with Duffield, Richmond sees 
the liberal peace as involving a broad and complex range of actors, with distinct but 
connected ideas about the nature of peace, who exercise a broad hegemony in 
conflict and post-conflict spaces. Apart from establishing a genealogy of these 
hegemonic discourses, the key focus of Richmond’s research is the ethics and 
politics of the relationship between the liberal peace and ‘local’ communities. 
Particularly in his most recent work he has sought to understand, using a number of 
critical theoretical perspectives, how the liberal peace might be made less 
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hierarchical, less illegitimate and less fragile in its approaches to and practices of 
peacemaking. Unlike Duffield and Pugh, however, Richmond’s analysis does not 
seek to establish an ‘explanatory’ account of the liberal peace via an analysis of 
particular social forces, economic structures, actor-interests or specific historical 
dynamics continuous with colonialism.
131
 Rather, Richmond approaches the liberal 
peace through the contours of its main ideas and their origins with the aim of 
developing a less hegemonic, ‘post-liberal’ response.  
 
Richmond bases some of his primary preoccupations on the way in which 
the notion of ‘peace’ has been dominated by particular traditions of thinking. In The 
Transformation of Peace, Richmond argues that the contemporary peacebuilding 
consensus – the liberal peace – derives from four aspects of European 
Enlightenment thinking: the victor’s peace, the institutional peace, the constitutional 
peace and the civil peace.
132
 These aspects correlate with a spectrum of theoretical 
approaches in approaches to peacemaking in International Relations. Thus the 
victor’s peace reflects orthodox realist thinking on peace as consisting principally of 
order and domination, the institutional peace speaks to realist and liberal concerns to 
institutionalise this order, the constitutional peace expresses liberal concerns over 
the nature of the internal political settlement and the civil peace relates to concerns 
for emancipatory political forms and agents beyond the state. These different strands 
coalesce as a hybrid form of liberal peace, which expresses itself differently in 
different contexts. For example, ultra-conservative versions of the liberal peace can 
be observed which are imposed by force, as initially in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia 
and Kosovo, whereas more orthodox forms can be observed in places where the 
liberal peace has become embedded and institutionalised over time, such as East 
Timor, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique.
133
  
 
Despite this complex genealogy, however, for Richmond the liberal peace is 
to be understood as a basic ideological and political consensus on the nature of post-
conflict reforms, as requiring ‘democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free 
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and globalized markets, and neoliberal development’.134 This has cohered around a 
‘specific ontology and methodology’135 which is peace-as-governance: 
 
The liberal peace framework and its graduations converge on a notion of 
peace-as-governance. This is both biopolitical and governmentalising in the 
Foucaultian sense of these terms, reordering state and society via the alphabet 
soup of agencies, organisations, and institutions. The framework relies on the 
concepts of territorial statehood and sovereignty, and on dominant states in the 
international community. These assume that the epistemology, ontology, and 
methods associated with the liberal peace are on ethically firm ground.
136
  
  
Richmond sees liberal peace itself as an attempt to transform societies which is 
grounded in a sense of the epistemic authority and superiority of a liberal world 
order. The invocation of Foucault seems to point to a ubiquity of this power as 
opposed to anything more specific regarding the mechanisms of this power. 
Nonetheless, and importantly, this ‘top-down’ sensibility is viewed as ‘hubristic’ by 
Richmond, who argues that the liberal peace is more often ‘virtual’, meaning that 
“democratization, human rights, the rule of law, freedom of the press, development 
and economic reform are deferred for an uncertain period”.137 Part of the critique at 
least is that the liberal peace has not achieved its stated goals in post-conflict 
environments. Richmond makes this case most particularly with regard to case 
studies such as Cambodia and Kosovo.
138
 
 
 Thus Richmond moves from a focus on the Enlightenment genealogy of the 
liberal peace towards a critique of its ethical and political structures, from which he 
aims to offer alternative approaches to peacebuilding.
139
 Broadly, he critiques the 
liberal peace for exercising forms of hegemony that suppress pluralism, depoliticise 
peace, undermine the liberal social contract and exercise a colonial gaze in its 
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treatment of the subjects of the liberal peace.
140
 In view of these various aspects of 
failure, the liberal peace is characterised as ‘ethically bankrupt’141 and requiring re-
evaluation. 
 
The response to these kinds of problems, suggests Richmond, is to aim for 
an ‘everyday’, ‘post-liberal’ or ‘hybrid’ form of peace. This envisages a liberal-local 
relationship which is characterised by an everyday ethic of empathy and care, in 
which ‘everyday local agencies, rights, needs, custom and kinship are recognised as 
discursive ‘webs of meaning’.’142 Although Richmond would probably resist this 
interpretation, his representation of the ‘local’ in his work seems to reflect an 
imagined communitarian space characterised by ‘context, custom, tradition and 
difference in its everyday setting’143, which he sees as being marginalised or ignored 
by the practices of the liberal peace.  Whilst Richmond argues that these should not 
be romanticised, as he argues the liberal peace does, he also uses this contrasting 
conceptualisation of the liberal/international and local/everyday as a means of 
informing his post-liberal ethics of peace, which even seem to require a much more 
involved and localised form of intervention than the liberal peace currently offers: 
 
If the liberal peace is to be salvaged it would have to offer a more pluralist 
debate on its own alternatives, a via media between itself and them, and would 
also have to offer a technology of governance that is broadly representative of 
all actors at multiple levels, public and private, gendered and aged, and of 
multiple identities. This would mean it would adopt a hybrid localised identity 
to counterbalance its global or governmental metanarrative of 
cosmopolitanism, with commensurate implications for its claimed boundaries, 
rules, rights, freedoms, and norms. This might mean it would accrue more 
everyday legitimacy, which might be then formalised in governmental, 
institutional or constitutional structures and legal frameworks, which would 
rest primarily upon a ‘new’ social contract. This legitimacy would rest upon its 
provision of social, cultural, economic and political resources sufficient to meet 
the demands made upon it by its local, everyday, constituencies and an 
international community of which they should be a stakeholder. It would also 
rest upon an international social contract, while not displacing indigenous 
legitimacy with preponderant institutions that are inflexible and actually 
obscure the local and the everyday. But such a framework should not then be 
set in stone, but instead must be seen as an evolving form, focusing on an 
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everyday peace, and the necessary emancipatory and empathetic structures and 
institutions this may require.
144
  
 
Here, the ‘via media’ Richmond proposes pushes essentially for more balance 
between the liberal and the everyday, in a way that would render the outcome more 
legitimate, sustainable and ethically satisfactory. An international social contract is 
required that does not ‘obscure the local and everyday’, but does not seek to 
dominate it either. In this, Richmond’s account of alternatives to the liberal peace 
seems riven with a sense of tension between two seemingly conflicting ethical 
positions. It is this tension that underpins his conception of the post-liberal peace. 
On the one hand, he argues that ‘[i]t is difficult, from a liberal and critical position, 
to image [sic] this being achieved without some conception of democracy, law, 
human rights, and development or welfare support.’145 In this and elsewhere, it is 
clear that he does not imagine that the alternative to the liberal peace to be an end to 
liberal peacebuilding, but rather one which institutionalises participation and 
‘engages’ with issues such as welfare and culture in different ways. On the other 
hand, and in a more openly sceptical moment, Richmond also acknowledges that the 
liberal peace as derived from the Enlightenment may not be able to live up to 
contemporary ethical demands, although it is not clearly specified as to what these 
are.
146
 They seem to relate to the desire for ‘genuine self-determination’:  
 
This requires that local academies and policymakers beyond the already liberal 
international community are enabled to develop theoretical approaches to 
understanding their own predicaments and situations, without these being 
tainted by Western, liberal, and developed world orthodoxies and interests. In 
other words, to gain an understanding of the ‘indigenous’ and everyday factors 
for the overall project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a via media needs 
to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the orthodoxy of 
international prescriptions and assumptions about peace.
147
  
 
The argument that knowledge is ‘tainted’ strongly implies that the liberal peace is 
not an authentic and as such legitimate framework for ‘indigenous’ knowledge, 
which emerges from the ‘local’. Yet, for Richmond’s critical liberal position, 
frameworks such as ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ (which he sees as the 
inheritance of the Enlightenment) are necessary for a more emancipatory version of 
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the liberal peace. This is what presents itself as the key tension for which Richmond 
seeks a solution, via the notion of the ‘everyday’, and via relations of ‘empathy’ and 
‘care’.  
 
His most recent work on the ‘everyday’ however suggests that its 
significance as a site of ethical engagement is much more ambiguous: 
 
Everyday life is both commensurate with, in opposition to and modifies 
colonial practices of government. In this terrain, a hybridity emerges which 
reflects cultural and social patterns, material inequalities and patterns of 
colonial power, disguise, timelag and blindspots – as Bhabha has so eloquently 
illustrated. It is a site of resistance, assimilation, adaption and of hidden 
agencies. It is also the site where power is often experienced in its most 
negative forms.
148
 
 
On this reading, which he links with postcolonial theory, it is rendered more 
doubtful that the everyday can in fact serve as a framework for a more emancipatory 
ethical relationship between the liberal peace and diverse ‘local’ entities. Rather, in 
this reading, the everyday should be seen as a site of researching and linking to 
‘hidden everyday agencies’ which in various contexts moderate and resist the 
excesses of the structures of the liberal peace. Indeed, peacebuilding itself should be 
understood as resistance: ‘Peacebuilding as resistance may prioritise self-
determination, community, agency, autonomy, sometimes democracy and a sense of 
nation, and sometimes the materiality of liberal states.’149 It is not entirely clear 
what an understanding of peacebuilding as resistance would mean in a concrete 
sense. The conception here of resistance suggests a more agonistic and 
indeterminate relationship between the liberal and local in a reconfigured 
peacebuilding, one in which ‘pluralities… meet, interact, integrate, react, resist, 
mediate and negotiate.’150 Such a vision ‘rescues and reunites the liberal and local’, 
providing a platform for a post-liberal peace.
151
  
 
To Richmond it is increasingly clear that conventional forms of studying IR 
through state-centric lenses are particularly inadequate for the investigation of the 
                                                 
148
 Richmond, ‘Resistance’, 677. 
149
 Ibid., 686. 
150
 Ibid., 688. 
151
 Ibid., 689. 
68 
 
‘everyday’; rather, he sees the discipline of anthropology and critical approaches to 
ethnography as providing more appropriate resources for this task. Although his 
account of this methodology is not developed very far, it is clear that it is meant to 
provide a counterpart to the various ethical and ontological interests in ‘enabling a 
clearer engagement with the local, with alterity and with the everyday in the name 
of emancipation’.152 It is such an engagement which provides the ethical alternative 
of the post-liberal peace. 
 
Richmond’s central problematic of alterity – in which the liberal peace 
presents ethical questions in terms of how it deals with ‘the other’ – has been an 
important one in galvanising a critical research agenda in the liberal peace debate, as 
has the more recent acknowledgement that how such questions are researched are an 
important part of this.
153
 Indeed, it is an important issue for this project as well. 
However, it is unclear how his proposed modalities of engagement – empathy, care 
and the everyday – actually disrupt the variously problematic aspects of the liberal 
peace, or whether in practice they may even invite a more intimate form of 
regulation and monitoring. After all, Richmond has also argued that the post-liberal 
peace is already emerging in many post-conflict countries, from Afghanistan to 
Iraq, where ‘liberal-local hybrid’ forms of peace characterised by negotiation and 
resistance exist, in which he includes the use of the Tribal Liaison Council and the 
explosion in sectarian violence.
154
 But do these hold out the promise of a more 
emancipatory peace? Richmond argues that they represent the ‘hidden agencies of 
the everyday’155 yet it is never clear whether by virtue of their more implicitly 
‘authentic’ status he prefers them to the liberal peace or whether they represent an 
ethically preferable alternative – the anticipated ‘post-liberal peace’156 in which the 
liberal and local are rescued and reunited.  
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IV. The liberal peace as illiberal statebuilding 
 
 By contrast to Richmond’s focus on the ethics of liberal-local engagement as 
the key problem in intervention, David Chandler’s critique has come to focus on the 
illiberal and broadly hypocritical character of its practices. He sees ‘the liberal 
peace’ as the cultivation of unaccountable political structures which are ambitious in 
their transformative aims. In his more recent work, Chandler challenges many other 
critiques, arguing that what intervention in post-conflict societies produces is not a 
‘liberal’ peace but an inversion or critique of the classical ideals of autonomy and 
social contract that liberal political theory endorses.
157
 This is achieved through a 
radical re-interpretation of sovereignty away from its legal and political content 
towards a conception of sovereignty as governance capacity.
158
 On the whole, 
Chandler’s contributions to the liberal peace debate have sought to highlight the 
space between its justifications and its practices, doing so from a position that can 
be understood as simultaneously ‘critical’, liberal and conservative in its 
assumptions. Yet its perceived radical scepticism towards the intentions of 
interveners have forced many to reckon with its strident criticisms of intervention 
missions.
159
  
 
In Faking Democracy after Dayton, published in 2000, and before the debate 
on the ‘liberal peace’ became particularly prominent, Chandler argued that the deal 
struck for peace and democratisation in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords had 
resulted in virtually all state functions being removed from the hands of Bosnians.
160
 
Despite the language of democratisation and the framework of rights being 
developed, Chandler argued that what resulted was an intimate form of regulation – 
a key theme in his work since then. As such, democratisation processes tended to 
produce precisely the opposite of democracy. It was noted that such logic was 
premised on the perceived inability of Bosnians to make the correct choices when 
governing themselves, making international supervision a responsibility for 
interveners analogous to the colonial White Man’s Burden.161  
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One of the themes that emerges in Faking Democracy and comes to 
dominate Chandler’s later work is the origins of these dysfunctions in the changing 
character and environment of Western power. In Faking Democracy, Chandler 
argues that despite the ostensible failings of the Bosnia mission, critiques of it are 
generally lacking,
162
 which he attributes to the functions that Bosnia serves by 
legitimating the US role in NATO, the UN and the OSCE in the post-Cold War 
environment. As such, democratisation in Bosnia is understood as an externally-
driven process fulfilling externally-relevant functions for more powerful 
international actors, in which the actual democratisation of Bosnia is of little 
importance.
163
  
 
In more recent work such as Empire in Denial, Chandler extends these lines 
of argument more broadly within the context of the liberal intervention debates.
164
 
What results in countries subject to intervention is a deeply illiberal form of state-
building, in which political decision-making is taken out of the hands of domestic 
actors and into the hands of internationals, who are themselves not accountable for 
their decisions. Within this policy architecture, however, domestic actors are still 
held responsible for failure through their purported unpreparedness for liberal 
reforms and lack of capacity.
165
  This externally constructed state is thus riven with 
political contradictions and weaknesses.  More recently, Chandler has claimed that 
this weakness is not an unintended consequence of state-building programmes, 
which are not designed to produce independently-functioning states.
166
 Rather they 
are designed to create new structures of neoliberal – or what he terms ‘post-liberal’ 
– governance, through which autonomy is continually ‘managed’ by external 
agencies.
167
  
 
This move towards international statebuilding is connected to the rise of 
‘ethical foreign policy’ in the West, in which values rather than interests are seen as 
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the primary determinant of foreign policy and the boundary between Self and Other 
is ostensibly dissolved.
168
 This prioritisation of an ethical approach to policy has the 
effect of driving an evasion of Western political responsibility for policies, as they 
are increasingly pursued in a regulatory space which blurs the lines between 
‘domestic’ and ‘international’ politics. Although these spaces increasingly trumpet 
that they are spaces for ‘participation’, ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’, they do not 
problematize the power relations and therefore have the effect of generally 
legitimising them.
169
 Moreover, drawing on the work of Graham Harrison on 
‘governance states’, Chandler argues that these ‘post-conditionality’ arrangements 
also erode the accountability of a contractual structure for co-operation.
170
 
 
 Yet for Chandler, in open contrast to Duffield and Pugh, this international 
order does not express congruence between the interests of Western capitalist 
powers and the discourses of the liberal peace but a disjuncture.
171
 In this sense, the 
post-Cold War era does not represent a triumph for the West but the crisis of its 
ideology and the loss of its political purpose, which has provoked more solipsism 
than globalism: 
 
We are witnessing neither the interest-based projection of hegemonic power 
nor the value-led challenge to hegemony and traditional forms of power. 
Rather, idealised policy discourses and practices reflect today’s ‘hollow 
hegemony’ - the hollowing-out of the traditional frameworks of meaning which 
reflected and structured Western power.
172
 
 
For Chandler, the turn towards statebuilding thus represents a Western empire in 
denial – of its purpose, its ideology and its power. Fundamentally this is 
symptomatic of a kind of political crisis in the West, in which politics itself – 
contests over interests, ideologies and objectives – is increasingly absent and instead 
decisions are made in the framework of empty bureaucratic policy adjustment and 
regulation.
173
  The ‘liberal peace project’ identified by Duffield is thus understood 
not as a project with objectives but an evasive form of global ordering. Contra 
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Richmond, the appropriate response is not a critique of its ideology and the pursuit 
of a ‘post-liberal’ form of engagement, as this is a fundamentally anti-political and 
unaccountable form of authority.  
 
 Chandler’s provocative engagement of both intervention and the critical 
debate has taken an ostensibly different line to those of Duffield, Pugh and 
Richmond, whose positions he has suggested are in danger of creating a kind of 
apology for liberal interventionism.
 174
  This line of argument opens up a space for 
thinking about the different kinds of theoretical orientations behind these critiques, 
and specifically for interrogating the starting assumptions which inform their 
‘critical’ accounts.  This is not to deny the collective value of the existing critiques. 
They ask serious and important questions of intervention: as a system of global 
ordering, an ideology and technology of power and neoliberal capitalism, and a 
hybrid, unaccountable structure of political relations.  There are many overlaps 
between these critiques, as well as important differences, which reflect different 
conceptual emphases and frameworks. Yet, as the next section will discuss, this 
seems to be a conversation that is Western-centric in its primary preoccupations and 
envisioning of alternatives, suggesting that its ambition for more pluralist ways of 
thinking is not yet realised. 
 
V.  Discussion: where are the subjects of the liberal peace? 
 
 In making their important contributions to the liberal peace debate, in terms 
of discourses, political relations and ethics, all of these authors have shown a 
preoccupation with deconstructing its resonances with imperialism and colonialism. 
Duffield for example seeks to recover the imperial and racist pasts of liberal and 
developmental thought as a means of contextualising more recent practices, whilst 
carefully unpicking the discursive constructions of the global South.
175
 Richmond 
also argues that the liberal peace operates with a ‘colonial gaze’176, whilst Chandler 
overtly considers statebuilding a form of ‘empire’, or ‘white man’s burden’, albeit a 
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different type to that of the past.
177
 All focus on ways in which the agents of the 
liberal peace tend to construct a form of epistemic superiority for themselves over 
the territories and populations in which they intervene, re-constituting relations of 
paternalism and trusteeship. Within this, Duffield and Chandler put particular 
emphasis on the re-interpretation of doctrines that were intended to support an anti-
imperial world order post-1945: principally ‘sovereignty’, but also ‘development’ 
and ‘security’. As noted at the outset of this chapter, this is important in terms of 
establishing the analytic, political and ethical terrain of critique, and in demanding 
reflection on these problems from those who defend intervention from the charge of 
imperialism in a supposedly post-imperial world.  
 
 Yet despite this anti-imperialist ethic within the critiques, it is possible to 
argue that they themselves retain what might be understood as a set of quite 
‘Eurocentric’ horizons. Hall and Hobson argue that in theorising about liberal 
imperialism, contemporary postcolonial writers have tended to conflate 
Eurocentrism with racism and imperialism.  In fact, they argue, in looking at liberals 
of the past it is possible to discern a complex relationship of the three whereby it is 
possible to be neither pro-imperialist nor racist, yet still Eurocentric.
178
 In this 
piece, they understand Eurocentric gazes as emphasising the distinctive character of 
Western civilisation, despite comprising a set of diverse views on the relationship 
between Europe and the rest of the world. This however did not make them 
imperialists: the thinkers they survey had radically different views on the 
desirability and feasibility of the mission civilisatrice, based on a range of theories 
from liberal institutionalism to racism and cosmopolitanism. Importantly, many of 
them were also anti-imperialist. Yet within all of these was the underlying 
assumption that various ideas and traditions were the particular preserve of Western 
civilisation.  
 
Bhambra also notes, following Wallerstein, that Eurocentrism in social 
theory has multiple faces, including ‘its historiography, the parochiality of its 
universalism, its assumptions about (Western) civilisation, its Orientalism and its 
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attempts to impose a theory of progress’,179 but adds that it can also be understood 
as a ‘belief, implicit or otherwise, in the world historical significance of events 
believed to have developed endogenously in the cultural-geographic sphere of 
Europe’.180 The point is, then, that Eurocentrism is about one’s conceptual 
framework and analytic framing of a problem, not simply about a pro- or anti-
imperialist attitude.  
 
 Despite being quite strongly anti-imperialist in ethic and political stance, I 
would argue that there are some cognate analytic tendencies within the critical 
debate on the liberal peace, whereby the almost exclusive focus on the 
distinctiveness of the discourses, agencies, interests and values of the ‘liberal’ 
‘West’ has thus far largely obscured, except as a cipher of ‘local’ alterity, the 
subjecthood of those whose political existence is supposedly shaped by it. Whilst 
this does not necessarily invalidate the importance of these critiques, they are 
nonetheless inhibited in their pursuit of a post-colonial politics through the use of 
these Western-centric lenses, albeit in different ways.  
 
 This issue is perhaps most obviously manifested in the work of Richmond, 
whose focus on the problematic of alterity and liberal-local relations puts him 
exactly in this kind of conscientious bind – that is how to engage with a subaltern 
‘other’, delineated by him as reflecting ‘context, custom, tradition and difference in 
its everyday setting’ whilst holding onto an emancipatory or critical research agenda 
which might also reflect liberal values such as democracy or human rights. It is 
through this that a kind of uncertainty or anxiety emerges about the nature of a 
‘post-liberal peace’, which is on the one hand to be welcomed as it might represent a 
via media between the international social contract and indigenous legitimacy, but 
on the other might represent a space of colonial domination.
181
 Chandler argues that 
Richmond is preoccupied with an ‘empathetic’ engagement rather than any attempt 
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to ‘know’ as this would entail a form of hegemony.182 Begby and Burgess also pick 
up Richmond’s qualms about the possibility of ‘knowing’ the ‘non-liberal other’.183 
 
 In order for this tension to be a coherent one, and for the ethical solution 
suggested to be appropriate, Richmond must lean on the distinction between the 
liberal and local being assumed as mutually unintelligible and constituted by 
different ontologies – a Western ideological hegemonic universalising mission on 
the one hand, and a site of culture and resistance on the other. This is followed 
through in how Richmond represents the ‘local’. As discussed above, there is a 
sense in which it is understood as implying the need for some kind of authentic 
space where needs and rights are expressed, compared to the ‘Western-induced 
artifice’184 that ‘civil society’ often represents. Yet where Richmond does engage 
with particular cases, as he has done regularly, he nonetheless tends to do so in the 
context of evaluating the failure of the liberal peace to live up to or fulfil its own 
programmes, as in Cambodia and East Timor.
185
 Local actors appear here as only 
strategic, engaged in a non-political struggle for state power and inter-group 
dominance and not as articulating a meaningful set of ideas and objectives. 
 
 What is most interesting about Richmond’s framework perhaps is not so 
much an essentialisation of the ‘Other’, which he is increasingly conscious about 
and aims to avoid,
186
 but the ways in which the West is made distinctive, 
represented through its genealogical relationship with its endogenous Enlightenment 
traditions and the values of the liberal peace.
187
 In this sense, the Eurocentric logic 
of the analysis manifests itself more obviously via a kind of ‘Occidentalism’.188 In 
this sense, Richmond seems to be following Foucault closely in his fixing of 
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liberalism within the specific history of the West.
189
 Moreover, it is clear that 
Richmond regards such a framework and its freedoms as being in some sense 
indispensable in a peacebuilding framework, which is why a ‘post-liberal’ peace 
which balances these values with ‘indigenous legitimacy’ is required.  Indeed, on 
Richmond’s logic, if one could conceive of an emancipatory politics outside the 
supposed confines of Western liberalism, then the justification for the liberal peace 
itself becomes decidedly weaker. But since it is the ‘Enlightenment ontology’190 
which is assumed to be the source of emancipatory as well as conservative politics, 
we must perpetually deal with this agonistic tension between the West and its 
Others. 
 
This paradox of liberalism works itself out in a very different way in 
Duffield’s work. Also following Foucault, Duffield sees liberalism as a technology 
of government, and biopolitics as the modern attempt to regulate populations and 
their life chances, although liberalism also has resources to resist and criticise this. 
There is arguably a less sanitised history of Western political thought offered in 
Duffield’s account of its genealogy to that of Richmond; rather he argues that 
liberalism’s paradox has a long history in its violent encounters with non-European 
populations and is not simply an expression of the contemporary liberal peace. 
Rather it has always been one way of dealing with the ‘surplus populations’ 
produced by capitalism which are necessary for its own reproduction.  
 
Darby argues that Duffield can be considered a ‘post-colonial’ thinker191; 
indeed he can be read as being engaged in the Foucaultian project of what Pasha 
calls ‘provincialising the West’192 in his deconstruction of the liberal peace project. 
In this sense his focus on the agencies, discourses and practices of ‘Western’ 
political subjects and the capitalist system can be seen as a ‘necessary’ kind of 
Western-centrism borne out by the shape of analysis. For Duffield, future paths of 
engagement should begin with ‘the solidarity of the governed’ which begins from an 
understanding of the similarities between people and their struggles against 
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neoliberalism.
193
 This is a necessarily thin and broad vision of a basis for solidarity, 
in which it is envisioned that the principles of ‘mutuality and interconnectedness’194 
will deliver a new and radical form of citizenship.  
 
Whilst Duffield’s vision is in many ways attractive, it seems somewhat 
unsatisfying as a response to the proto- imperial structures of the liberal peace. In 
particular, the ‘thinness’ of the radical alternative seems in some ways the result of 
the ‘thick’ analytic engagement with the liberal peace, and more particularly the 
paradox of liberalism. In this set-up, the idea of freedom as such is implicitly 
rendered – to borrow Elshtain’s phrase – ‘ontologically suspicious’ - as it is seen as 
only a paradox resulting from the governmental technologies of liberalism. But does 
this have to be the case? In one reading this logic seems to reproduce the narcissistic 
notion that human freedom is essentially a Western liberal idea, a logic strongly 
contested within anti-Eurocentric histories of political ideas.
195
 Without this 
particular logic, the supposed ‘paradox’ immanent to liberalism and freedom 
becomes infinitely weaker, since the counter-assumption of diverse existing and 
valid cosmologies of freedom undercuts the apparent necessity of the 
contradictions.
196
 Indeed, rather than a ‘paradox’, delivered by 
conceptual/logical/historical necessity, the problem begins to look more 
straightforwardly like a form of ‘hypocrisy’, in which interveners preach one thing 
and do another, perhaps along Chandler’s line of argument. Duffield himself 
recognises this pattern of unevenness in his conception of ‘insured’ and ‘uninsured’ 
forms of life. As such, perhaps the apparent paradox of liberalism can be dealt with 
in a more satisfying manner through de-emphasising the centrality of the 
Foucaultian conundrum. In this sense Pugh’s more assertive embrace of a ‘life 
welfare’ approach based on a more egalitarian political economy is one that seems 
untroubled by the supposed paradox of liberalism and more clearly affirms a 
particular interpretation of it based on social insurance and liberal social contract 
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theory,
197
 although this does not necessarily sit well with the issue of heterogeneity 
and in particular its implications for alternative aspirations.  
 
Chandler also seems to reject the paradox of liberalism in his response to the 
other critics – arguing that the liberal peace does not represent so much the 
contradictions of divergent strands of liberalism but the mutation of the classical 
form which emphasised autonomy into an essentially degraded ‘neoliberal’ form 
which critiques it.
198
 He argues that in critiquing liberal aspirations
199
 critics suggest 
that the non-liberal Other is not ready for them, and we might lose the capacity for 
what must be assumed to be more important projects: 
 
There is a danger that liberalism is criticised not for its inability to universalise 
economic growth and overcome the problems of combined and uneven 
development, but for the aspirations of development itself.
200
  
 
Essentially Chandler is arguing that the baby has been thrown out with the 
bathwater in the other critiques, undermining the possibility of a progressive 
politics. Whilst it is never made totally explicit what kind of politics of engagement 
Chandler would advocate, and indeed it is not clear that he would advocate anything 
specific, it is clear that his preoccupations with autonomy, sovereignty and the 
virtual death of political ideologies in the West indicate a kind of re-founded 
pluralist liberalism in which ‘politics’ and ‘autonomy’ are themselves more highly 
valued as the foundation of a properly political project. Yet as Lee Jones has 
recently argued, this seems to depend upon an implicit defence of the ‘mythology’ 
(Chandler’s word) of unproblematic autonomy as the basis for political society and 
an evasion of the issues raised by the shaping of a homo oeconomicus under a 
particular social order.
201
 Whilst Chandler is difficult to pin down on the issue, in 
several places his critique of post-structuralist and cosmopolitan approaches refer to 
the loss of the ‘liberal right-bearing subject’202 and the ‘transformative dynamic 
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ontology of the universal rational subject’.203 Chandler points to such a loss as a 
serious problem for critical thinkers, and implies at times that the loss of a bounded 
community and rights-bearing subject of politics is a loss of politics per se.  It 
would seem that a recovery of politics thus implies a return to such a subject. 
 
 Like the other authors discussed here, Chandler’s main object of critique is 
the West and its intervention practices, and in this sense the critique, like the others 
under discussion, is also ‘necessarily’ Western-centric. Unlike the others, however, 
Chandler’s critique implies a kind of positive value to this parochialism as a 
baseline for political accountability. In this sense the critique is not keen to 
anticipate any kind of ‘solidarity’ with the subjects of statebuilding but is nostalgic 
for the decolonising ethics of sovereignty and self-determination because they 
establish boundaries for political community.  In some senses, Chandler’s work 
changes the main focus of the debate on peacebuilding and statebuilding 
interventions to a battle over the changing character and interpretation of Western 
liberalism.   
 
Whilst of course this may be a valuable conversation to have for a number of 
reasons, what it does do is marginalise the supposed subjects of intervention from 
the analytic framework. For a research agenda ostensibly concerned with pluralism 
and problematizing Western domination, this is surely a problem. It is not that there 
is a lack of case research as such – indeed many of the writers here have spent 
considerable time researching existing sites of the liberal peace around the world, 
and particularly Bosnia.  Moreover, several critiques such as those of Richmond and 
Pugh articulate a particular concern to include ‘local voices’.  Yet there often seems 
to be little way to actualise this desired pluralism in the research.  
 
Where Richmond does engage with case studies, for example, the dominant 
narrative is that the liberal peace has failed in its aims, in sectors such as 
democratisation and good governance, rule of law and civil society building, with 
political actors simply instrumentalising the discourses of internationals to pursue 
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mono-ethnic or power-based political strategies.
204
 Whilst the opinions of 
international bureaucrats are often represented, the views of e.g. the Kosovans who 
are being represented as co-opted or anti-pluralist are not.
205
 Nor are the histories of 
the cases engaged as ways in which the politics of Kosovans may be located. 
Although Richmond has recently advocated for an ‘ethnographic’ turn in research, 
which may indicate recognition of this issue of exclusion, it does not yet seem to 
have emerged in his own work which reproduces this marginalisation.  
 
Chandler and Pugh also focus on particular cases within their critiques – 
most often Bosnia and Kosovo as representing some of the most extensive sites of 
intervention. For Chandler in particular, the emphasis of analysis seems to be 
squarely on the views of interveners and the ways in which they deny or evade 
responsibility for the decisions they take in various policy areas. There is virtually 
no sustained engagement with the citizens of these countries as political subjects, 
with meaningful political histories and agendas, rather than the countries themselves 
as zones of intervention. This is in keeping with both the tenor of the critique and its 
main focus. For example, in his writings on anti-corruption initiatives within 
Bosnia, he suggests that it is the anti-corruption campaigns around elections 
themselves that have promoted disillusionment, although he seems to have little in 
the way of public opinion or evidence to support this claim, other than the fact that 
people continue to vote for nationalist parties.
206
 Yet this could be an important part 
of Chandler’s argument – if we are to assume, contra the interveners, that people in 
post-conflict environments are capable of authorising their own politics, why not 
deal with their expressed views on these issues? This would be consistent with the 
critique of statebuilding that Chandler wishes to advance.  
 
Pugh’s focus in case studies has been mostly connected to the political 
economy of post-conflict states and the impact of neoliberal economic reforms on 
the provision of state benefits and redistribution. In comparison to Richmond and 
Chandler for example, he has shown relatively little interest in theorising the 
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representation of intervened-in societies. Yet methodologically he has actually 
engaged more deeply with ‘local voices’ than either of these authors, in particular in 
looking at how Bosnian activists, journalists and academics have responded to and 
represented national economic problems.
207
 By and large, these viewpoints have 
been integrated into and support Pugh’s own analysis of the situation rather in 
service of a type of ‘heterogeneity’ to be engaged.  The question that this throws up 
is then to what extent ‘local voices’ are relevant to the discussion, given that most of 
the analytic weight is thrown behind a critique of neoliberal structural adjustment 
whose fundamentals do not change regardless of the revisionist tendencies in 
intervention. Although Pugh does not address this issue explicitly, recent work 
suggests more of a balance emerging between the global and localised levels of 
critique – a theme which will be picked up in Chapter Three. 
 
Duffield’s analysis is, like Chandler’s, focused on deconstructing the 
contradictions and assumptions of Western policy in various sites of intervention, 
and as a result the majority of the case analysis is directed at the activities of the 
agents of the liberal peace. However, in his detailed analysis of cases such as Sudan 
and Mozambique there is a much greater sense of the intended recipients as existing 
in their own right – that is to say engaged in meaningful political activity and with a 
lifeworld and a history beyond the structures of Western power.
208
 Indeed, one of 
the strong critiques that Duffield makes is that aid agencies tend to see the 
populations amongst which they work as being undifferentiated.
209
  
 
Yet his own conceptual framework seems simultaneously to roll back and 
push against the significance of the subjecthood of the recipients. In viewing 
liberalism as a technology of an expanding Western frontier of government, which 
consolidates sovereign power through biopolitical control over the populations of 
the South,
210
 Duffield’s analysis seems to suggest that this is a successful attempt to 
dominate the global South, operating through the constitution or cultivation of a 
liberal subjectivity. This mechanism is an important aspect of the understanding of 
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power as productive and constitutive of subjects, although Duffield makes efforts to 
qualify this. As such, there is a kind of tension between the narrative of a powerful 
West regulating the global South through structures of global liberal governance and 
the emergence of the various political actors in the South as having significance in 
their own right.  
 
Roger Mac Ginty’s recent work on ‘local resistance’ and hybrid peace211 has 
made an important contribution towards redressing the balance of analysis away 
from an almost exclusive focus on interveners and their liberal credentials, towards 
an appreciation of how actors targeted by interventions engage in “renegotiation, 
subversion, non-engagement, cherry-picking, and outright resistance.”212 In 
developing a heuristic framework for understanding how in each situation this 
produces a ‘hybrid’, Mac Ginty’s work does much to articulate some of the kinds of 
agency and presence that exist in post-war societies beyond the ambit of interveners. 
The analysis of hybrid peace proceeds through five case studies – Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Northern Ireland, in each of which a particular 
dimensions of the liberal peace is explored: security, constitution-building, 
economic restructuring, governance and civil society involvement. The levels of 
hybridisation vary, according to factors such as the compliance capacities of 
interveners, their incentivising powers, local abilities to resist or adapt, and the 
maintenance of alternative forms of peacemaking. In each case, it is shown how the 
plans of liberal peacebuilders are subverted by environments, events and agencies 
which are beyond their control and comprehension, and how the outcomes often 
bear little resemblance to the blueprint. Therefore, for example, liberal 
peacebuilders have been forced to rely on ‘warlords’ for security in Afghanistan,213 
Iraq’s ‘neo-liberal’ economic policy has very Keynesian cash injections and anti-
competitive tendering,
214
 and Bosnia’s ‘liberal’ constitution-building has had to 
reckon with the historical legacies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
215
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Despite the deeper and richer empirical account of interventions, it is unclear 
what the theoretical grounding of Mac Ginty’s critical position is – indeed if his 
position is even ‘critical’ in the way that has been understood thus far in the 
discussion – namely, a critique of the hierarchies of international power. Whilst for 
example, he objects to the ‘ethnocentrism’ of much research,216 and the over-
emphasis on the power of liberal transformation, he does not articulate much in 
terms of either why this is specifically a problem, nor how the ‘hybrid peace’ 
framework might help break out of this paradigm. Indeed, in using ‘liberal’ and 
‘local’ as broad categories for understanding action, albeit with caution, the analysis 
cannot help but indicate that this is the major fault-line of how we should 
understand subjects in the ‘post-liberal peace’. Moreover, it is also unclear whether 
the ‘locals’ are understood as political subjects with relevant political goals or 
simply as strategic actors aiming to exploit the internationals.
217
 Mac Ginty is 
however conscious of such issues, noting for example that many researchers may 
lack the requisite ‘antennae’ to pick up and interpret behaviour.218 Whilst this 
important work provides some empirical substance to help move away from the 
Eurocentric or liberal-centric tendency in critiques of the liberal peace, the 
conceptual grounding and political significance of such experiences leaves questions 
to be answered, particularly as to how this helps move away from an ‘ethnocentric’ 
paradigm of critique.  
 
Collectively then, although the critiques work to unpick the imperial and 
hierarchical structures of the liberal peace, they have largely tended to obscure the 
people who are the objects of this domination through their accounts of the political 
subject. As such, the apparent paradox of liberalism – ruling people to make them 
free – remains intact in various forms, even if there are elements of heterodoxy in 
and around it. It is for this reason that despite its dysfunctions, the future envisioned 
by the critiques does not look like a break from the past, but only a ‘post-liberal 
peace’ where a transformative agenda is tempered by empathy and the solidarity of 
the governed, or a withdrawal to the bounds of the sovereign community for 
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Chandler. Yet, as the following chapters will show, it is possible to think beyond 
this Eurocentric paradox and re-formulate the problems in a more fundamental way. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 The lively debate on the liberal peace has been a very important one for the 
discipline of International Relations as a whole in recent times, representing the 
conjuncture of its emerging critical theories over the last few decades and their 
application to ‘real world’ politics. As this chapter has shown, however, although 
this debate has been rich and productive in terms of analytic frames for thinking 
about the liberal peace, it has not so far – with the exception of Mac Ginty to a 
limited extent – embraced a particularly pluralist research agenda despite its anti-
imperial critiques.  It has thus far remained focused within a rather ‘West’-centric 
debate, in which the broad associations of the West with the Enlightenment, with 
liberalism, with ideological politics and modernity arguably allow defenders such as 
Roland Paris to see empire and trusteeship as an ongoing necessity.
219
  
 
 The following chapters look to a different tradition of anti-imperial thought 
for inspiration in re-thinking the subject of politics in the face of imperial rule – 
what is variously called ‘decolonising’ or ‘anti-colonial’ thought. This school of 
thought begins with the fundamental rejection of the paradox of liberalism and the 
foundation of ‘modern’ ‘liberal’ subjectivity as the necessary foundation of a 
‘progressive’ politics. Indeed, this assumption is rendered strange within the context 
of a decolonising project, which seeks to develop immanent and specific 
understandings of domination to inform relevant strategies of resistance. In 
recovering the importance of the dominated as a historical and political subject, and 
in rejecting the projected self-images of imperial powers, decolonising thought may 
help re-frame the stakes involved in evaluating and re-thinking the importance of 
the liberal peace.  
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Chapter Three 
Re-thinking the subject of politics: embodied being in anti-colonial 
thought 
 
 
 
Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance 
of monopolies and finance capital has established itself; in which the export of 
capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the 
world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all 
territories of the globe among the great capitalist powers has been 
completed.
220
 [Lenin] 
 
I saw folk die of hunger in Cape Verde and I saw folk die from flogging in 
Guiné (with beatings, kicks, forced labour), you understand? This is the entire 
reason for my revolt..
221
 [Cabral] 
 
I sincerely believe that a subjective experience can be understood by others; 
and it would give me no pleasure to announce that the black problem is my 
problem and mine alone and that it is up to me to study it…Physically and 
affectively. I have not wished to be objective. Besides, that would be dishonest: 
It is not possible for me to be objective.
222
 [Fanon] 
 
 
The previous chapter argued that the critiques of the liberal peace had 
developed various arguments against Western power in post-conflict environments 
without substantively engaging the people targeted by interventions as political 
subjects. As discussed, this in part related to a conceptual thinning of the political 
subject via the regulative production of subjectivity, an assumption of its broadly 
communitarian basis or a simple rejection that politics could take place outside an 
assumed liberal rights-bearing subject.  All of these resulted in critiques of the 
imperial or colonial character of the liberal peace, but did not necessarily dislodge a 
Eurocentric account of the world.  
 
In this chapter, I draw upon the thought of Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon and 
Amílcar Cabral, three figures actively engaged in bringing about resistance to 
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European colonialism in the mid-twentieth century. These thinkers offer a basis for 
re-thinking the political subject – specifically the colonised political subject – and 
offer alternative ways to critique imperial structures of power through a 
reconstruction of subjecthood itself. However, this necessitates some fundamental 
critiques of philosophical orientation within the underlying political theory that 
informs critiques of the liberal peace. In this chapter, I discuss these elements as 
comprising a different articulation of, first, the embodied political subject, second, 
of the multi-dimensional political environment and third, of a humanist political 
ethics.  
 
Collectively, these re-orientations provide a basis for articulating a subject 
targeted by powerful interventions as a proper subject of politics – and indeed for 
re-thinking our understanding of political subjects more broadly as being situated, 
embodied and involved in a multi-dimensional political world. They also articulate a 
basis for a political ethics of engagement based on a non-rationalist and non-
reductive humanism.  As I hope to demonstrate in the remainder of the thesis, using 
this as a basis for re-orienting critical analysis helps get over some of the binds of 
Eurocentrism and provides a basis for a more substantive critical political 
engagement with the significance of liberal peace interventions.  
 
I. The critique of imperialism in earlier political thought 
 
 In order to contextualise the contributions of the anti-colonial movement as 
approaches to critical theory, it is helpful to think about the intellectual climate that 
had dominated public terms of critique up until that point. Within the first decade of 
the twentieth century, two broadly influential anti-imperial texts had been produced 
within Europe which set the tone for much of the antipathy towards empire as it 
developed there in the early twentieth century. These were John A. Hobson’s 
Imperialism: A Study and Vladimir Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism, influential statements of liberal and socialist critiques of imperialism 
respectively.  Both texts contained different but powerful and detailed analyses of 
the character, dynamics and effects of imperialism, much of which might resonate 
with the character of the early twenty-first century world economy.  Yet, they did 
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not seriously engage with imperialism as a fundamental problem of social and 
political exclusion, nor really challenge the Eurocentric, racist and paternalist 
foundations of its intellectual framework.  
 
Hobson’s seminal 1902 work Imperialism: A Study¸ was deeply influential 
across the English-speaking academy, and played an important role in inspiring the 
later analyses of Lenin and other self-identified socialists.
223
 Hobson’s work is 
however more often considered part of the ‘liberal’ reformist canon.224 The work 
itself seeks to systematically problematise the ‘social pathology’225 of imperialism 
through challenging the economic, political, social and scientific character of its 
impact on Britain and its imperial possessions, which Hobson sees as largely 
retrograde. 
 
Economically, he argues that imperialism, through its reliance on military 
and financial protection, is a form of costly protection that is not worth the gains 
made.
226
 Rather he suggest that Britain has done the ‘hard work’ of opening up 
markets but should let other powers expend energies in controlling them. The 
economic argument from the perspective of free trade is a central pillar of his 
critique, which itself is clearly directed at his contemporary British intellectuals and 
decision-makers and targeted towards reworking a conception of the national 
interest.  
 
Politically, he considered imperialism to have given up in its major task of 
potential value – that is the preparation of natives for self-government. He is deeply 
disparaging of the haphazard way in which the empire is governed and 
administered, citing a study describing Colonial Office policy in ruling West Africa 
as akin to ‘a coma accompanied by fits’.227 This is in contrast to the policy of 
‘colonialism’ as Hobson understood it: permanent nationalist outgrowths with 
British-style representative institutions of government, such as Australia and 
Canada. Hobson argued that, on the contrary,  
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[o]ur other colonies are plainly representative of the spirit of Imperialism rather 
than of colonialism. No considerable proportion of the population consists of 
British settlers living with their families in conformity with the social and 
political customs and laws of their native land: in most instances they form a 
small minority wielding political or economic sway over a majority of alien 
and subject people, themselves under the despotic political control of the 
Imperial Government or its local nominees.
228
  
 
Thus imperialism was understood as having largely failed in its possible 
transformation of the political society of other lands. Most seriously, Hobson 
argued, imperialism had become a substantial moral failure, largely characterised by 
hypocrisy in its appearance as the disinterested spread of Christianity and 
civilisation rather than the pursuit of self-interest and commercial gain.
229
  
 
Hobson’s proposed solution to these problems of international politics was 
not, however, an end to the rule and transformation of tropical societies by 
European powers, but he saw potential for international institutions and forms of 
Commonwealth to better direct the practices of imperialism.
230
 As Long argues, this 
was due to an implicit conviction that the ‘lower races’ could not necessarily be 
trusted to defend themselves or manage natural resources appropriately.
231
 It was 
also combined with credence in the possibility of scientifically understood racial 
order being managed rationally by an internationalist policy: 
 
Effective internationalism is the only sound basis of competition and rational 
selection among nations. In the cruder form of the human struggle, accident, or 
numbers, or some primitive force or cunning, may secure the success of a 
people whose “social efficiency” is of a low order, impermanent and 
unproductive, while it stamps out or checks the growth of a people whose latent 
powers of achievement and capacities of progress are far superior. Only in 
proportion as racial or national selection is rationally guided and determined 
does the world gain security against such wastes and calamities.
232
 
 
Although Hobson’s standpoint had made him critical of the hypocrisies and wastes 
of imperialism as it was practiced at the turn of the century by the British, this 
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critique was completely devoid of an engagement with the ‘lower races’ as political 
beings except as likely to rebel if overly exploited.
233
 In his imaginary, the world 
should be, and was, dominated by the white nations and their traditions of political 
order. Yet it was also put into danger by the tendency of the white nations to allow 
the illusion of private economic gain to result in politically damaging and morally 
bankrupt forms of imperialism. Imperialism for Hobson thus represented the 
corruption of free trade and European rule. 
 
Lenin’s text, on the other hand, articulated an account of imperialism as the 
highest form of monopoly capitalism.
234
 He borrowed extensively from Hobson’s 
analysis and empirical material but also reacted against it, reframing the process in 
more clearly Marxist terms of conflicting social forces, the concentration of 
production, the export of finance capital rather than goods and the consolidation of 
monopoly power within imperial ‘spheres of influence’. Imperialism in this stage of 
its historical development was both antagonistic and militaristic, resulting in the 
uneven development and exploitation of the rest of the world in order to continue 
the generation of profit for the capitalists.  
 
Yet, for Lenin, what was important about imperialism was that historically 
speaking, it was the precursor to worldwide revolution, which was accelerated by 
the world being interlinked into a single capitalist monopoly of production.
235
 The 
monopolistic character of production relations were thus amenable to being subject 
to co-ordinated socialist control. Attempts to pull back from imperialism in favour 
of more peaceful co-operation, as apparently advocated by Hobson and, the bête 
noire of the essay, Kautsky, were thus bourgeois and reactionary in attempting to 
stave off the restive forces of struggle across the world by the workers.
236
   
 
The significance of colonialism in this historical process was principally in 
accelerating competition once the division of the world amongst the imperialists had 
been achieved. Lenin’s line in this sense clearly resonated with the writings of 
Marx, who had earlier written that India’s insertion into British colonialism had 
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many destructive effects but that it would be able to enter the bourgeois period of 
history which was necessary for social revolution.
237
 As such, imperialist 
colonialism was understood as a kind of necessary evil for the purposes of true 
social progress, albeit one which incurred broad exploitation and suffering.  
 
The European left’s critical accounts of imperialism and colonialism in the 
early to mid 20
th
 century derived in a large number of ways from these two 
influential narratives, which, although widely illuminating and critical, 
characterised the phenomena in a way which was deeply Eurocentric.
238
  Hobson 
clearly regarded Europe and white nations in general as a standard for the best 
forms of government, culture and political order – while he expresses some 
mitigation and ambivalence in places about the extent to which the representatives 
of such countries live up to such a framing, it is nonetheless important in his 
understanding of imperialism and the relations with colonies in Africa and Asia. 
This Eurocentrism is clearly compounded by a failure to confront the racist tropes 
of his age, which he believes fall under the domains of science and rationalism.  
 
Lenin’s analytic Eurocentrism is of a substantially different order, although 
with some curiously similar analytic outcomes in terms of the colonised countries. 
Lenin’s focus is basically exclusively centred on analysing the metropolitan 
countries and capitalists, with the subjects of this order mentioned only in passing 
as a broad mass of millions who are exploited by it. Otherwise they are substantially 
absent from the narrative. Their problem in Lenin’s framework is that colonial 
subjects – and a number of other lesser intellectuals – are largely ignorant of their 
conditions, or have leaders who are compromised by the reactionary bourgeois 
demand for national independence. Lenin’s analysis is thus produced as a form of 
disabusing the wider ignorance regarding the world historical significance of 
imperialism as presaging the beginning of the end of capitalism and the move to a 
higher form of production. The fate of colonial countries is to first be inserted into 
the system of global capitalism before it can be superseded. As such they are 
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understood as being developmentally backward and lacking in their own historical 
agency. 
 
The analytic and prescriptive outcome for both Hobson and Lenin is a 
deferment in the short-term of freedom for the colonies, in favour of an improved 
colonialism which will accelerate the movement of societies towards European 
frameworks, understood as the only path of civilizational or historical progress. In 
this sense, they did not reserve any particular kind of critique for colonialism in and 
of itself – it was a subsidiary problem – or for Hobson not really a problem – in the 
broader framework of imperialism. In this, we can already begin to sense some 
analytic affinities with the paradox of liberalism elaborated in Chapter Two – there 
is an understanding that global imperial domination constitutes a problem, but there 
is an ambivalence about the character of the solution, which might itself in certain 
cases require a better adherence to the values of the ‘West’ or ‘Europe’, such as for 
Chandler. As with the critiques of the liberal peace, this is integrated into a serious 
and substantial critique of global power. Yet these are critiques in which the objects 
of domination are largely silent and not expected to make demands as political 
subjects.  
 
Some of the anti-colonial thinkers, to which we now turn, derived much 
intellectually from both the Hobsonian and Leninist critiques of imperialism which 
framed important aspects of their critical theory – particularly their narratives of the 
global economic structures of imperialism. However, they understood them to be 
fundamentally inadequate as critical theories for people in the colonies – that is 
theories that would problematize power relations in a way which would more fully 
expose and challenge the modes of domination experienced. Yet, in order to do this, 
they found it necessary not just to challenge the tactical basis of anti-imperialist 
activity but the deeper philosophical understanding of social and political being 
upon which political activity was based.  
 
In the following section, we will look at the work of Frantz Fanon, Amílcar 
Cabral and Aimé Césaire as important exemplars of this intellectual and political 
tradition seeking to re-found the ‘subject’ of politics outside the delineations of 
colonial and imperial Europe. Whilst it is not possible to do justice to the 
92 
 
complexities of their positions here, what follows is a synthetic reading of their 
thought, which offers a platform for the kind of philosophical re-orientations needed 
to approach the ongoing question of Eurocentrism in the critical liberal peace 
debate, and indeed more widely in the study of world politics. Whilst there are 
significant differences between their standpoints which are important in considering 
them more holistically as thinkers, in what follows I will focus on some common 
areas of concern which are relevant to these issues.
239
 
 
II. Anti-colonial activists as critical thinkers 
 
The extraordinary context in which these thinkers operated is particularly 
important for an appreciation of the significance of their thought. Césaire and Fanon 
were brought up in Martinique under French assimilationist colonialism, working as 
professionals in Martinique but spending time in Paris for their higher education. 
The young Fanon however also studied in Martinique under Césaire, who was a 
deeply important influence on him. Cabral was brought up in Cape Verde but was 
educated in Lisbon during the Salazar regime. In this sense, they had unusual access 
to education and wealth compared to the vast majorities in their countries of birth. 
During these earlier decades of the twentieth century, the social networks formed in 
colonial capitals amongst black students from the colonies, including sympathisers 
amongst European thinkers and political movements, were very important as 
counter-hegemonic intellectual networks in which various ideas circulated. As such, 
they may be regarded as nodes in a broader historical political movement which was 
actively involved in bringing about – it is no exaggeration to say – worldwide 
political change. 
 
 The individual careers of the three thinkers were however also of relevance 
to the analyses they developed of colonialism. Césaire returned to Martinique in 
1939, qualified to teach French literature, and was already a poet of some renown. 
Surrealist André Bréton was a close colleague who had taken up re-publishing his 
work for a wider audience – in particular the poem Notebook on Returning Home. 
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Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism was written in 1950, shortly after his return to 
Martinique, and published in English three years afterwards.  He went on to become 
much more active politically, joining the French Communist Party for a short time 
until he fell out with them over the Hungarian uprising in 1956. He continued to be 
active in Martinican politics as mayor of Fort-de-France and founder of the 
Martinican Progressive Party until the beginning of this century.  All the while, 
however, Césaire also pursued his politics through his art in plays and poetry, 
including in biopics of Henri Christophe and Patrice Lumumba, and in a radical re-
writing of The Tempest.
240
 As will be discussed further on, Césaire used his 
platform as a poet and politician to ask questions about the human and cultural 
dimensions of colonialism and racism, which was a fundamental grounding for his 
critique of colonial politics. 
 
Fanon’s short career was in some ways more deeply interwoven with the 
colonial machine. After studying under Césaire in Martinique at the lycée, he served 
in the Free French Army, initially on the European front, for two years. Whilst 
studying medicine in Lyon, he began to write Black Skin, White Masks, which was 
published the year after he qualified as a doctor. In 1953, he accepted a post in a 
psychiatric hospital in Algeria, where he instituted ‘radical changes’ in the practice 
of colonial psychiatry. Yet, increasingly unwilling to treat the symptoms of the 
colonial situation rather than the cause, he resigned in 1956 and put his efforts into 
working with the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) both inside and outside 
Algeria, both writing its central publication El Moujahid and representing the FLN 
in various conferences abroad. However, by late 1960 his leukaemia had become 
apparent. He rushed to complete The Wretched of the Earth in 1961 in Tunis, before 
dying in Washington in December, and being smuggled in for burial in Algeria.
241
 
Fanon’s intimate acquaintance with colonial psychology and psychiatry clearly left 
a deep impression on his writings, and in particular, as we will see, on the ways in 
which he understood the relationship between people and society.  
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 Cabral’s professional training and experience as an agronomist kept him in 
close contact with the land and the socio-economic issues of agriculture, which was 
to become a central pillar of his political response to colonialism. Born in colonial 
Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau) to Cape Verdean parents, Cabral earned a scholarship 
to study agronomy in Lisbon in 1945. Simultaneously, he became closely involved 
with the emerging lusophone African nationalist movements at the Casa dos 
Estudantes, organising and meeting regularly with fellow students. After graduating 
with high honours in 1951, he undertook a range of work for the Portuguese 
agricultural ministry, much of which involved closely surveying the soils in 
Portugal, Guinea, Cape Verde and Angola over a period of years. This travel 
allowed him to found the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e 
Cabo Verde) in 1956, and also to reinforce and deepen the connections with other 
anti-colonial movements such as the MPLA (Movimento Popular da Liberação de 
Angola). It was during this time that Cabral also developed his distinctive analytic 
approach to the question of African liberation, which drew heavily on his own 
understanding of political economy and social order. Cabral led what was widely 
understood to be a highly successful peasant revolutionary war in Guinea-Bissau 
against the Portuguese. Although he was assassinated in 1973, politically the 
PAIGC had all but succeeded in its attempt to overthrow the colonial authority.
242
  
 
 These three figures thus had quite different but connected lives, which we 
see implicated closely with the kind of political thought that they developed. The 
African independence movements were closely personally connected with each 
other, and to a lesser extent the other decolonisation movements from Asia and 
Latin America. Yet, at least as important as the general intellectual climate were 
their personal experiences as colonial subjects and as professionals at the ‘coalface’ 
of colonialism – particularly for Fanon and Cabral. This experience, combined with 
conviction that the colonial experience was of a distinctive kind,
243
 had substantially 
alienated them from the mainstream left in France and Portugal at the time, with 
Fanon and Cabral never joining the respective Communist Parties, and Césaire 
leaving the French Communist Party in 1956.  
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 This chapter will next explore are some specific ways in which the anti-
colonial thinkers’ political departures from European movements were connected to 
and supported by specific philosophical departures in the nature and form of 
political critique. It is clearly impossible to do justice to the complexities and 
contradictions of these works with such an exercise in the context of the thesis; 
nonetheless it is possible to use them as a lamplight for more contemporary issues 
through this re-telling. Although they are influenced by the kinds of arguments that 
Hobson and Lenin use regarding the character of imperialism, they understand the 
objectives of critique and the character of colonial oppression quite differently. 
Towards the end of the chapter, we will reflect on how these philosophical 
departures can also help understand the conceptual limitations of the contemporary 
critical debate on the liberal peace. 
 
III. Re-orientating political critique 
 
As McCulloch argues, it is important to see Césaire, Fanon and Cabral as 
responding directly to their discomfort with Eurocentric or reductive accounts of 
political order and the colonial condition.
244
 This is very apparent where there is 
direct engagement of a particular thinker, such as between Fanon and Sartre,
245
 but 
can also be understood as directed towards the broad environment of imperial and 
anti-imperial thought, which were dominated by liberal and Leninist accounts of 
imperialism. This discomfort stemmed in part from the mismatch between the 
contemporary context of anti-colonial antagonism and revolt, and the failure of 
European political theory to comprehend its significance.  
 
This is interesting to us now because of the problem-space laid out in 
Chapter Two in the critiques of the liberal peace, which I have suggested have 
tended to analytically marginalise or represent sparsely the experiences of intended 
beneficiaries, whilst strongly emphasising the distinctively Western or neoliberal 
                                                 
244
 Ibid., 112. 
245
 Bernasconi, R. (2007). On Needing Not to Know and Forgetting What One Never Knew The 
Epistemology of Ignorance in Fanon's Critique of Sartre, in Sullivan, S. and N. Tuana (2007). Race 
and epistemologies of ignorance, State University of New York Press  
96 
 
character of hierarchical intervention. The philosophical departures of anti-
colonialism however shine a light on other possible ways to think about the political 
subject and social relations in a way which is helpful for reframing the debate. 
 
i. The embodied, situated subject of politics 
 
In making demands for political recognition, equality and autonomous status 
in the context of the decolonising movement, anti-colonial thinkers realised they 
had to overturn the ways of thinking which insisted on deferring this for colonial 
subjects. These were connected to forms of scientific and cultural racism as well as 
to historically teleological accounts of political society. Such accounts, for which 
we have taken Hobson and Lenin as representatives, depended on ontologies of a 
human subject and political economy which were at their most advanced or free in 
white, civilised, capitalist Europe.  Rejecting this understanding of the subject was 
therefore a critically important dimension of decolonising political thinking.  
 
In the first place, anti-colonial thought critiqued the absence of the non-
European political subject. Césaire’s work, emerging first chronologically amongst 
the three, recognised in colonial politics the denial of ‘African Presence’ – the title 
of an influential journal published and edited with Léopold Senghor.
246
  The denial 
of presence – understood in literary, historical, cultural terms – was, they argued, 
what allowed the justification that ‘civilisation’ was being brought by Europe to 
Africa. Césaire’s work was thus directed against the rejection of black civilisation 
that was both implicit and explicit in their discourses. The notion of ‘Négritude’, 
developed in the work of Senghor as well as Césaire, was a means of trying to 
identify and come to terms with the wrench in social, cultural and historical terms 
that slavery had meant for many people of African descent, as well as re-establish a 
deeper notion of being ‘black and proud’ through engaging with this.247 Most 
famously, the Notebook on Returning Home / to the Native Land is a set of 
reflections on what blackness / ‘négritude’ meant both as a source of historical 
misery and possible strength for the future. This was clearly a crucial part of 
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building up an understanding of people as subjects with political significance, 
historical presence, agency and the right to claim freedom. As such, Césaire is re-
grounding the historical lineages of Caribbean blacks from the rivers of the 
Zambeze and Congo through the Haitian revolution.
248
 Yet it involved a complex 
re-evaluation of the historical consciousness of what ‘blackness’ represented, 
particularly for the diasporas of Martinique and the wider Caribbean. To re-
construct the embodied history of the diaspora was necessary intellectually; yet it 
was also to come to terms with the painful ambiguities of this history which was not 
like the victors’ history told of Europe.249 The sense of this task being nonetheless 
unavoidable is clear from Césaire’s work – to fail to reflect on Africa as an 
embodied historical subject is to render Europe’s presence within it as inevitable.  
 
Going beyond the need to redress ‘absence’ per se, Fanon radicalises the 
understanding of the political subject as being fundamentally ‘embodied’ in the 
world, with what he labels a critique of ontology or Being. This can be understood 
in the context of Sartrean existential philosophy, with which he was a fellow 
traveller, which critiqued the transcendental subject as the basis for philosophy.
250
 
For Fanon, most clearly in Black Skin, White Masks, there was no hope of 
understanding the black man through a transcendental subject of philosophy, which 
erased and negated both his experience of being and his subjecthood: 
 
Ontology – once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside – 
does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must 
the black man be black; he must also be black in relation to the white 
man…The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white 
man.
251
  
 
Thus, a political philosophy based on the abstraction of ontology, disregarding the 
lived experience of racialised political life would be unable to analyse and address 
the alienating ‘massive psychoexistential complex’252 that colonialism had 
produced. The transcendental subject of European philosophy was a canard 
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‘human’, to which the white man aspired, and to which the black man never could 
on white society’s terms.253 Fanon’s argument was thus that racialised subjecthood 
and political consciousness was instead to be understood largely ‘sociogenically’ – 
generated and invented through social relations. The attempt to make a 
transcendental subject the ‘proper’ subject of politics is thus the attempt to ignore 
the social relations and processes of recognition and identification which constitute 
and make possible human being.  
 
Fanon’s critique is thus one which challenges the negation of the black 
subject as a human and a political subject, which is a negation produced by a 
combination of racial over-determination from the white gaze, as well as adherence 
to an implicitly white model transcendental subject of politics.
254
 These combined 
tendencies produce an empty mimicry as the only possible future for black political 
subjects in a racialised social order, in which one’s sense of self will always conflict 
with society’s interpretation of one’s misplacement or lesser status. Fanon argues 
that this is deeply alienating, and will ultimately end in defeat for the black subject: 
 
Nevertheless with all my strength I refused to accept that amputation. I feel in 
myself a soul as immense as the world, truly a soul as deep as the deepest of 
rivers, my chest has the power to expand without limit. I am a master and I am 
advised to adopt the humility of the cripple. Yesterday, awakening to the world, 
I saw the sky turn upon itself utterly and wholly. I wanted to rise, but the 
disembowelled silence fell back upon me, its wings paralyzed. Without 
responsibility, straddling Nothingness and Infinity, I began to weep.
255
  
 
This powerful passage brings out precisely the existential dilemma that a racialised 
transcendental construction of subjecthood delivers for Fanon – it is a conceptual 
delimitation of the ways which he is allowed to exist and be present in the world; it 
is an ontological set-up that will always exclude him. The negation of embodiment 
required by an abstracted formulation of the human subject has produced a trap for 
the colonial, racialised subject. As I will discuss further on, this trap of abstraction 
resonates with the paradox of liberalism identified in Chapter Two. For Fanon, one 
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way out of this is through a recovering a phenomenological approach to the 
understanding of the social world, which focuses on subjectively and inter-
subjectively experienced dimensions of being. A focus on embodied experience 
thus offers a potential for political critique that a transcendental or abstract 
conception of politics cannot: it is the path between ‘Nothingness and Infinity’ in 
which concrete liberating action must be understood.   
 
If Césaire rejected the negation of cultural-historical presence, and Fanon 
the negation of embodied being, Cabral can be understood as rejecting the 
derogation of African subjecthood within the historical teleology of orthodox 
Marxism. In this Cabral was also a strong advocate of appreciating the essentially 
situated and specific nature of critique and struggle. Whilst he certainly did not 
reject the underlying theoretical premises of Marxism regarding the nature of 
capitalism, he considered them useless outside of a context in which they could be 
made relevant. As Chabal argues,  
 
Cabral’s analysis shows that he was not concerned with a theoretical discussion 
of Marxism per se, but with its relevance to colonised societies. His historical 
specificity and his uncompromisingly African perspective were implicit 
criticisms of much orthodox European Marxism of the time. ‘Marxism is not a 
religion’, he once said, and Marx did not write about Africa.256 
 
Thus critique meant not only specifying the experiential content of colonialism, but 
also being careful about the particularities of the Guinean-Cape Verdean context as 
opposed to other revolutionary contexts. One could not simply replicate, as he 
famously argued, the Cuban revolution, in Guinea, as Guinea had different 
geographical, economic, social, cultural and political structures.
257
 Historical 
specificity was important on two fronts for Cabral; firstly, it had strategic value in 
supporting the struggle for national liberation with which he was preoccupied, but 
secondly, it aligned with his broadly ‘people-centred’ approach to political 
philosophy.  Chabal’s view is that this rendered Cabral a deeply pragmatic figure, 
who was simply sceptical in a broad sense about the value of theory alone. Indeed 
there is something in Cabral’s statements which confirms this, particularly in his 
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critique of Marxism and his characteristic humility around the implications of his 
own approach. It is a sentiment that resonates with Fanon’s sense of an embodied 
critique: ‘I do not come with timeless truths’, rather that his analysis speaks to ‘my 
century, my country, my existence… I belong irreducibly to my time’.258 
 
However, McCulloch argues that the implications of Cabral’s thought are in 
fact themselves theoretically significant as an alternative African theory of 
imperialism.
259
 Indeed, he goes to some lengths to substantiate his approach around 
‘the weapon of theory’ and the importance of engaging conceptually with each site 
of struggle.
260
 McCulloch argues that Cabral’s insistence on looking at class 
formation in pre-colonial Africa was a major departure from theories of imperialism 
which assumed that Africa had been classless and pre-historical before the arrival of 
the Europeans, as well as a critique of more essentialist writings on Négritude.
261
 
Indeed, Cabral refused, politically and analytically, to ignore the historical 
experience of African societies. His subsequent theoretical focus on the mode of 
production as a key element of social structure was a means of getting to what he 
understood as the ‘reality of the land’ in Guinea and the particular impact that 
Portuguese imperialism had had on its productive use.
262
 Serequeberhan argues that 
for Cabral, there was a constant dialectical interplay between the conceptualisation 
of experience and the experience itself.
263
 As with Fanon, then, the need to begin 
with rather than exclude embodied experiences led to a fundamental re-appraisal of 
political theory. 
 
To summarise, although it happens in quite different ways for these thinkers, 
we can interpret a common concern that decolonising political critique needed to be  
based on an ‘embodied’ subject. First, it needed to attack the somatic, racialised 
ordering of humanity which made African subjects non-entities in a political sense. 
Second, however, it needed to reclaim the embodied, rather than transcendental, 
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subject as a source and site of political critique. For Césaire, the negritude 
movement served more or less this purpose – it worked through a reframing of 
racial embodiment, being unable to escape it. In Fanon’s later writings, especially 
The Wretched of the Earth, political violence against colonialism became articulated 
as the embodied response to the political violence embedded within colonialism.
264
  
 
The third sense in which the political subject needed to be ‘embodied’ in 
decolonising thought is in its historical specificity or timeliness. This is a further 
aspect of the decolonising critique of an abstract or transcendental subject of 
ideology; rather, ideologies are directed towards particular historical problems and 
have value insofar as they help imagine a future for the subjects of this period. As 
mentioned, Cabral is strongly associated with this position in his critique of Leninist 
revolutionary theory, which I have suggested derives from political as well as 
practical concerns. As Gordon argues, for Fanon, this is because ontology which is 
abstracted from its concrete, sociogenic conditions is precarious: if the world with 
which the text was consistent was disordered, the consistency of the text itself had 
nothing to recommend it.
265
 Clearly this is a understanding of the need for historical 
embedding in political thought which is distinct to that of Cabral, who sees the 
African peasantry has having a distinctive niche in history; nonetheless they share 
an understanding that political critique – in their time the project of national 
liberation – is necessarily grounded in its own situation. When interviewed in later 
life, Césaire made a similar point regarding thinking on Négritude – that it was a 
timely statement of blackness directed against the alienating conditions of racism.
266
 
 
By contrast, looking back towards the critiques of the liberal peace 
discussed in the previous chapter, the notion of an embodied, situated subject of 
politics – in all three senses – is largely absent. This absence is most obvious in 
terms of the intended beneficiaries of the liberal peace, whose presence in the 
analysis is mostly non-existent. When intended beneficiaries are invoked, however, 
they are usually silent, their subjecthoods often compromised via co-optation or 
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governmentality, or else they are defined by a space outside liberal politics which is 
culturally authentic or communitarian in character. They may appear to be 
strategically engaged, but these strategies are cynical and have no political meaning. 
Alternatively, they may simply belong to the ‘surplus populations’ of capitalism. 
Yet, they are not understood to be proper subjects of politics. 
 
In all of these analytic frameworks, one has a sense of the dispensability of 
the target subject, who is over-determined from without by the hegemonic power of 
the liberal peace and the paradox of liberalism. In response to recent critiques, 
authors have increasingly begun to talk about ‘resistance’, but even this takes place 
on the terrain of analysis already established between the liberal and local.
267
 There 
is thus no need to engage with the specific historical conditions, experiences or 
meanings given to social and political relations, or the distinctiveness of these in 
one case rather than another. Rather, the subject of intervention can be understood 
as either transcendentally proto-liberal/welfarist, as in the case of Chandler and 
Pugh, or transcendentally ‘local’, as in the case of Richmond.  Yet, if we follow 
Fanon’s critique of the transcendental subject, this analytic set-up negates the 
necessarily embodied character of political subjecthood as well as the potential that 
embodied subjecthood offers as a basis of critique.  I would add, however, that it 
also disembodies intervention and interveners, who become reduced to ciphers of 
‘liberalism’ and the liberal political project in the analysis.  
 
One of the aims of an alternative critical analysis of the liberal peace then 
might be to reconstruct an understanding of what an engagement with ‘embodied’ 
political subjects of the liberal peace would look like. Although there are snippets of 
such engagement within the existing debate, particularly in Mac Ginty’s work, these 
have been incidental rather than deliberate in terms of the analysis. The engagement 
with embodied subjecthood on the other hand is a guiding preoccupation and 
orientation for the rest of this thesis. Chapter Four reflects in further detail about 
what this would entail and how this can be achieved by a set of decolonising 
research strategies.  
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ii. A multi-dimensional conception of politics 
 
Related to the emphasis on the embodied character of the political subject, 
these three thinkers also insisted that colonial domination was of an essentially 
multi-dimensional nature, and that understanding all of these multiple dimensions 
was critical. This multiplicity comprised what can be understood as structural and 
experiential dimensions, involving historical, political, economic and other 
domains, which worked at levels which were personal, social and systemic, and 
these bases of domination were understood as being reciprocal and dependent on 
each other.
268
 In this then, one has an idea of the interconnected environment in 
which the colonised subject operates.  
 
As implied by the previous discussion, theoretical reduction, purity and 
parsimony were not considered particularly helpful as foundations for political 
analysis for the anti-colonial thinkers. As Fanon put it, ‘Reality, for once, requires a 
total understanding. On the objective level as on the subjective level, a solution has 
to be supplied.’269 From the outset, it is the emphasis on activism – on finding a 
‘solution’ to the experience of domination – which pushes critique towards a multi-
dimensional account of politics that understands its lived dimensions. 
 
For all three, this manifested as a continuous back-and-forth between the 
analyses of broad structures and the concrete manifestations in the lives of the 
colonised, although with variations in how they saw the relations between the 
levels. Importantly, however, all perceived that there were forms of disjuncture 
between the grand analytic diagnoses offered by European thinkers and the 
experiences of the colonised.  
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Cabral’s account of the political economy is typically structured in this way, 
moving between a focus on the ‘reality’ of dispossession and violence in the 
colonies and a structuralist line which explores the global system of imperialist 
capitalism, as exemplified in the Havana speech.
 270
 Throughout his body of 
analysis however, runs the need to start from ‘the reality of the land’.271 This is 
accentuated in his internal exhortations given to the audience of fellow activists in 
Guinea, where he consistently grounds his arguments in the specific details of 
colonial power.
272
  
 
Andrade argues that it was the conduct of the agricultural survey of Guinea 
in 1953 that gave Cabral the rooted and concrete analysis of ‘the basic, essential 
motivations for the struggle against colonial domination’.273 The findings of this 
survey underpin Cabral’s writings on the ‘economic reality’ of Portuguese 
colonialism, which speak to the specifics of the Guinean and Cape Verdean 
economies, detailing his mother’s paltry and inconsistent wages at the fish-packing 
station, to the comparative weakness of the port infrastructure, the consistent 
shortages arising from agricultural practice.
274
 His indictments in Portuguese 
Colonial Domination, one of the early liberation struggle pamphlets published in 
1960, lists a number of economic complaints against colonialism, including the non-
ownership of cultivated property, the forced acceptance of low prices, the driving of 
Africans off more profitable land and crop holdings, the high profits of the colonial 
companies, the ‘native tax’ on Africans and the spending of these revenues on 
Europeans. His last analogy is a visually and politically arresting one: ‘The setting 
up of each European family costs Angola one million escudos. For an African 
peasant family to earn that much money, it would have to live for a thousand years 
and work every year without stopping.’275  
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Davidson notes this was a particularly impressive skill or facility of Cabral 
as an educator and political thinker – the ability to see the linkages from theory and 
structure to the manifest reality of the world around him.
276
 I would however go 
further and suggest that this ‘double reading’ of the world was of very specific 
importance for anti-colonial political thinkers, who were openly conscious of the 
different directions in which experience and theory could pull, particularly where 
theory seemed to imagine itself distantly from the site of rule. Intimately linked to 
the recovery of the embodied subject, then, must be a form of analysis of experience 
that can flesh out this embodiment and make it live.  
 
For Fanon’s conception of the embodied subject, for example, engaging 
with the phenomenological experiential content of social relations is fundamental, 
because, as we have noted, the racialised subject is sociogenically constituted. As 
Gibson puts it, racial difference ‘was grounded in a social and historical context and 
was the result of a lived experience not an ontological flaw: one is not born Black 
but becomes Black, to rephrase de Beauvoir’.277 As noted above, Fanon looked for 
solutions on ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ levels. It is on this front that Gibson takes 
exception to interpretations of Fanon that only take up his work from a 
psychoanalytic or textual-discursive angle – Fanon himself is clear from the outset 
in Black Skins that there are concrete political and economic structures at work in 
the production of being.
278
  
 
Yet the content of the experience is such that it sometimes exceeds structural 
analysis dimensions which are nonetheless significant for the way that the world is 
– in terms of the alienation produced within violence, economic dispossession, sex, 
language and class hierarchies as obvious examples. This excess of manifestation 
does not stand outside what colonialism is; rather it is a constitutive part of the 
social whole and the relations between the people within it. Maintaining a multi-
dimensional frame for analysis and moving between the different dimensions and 
different levels is thus necessary for understanding, and eventually changing, the 
realities of colonial social order. 
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In Césaire’s reading, analysing the manifest dimensions of colonialism has a 
more strategic rhetorical purpose. This reading allows him to mount a direct and 
stinging critique of the violent hypocrisies of rule which a reading of its capitalist 
economic structures alone would not necessarily facilitate: 
 
In other words, the essential thing here is to see clearly, to think clearly – that 
is, dangerously – and to answer clearly the innocent first question: what, 
fundamentally, is colonization?
279
 
 
One of the most important intellectual strategies Césaire deployed in his visceral 
and pointed polemic Discourse on Colonialism was the critical inversion he 
performed on the claims of colonialism to ‘civilise’ the South; in fact, he argued, 
colonialism actively worked to de-civilise the coloniser through its use of violent 
and racist repression.
280
 Importantly, for Césaire these were not incidental or 
aberrant ‘implementation problems’ of colonialism but written into its degenerative 
logic of domination. As a strategy of public, political, anti-colonial critique its force 
was undeniable – the colonial emperor not only lacked clothing but was actually 
himself the barbarian at the gates, bringing not peace as he claimed, but violence.   
 
Importantly, Césaire performed this inversion by building up a 
phenomenological picture of the material realities of colonialism, which put into 
context its supposed achievements and intentions:  
 
They throw facts at my head, statistics, mileages of roads, canals, and railroad 
tracks. 
 
I am talking about thousands of men sacrificed to the Congo-Océan? I am 
talking about those who, as I write this, are digging the harbor of Abidjan by 
hand…  
 
They dazzle me with the tonnage of cotton or cocoa that has been exported, the 
acreage that has been planted with olive trees or grapevines. 
 
I am talking about natural economies that have been disrupted, harmonious and 
viable economies adapted to the indigenous population-- about food crops 
destroyed, malnutrition permanently introduced, agricultural development 
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oriented solely toward the benefit of the metropolitan countries; about the 
looting of products, the looting of raw materials.
281
  
 
In this passage Césaire delivers an emerging sense of the physical world of 
colonialism – of how it implicates human labour and natural resources, and the 
resulting distributive impact of the system – in marked contrast with the abstract 
developmental accomplishments proclaimed by the colonisers. The way in which 
the world materialises is very important in understanding how and why it is to be 
criticised – indeed for Césaire this results in reality being the opposite of the world 
that the colonisers believe themselves to be living in: 
 
The proof is that at present it is the indigenous peoples of Africa and Asia who 
are demanding schools, and colonialist Europe which refuses them; that it is the 
African who is asking for ports and roads, and colonialist Europe which is 
niggardly on this score; that it is the colonized man who wants to move 
forward, and the colonizer who holds things back.
282
 
 
Césaire’s phenomenological reading of the political economy of colonialism 
against the grain was thus aimed at producing a particular kind of truth through 
exposing contradictions – one that sought to embarrass power on its own terms as 
well as one that could be shared by those subject to it. Whilst the systemic and 
structural logic of capitalism provided an overall framework of analysis which he 
was content to use, it was fundamentally inadequate on its own as a political theory 
or framework. Here we might read the importance of phenomenological analysis in 
decolonising thought in the light of a more specific and embodied conception of 
political struggle outlined in the previous section. As Césaire declared upon 
resigning from the French Communist party, “I would say that no doctrine is 
worthwhile unless rethought by us, rethought for us, converted to us.” 283 
 
We can see, then, that phenomenological analysis was associated with a kind 
of intellectual freedom in critique – the ability to break out of the mental 
frameworks imposed by abstract or theoretical analyses of the colonial situation and 
‘see’ the question in a different way.  For Cabral, the focus on the specific 
experiences of the global economy allowed him to re-articulate an alternative 
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understanding of imperialism; for Fanon, the phenomenological dimensions allowed 
him to dissect and argue against racism, and for Césaire, looking at the experiences 
of colonialism allowed him to counter its propaganda as a force for ‘civilisation’. 
What is important for this thesis is that this process of defining and re-defining the 
problem through a phenomenological approach was itself an important kind of 
‘critical theory’ – the attempt to change the terms of engagement through a re-
evaluation. 
 
It is in this conception of the liberating potential of experience that ‘culture’ 
emerges as particularly important in anti-colonial critique as part of the framework 
of existential struggle. Césaire, Fanon and Cabral are in some senses importantly 
universalists, committed to anti-racism and humanism, as will be discussed below. 
Yet all emphasise the need for developing national ‘culture’ to recover a political 
subject that acts and does so on terms not determined by colonial power. For 
Césaire, as we have noted, this is the point of the Négritude movement. Fanon notes 
that colonial domination  
 
is not satisfied merely with hiding a people in its grip and emptying the native’s 
brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of 
the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys it. This work of 
devaluing pre-colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today…284  
 
The understanding of the colonised as properly historical and ‘cultured’ 
subjects is thus a necessary response to the tabula rasa presumptions of the colonial 
powers: ‘The concept of Negro-ism [read: Négritude], for example, was the 
emotional if not the logical antithesis  of that insult which the white man flung at 
humanity’.285 Cabral argues that ‘… whatever the material aspects of this 
domination, it can be maintained only by the permanent, organized repression of the 
cultural life of the people concerned.’286 This is because for Cabral ‘culture is the 
vigorous manifestation on the ideological or idealist plane of the physical and 
historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be dominated’.287 Although 
Cabral’s definition of culture is never fully elaborated, it is clear that he regards 
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culture as being expressive of a people’s history, experience and the environment, 
which is the ‘reality’ of social life.288 As such, cultural domination represents not 
just an auxiliary means of control but the basic ontological violation of a people: ‘It 
attains the highest degree of absurdity in the Portuguese case, where Salazar 
affirmed that Africa does not exist.’289  
 
For both Fanon and Cabral, ‘culture’ is important because, as Cabral argues, 
different realms of domination are ‘reciprocal and dependent’ on one another, again 
reinforcing the multiplicity of dimensions of rule and struggle.
290
 Yet, ‘culture’ is 
not necessarily to be interpreted only in its historical/traditional dimensions but as 
relating to contemporary activity. For Fanon, for example, a ‘national culture is the 
whole body of efforts made by a people in the sphere of thought to describe, justify 
and praise the action through which that people has created itself and keeps itself in 
existence’.291 It is thus an affirmation of subjecthood made against its persistent 
denial. Culture thus broadly also encompasses deliberate action on this front that 
emerges from struggle itself: ‘if imperialist domination has the vital need to practise 
cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily an act of culture’.292  
 
The emphasis on culture then speaks both to the attempt to recover or 
reconstruct an embodied and specific subject of politics, as well as the 
understanding that colonial domination and the struggle against it are inherently 
multi-faceted and multi-foundational. Social reality then must be apprehended 
through a framework which attempts to engage this complexity through a 
combination of both structural and phenomenological dynamics of analysis. 
Engaging with these dynamics is important for critical theory in terms of creating 
room for lateral re-thinking of the problems of domination, through attempting 
comprehension of the ‘excess’ that is produced in the experience of domination. 
 
Going back once more to the liberal peace debate unpacked in Chapter Two, 
it becomes clearer most of its critics tend to fixate on what might be called 
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‘structural’ dynamics, be they the needs of capitalism, the logical implications of 
liberal political theory or the failures thereof, or a broader sense of West-Other 
global relations. ‘Experience’, in terms of the experiences of the intended targets of 
social transformation, is analysed only rarely, and then in many cases only as a 
failure of the structure rather than presenting its own phenomenological challenges 
which are in excess of the structural questions.  One approach which begins to move 
in this direction are works such as that of Mac Ginty which emphasise the ‘hybrid’ 
character of the liberal peace in practice, and thus point to the distinctiveness of the 
concrete manifestation.
293
 Yet Mac Ginty maintains that this should not be seen 
something autonomous or in excess of the hybridisation dynamic.
294
  As I will argue 
later in the thesis along the lines of the anti-colonial framing, this is perhaps to miss 
important relations in order to maintain the liberal-local framing of the politics of 
intervention. 
 
 If, as argued in the previous section, however, it is useful to think about the 
embodied political subject as a subject for critique in intervention, it is also 
necessary to reflect on the phenomenological and experiential dimensions of 
intervention as part of the analysis alongside grand narratives of social structure. 
Anti-colonial thought used this strategy as a way of coming to terms with the 
simultaneously unified and differentiated character of social life; whilst 
commonalities, expressed as structures or abstractions, were important, they could 
not alone form the basis of a strategy of liberation. Moreover, they failed to 
understand domination as implicated in many aspects of human experience.  In the 
latter half of the thesis, I attempt to develop a closer engagement with the concrete 
dimensions of intervention, in order to analyse the liberal peace from a critical 
perspective which is both more holistic and open to the excesses of experience. 
 
iii. The ‘new humanism’ as ethical grounding 
 
Although the thinkers under discussion were concerned with the particular 
embodiment of the subject, social and historical specificity and the necessities of 
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cultural expression, they were nonetheless committed universalists who affirmed the 
need for ‘humanism’ as a basis for political ethics. In mainstream European political 
theory such positions are thought to be contradictory, characterised as a debate 
between universalist cosmopolitan and particularist communitarian political 
philosophies.
295
 For the thinkers discussed here, however, I would suggest that the 
call to found a ‘new humanism’ is a distinctive and useful way of approaching the 
problems of racism, Eurocentrism and alienation that characterised the experience of 
colonialism, and complements rather than contradicts the analyses of human being 
as embodied and multi-foundational. 
 
In the first place, then, humanism is a critique of racism, particularly for 
Césaire. In Discourse, one of the key lines of argument is that colonialism, rather 
than ‘humanising’ or ‘civilising’ the colonies, has de-humanised both the coloniser 
and the colonised through putting them together in a relationship of violent and 
absolute negation. The logical conclusion of this violent mission for Césaire is 
fascism: 
 
Yes, it would be worthwhile to study clinically, in detail, the steps taken by 
Hitler and Hitlerism and to reveal to the very distinguished, very humanistic, 
very Christian bourgeois of the twentieth century that without his being aware 
of it, he has a Hitler inside him, that Hitler inhabits him, that Hitler is his 
demon, that if he rails against him, he is being inconsistent and that, at bottom, 
what he cannot forgive Hitler for is not the crime in itself, the crime against 
man, it is not the humiliation of man as such, it is the crime against the white 
man, the humiliation of the white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe 
colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved exclusively for the 
Arabs of Algeria, the "coolies" of India, and the "niggers" of Africa. And that is 
the great thing I hold against pseudo-humanism: that for too long it has 
diminished the rights of man, that its concept of those rights has been-and still 
is-narrow and fragmentary, incomplete and biased and, all things considered, 
sordidly racist.
296
  
 
Césaire here points out very clearly that the universalist values of humanism as they 
are preached by colonising powers are hollow – a ‘pseudo-humanism’ which until 
the Holocaust was only seen to be applied to whites. It is a powerful critique – 
particularly retrospectively – because it seems so obvious that racism and humanism 
should be contradictions of each other.  
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 Yet, the relationship is not that simple. As Shilliam argues, Kantian 
humanism was based on the predicated separation of the noumenal realm of Reason, 
from the phenomenal realm of the world.
297
  This allowed the dignity of human 
nature, the font of the categorical imperative, to be tied to a spatially and racially 
delimited idea of who ‘humans’ were in the real world based on a perception of the 
adequacy of their ethical faculties, even if in the noumenal realm human dignity 
was innate.
298
 Thus Kant was able to sustain a racist disdain for non-white peoples 
within his ethical scheme. Again, in this delimitation, we see something like the 
image of a transcendental subject performing the conceptual work of dividing the 
world into ‘proper’ subjects of humanism, who deserve to be treated as ends and not 
means, and as-yet-not-proper subjects of humanism, whose lack of ‘human’ 
faculties is itself threatening to humanism. As with the vision of the political 
subject, a transcendental ontology of humanism could be made consistent with the 
experience and practices of racial discrimination and violent ordering.  
 
 The ‘new humanism’ envisaged by anti-colonial thinkers therefore needed to 
be one which re-founded human relations on terms of engagement which were non-
exclusionary and, I want to emphasise, non-transcendental. Rather, the grounds for 
humanism derived from sharing concrete dimensions of embodied human 
experience. Fanon articulates the fascist-colonial link then in a way which offers 
some ground for this new humanism for its victims: ‘The Jew and I: Since I was not 
satisfied to be racialized, by a lucky turn of fate I was humanized. I joined the Jew, 
my brother in misery.’299  The notion of suffering as a basis for humanist solidarity 
is here very important.
300
 We see it also in Cabral, in the quote given at the 
beginning of the chapter: “I saw folk die of hunger in Cape Verde and I saw folk die 
from flogging in Guiné (with beatings, kicks, forced labour), you understand? This 
is the entire reason for my revolt.”301 Fanon here speaks to psychological suffering, 
and Cabral to physical suffering. Yet both find within this an ethical provocation 
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and a platform for what they see as a new humanism, which offers the possibility 
for a more solidaristic and inclusive kind of politics.  
 
This is particularly important for Fanon for overcoming two divisive 
tendencies immanent within colonialism. The first is the pervasive alienation 
produced in the ‘native’ by racism, dispossession, repression and violence, which is 
pathologised as a kind of mental disorder by the colonial authorities.  It is in this 
context that Fanon is ‘lucky’ to be joined in misery with the Jew, because this act of 
joining together represents a possibility for escape. The second divisive tendency 
against which a new humanism is to be set is what is identified as Europe’s 
‘increasingly obscene narcissism’302, which Fanon understands as having ‘stifled 
almost the whole of humanity in the name of a so-called spiritual experience’.303 A 
new humanism thus needed to  
 
reconsider the question of cerebral reality and of the cerebral mass of all 
humanity, whose connections must be increased, whose channels must be 
diversified and whose messages must be re-humanized.
304
 
 
The new humanism is understood in the context of a historical dialectic of 
freedom, in which white supremacy and Négritude both could give way to a re-
imagined universalism, and which is not exceptionalist and narcissistic but 
grounded in an understanding of human commonalities.
305
 Although Cabral was an 
advocate, as we have seen, for recovering a sense of national culture, he warned 
against over-glorifying African culture for its own uniqueness, reminding his 
followers wryly that others too ate with their hands and sat on the ground, and that 
‘[t]he important thing is not to waste time in more or less hair-splitting debates on 
the specificity or non-specificity of African cultural values, but to look upon these 
values as a conquest by a part of mankind for the common heritage of all 
mankind’.306 In this he echoes Césaire’s sense of the relationship between cultural 
nationalism and humanism in anti-colonial thought, which must retain a critique of 
the universal subject as empty and transcendental:  
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Provincialism? Not at all. I am not burying myself in a narrow particularism. 
But neither do I want to lose myself in an emaciated universalism. There are 
two ways to lose oneself: walled segregation in the particular or dilution in the 
“universal.”307 
 
If a universalist humanism cannot be discovered through rationalist 
philosophy, as in a Kantian framework, how, then, is it to be known? I have 
suggested here already that for Fanon and Cabral, recognition of common human 
suffering and alienation provide a crucial starting point.  What has not been 
elaborated though is the significance of this as a kind of poetic knowledge. 
According to Kelley, Césaire was explicit about the importance of poetry as a tool 
of creative revolutionary critique.
308
 It was important because, according to Césaire, 
it was a way of getting beyond the structural and into the excesses of the 
phenomenological: ‘What presides over the poem is not the most lucid intelligence, 
the sharpest sensibility or the subtlest feelings, but experience as a whole.’309 
Similarly, the sensibility towards humanism is not so much a rationalist one but a 
poetic one, born of a sense of aesthetic, empathetic and corporeal connection to a 
broader humanity. This sense of humanism is more contingent and fragile than one 
based on the logical dictates of a rationalist, transcendental – or indeed ideological – 
universalism; a sense of universal humanity is adopted not simply because it is 
right, but also because it is beautiful.   
 
This does not render it a less important part of the overall philosophical 
schema of anti-colonialism. If human subjects are to be understood as embodied and 
situated in particular historical conditions, they are also constituted by their 
communications and social interactions with one another, in which language plays a 
crucial role. Language, especially poetic language, is a hermeneutic basis for 
generating common emotional understanding of particular and subjective 
experiences such as physical suffering that exceeds what little can be adequately 
specified and communicated in abstract or scientific terms.  In this sense, a poetic 
sensibility becomes a pre-condition for an embodied humanist ethics which seeks to 
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avoid the emptiness of the transcendental subject and develop bases for mutual 
recognition. 
 
The embodied ethics of a ‘new humanism’ provides a further interesting 
point of departure when we look back at the formulations of political and ethical 
relations as emerging in the critiques of the liberal peace discussed in Chapter Two.  
There we see a persistent anxiety about the affirmation of a universalist ethical 
framework, particularly for Richmond, because it is seen as necessarily always 
collapsing into a hegemonic liberal project over other ‘local’ values. Somehow, 
then, it is necessary to develop a ‘post-liberal’ ethics which is simultaneously 
universalist but not, and this tension is not really resolved.  In the light of the 
foregoing discussion however, it might be useful to think about whether an 
embodied, situated universalism helps un-think this trap. Insofar as human ethics 
are understood as inherently aesthetic and expressive rather than derived from the 
necessities of rationality, it is possible to imagine a space for a solidaristic 
universalist ethics which does not automatically dominate the landscape of the 
political through the generation of binding claims for political authority. 
 
A similar point might also be directed towards Duffield, who calls finally for 
a ‘solidarity of the governed’310 as an ethical orientation against the hegemony of 
the liberal project. In the light of the Foucaultian framework used, as Chandler 
argues, this emerges as a potentially content-less form of solidarity.
311
 If the 
political subject is however understood as necessarily embodied, and able to relate 
to others through poetic language amongst other forms of communication, then 
there is a possibility for humanist solidarity to become much more substantial and 
concrete in character without buying into the ‘liberal project’. This alternative 
account of ethical humanism coheres with the multi-foundational account of human 
being and human experience discussed in the previous section.  This also replies to 
Chandler’s implicit insistence on the modern liberal subject as a necessary starting 
point for theorising politics and political ethics; this is not necessary if political 
ethics are understood as taking place between embodied subjects able to relate and 
communicate on the basis of human experience. In short, being a humanist does not 
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require one to buy into a transcendental account of universality which then 
translates into a mandate for forms of particular political interventions, or to reject 
non-bounded forms of political community.  
 
IV. Critiquing the liberal peace from an anti-colonial perspective 
 
In this thesis, I am proposing to apply similar kinds of intellectual strategies 
in order to think about the liberal peace debate. Contemporary critiques of the 
liberal peace defences and critiques have of course not been racist in the sense that 
J.A. Hobson was. As mentioned at the start of Chapter Two, one of the most 
distinctive hallmarks of their ‘post-colonial’ orientation is that they operate in and 
endorse an intellectual and political framework in which racism is de-legitimised as 
a justification for political rule.  Nor are they historically teleological in the sense of 
Lenin; whilst many operate using Marxist categories, the understanding of 
capitalism as being historically progressive is remote from analysis.  
 
Yet, when reflecting on the critiques in the light of anti-colonial thought, 
there is a sense of dissatisfaction with the understanding of the non-Western 
political subject as it is represented in the critical literature. Most often it is through 
a sense of emptiness or a cipher-like quality to Bosnian / Cambodian / Kosovan 
targeted recipients of the liberal peace, complemented by an ongoing sense of 
Western exceptionalism, even if the latter is understood as heavy-handed. This 
characterisation makes the intellectual maintenance of the ‘paradox of liberalism’ 
inevitable, in which ‘liberalism’ is critiqued for being hegemonic but also valued for 
being emancipatory, leading to all sorts of anxieties about how to deal with the 
liberal peace, and whether it would not be better if it was retained after all. 
 
I have likened this to the trap of the transcendental subject as it is discussed 
by Fanon, which compounds the alienation of racialised subjects who are excluded 
from the possibility of transcendence by the socialised construction of them as 
racialised. Real politics in this construction is thus only the domain of the white or 
the liberal.  For the anti-colonial thinkers, politics and political critique is always 
embodied in the experiences of human subjects and located in historical conditions. 
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These cannot be understood or adequately analysed from positions of abstraction or 
transcendence such as the model of a liberal self; rather a fuller understanding of 
embodied experience and subjecthood must form the starting point for critical 
thinking.  
 
Reconstructing the embodied subject then becomes an intellectually 
liberating move, in which the existential crisis of the ‘authenticity’ of the liberal 
subject is partly solved by presupposing that embodied subjects are already an 
authentic basis for political engagement. In the re-articulation of humanist ethics, 
anti-colonial thought also suggested that there were bases for humanist solidarity 
which did not automatically translate to a rational logic of domination but could be 
a source of respectful engagement. In order to challenge the logic and practices of 
colonialism, the anti-colonial thinkers here discussed found it essential to articulate 
a different vision of human political subjecthood that could reject the various 
categories of person set up by colonialism and the visions of ‘proper’ politics that 
European political thought had created. Therefore, the reconstruction of subjecthood 
involved rethinking what it meant to be a political being, what the political world 
consisted of and how human political subjects could relate to each other under such 
pervasive structures of differentiation. 
 
That critical theory has a purpose and politics, and that anti-colonial thinkers 
had a historically particular purpose and politics, is not a striking observation. What 
is interesting is the way that these thinkers responded to their particular purpose, 
which tells us something about the ways this purpose shaped them and their 
thinking. For these thinkers political critique is not abstract but necessarily 
embedded in both structural and experiential concerns that are a feature of that 
specific context. It must simultaneously engage and transcend the form of 
domination that it seeks to resist. If this form of domination appears to be not 
singular but plural and multi-modal, as seems the case in the analyses of 
imperialism and colonialism, then critical theories and strategies also need to deal 
with this diversity. This means that a historically purposive critical posture cannot 
be theoretically pure, although it can be substantively coherent in the context of its 
existence and purpose. Critique for these thinkers is the understanding of a set of 
contingent problems by developing explicit, relevant ontological and political 
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commitments, although the theoretical posture of principles is often articulated in 
response to a problem rather than vice versa.  
 
These three elements in the thought of Césaire, Fanon and Cabral – 
situatedness, multiplicity and humanism – offer an attractive platform from which 
to think about current challenges in the liberal peace debate and world politics more 
generally. Whilst critical accounts of world politics have recently been concerned to 
develop big-picture accounts of imperial global power and specifically of 
neoliberalism, these principles invite a deeper engagement with and interrogation of 
the concrete attempts to resist and transform the political order that already exist. 
They also offer a kind of reply to the problems of anti-foundationalism and alterity 
that poststructuralist critique has been struggling with in its analytic and political 
interventions, which is a reflective and appropriately grounded multi-
dimensionalism. As a platform for researching the nature of power in international 
politics, it reminds us of the need to engage in a sustained and renewed way with 
the situation of those who we regard as being dominated. In order to critique the 
liberal peace from a perspective of reconstructed subjecthood, it is necessary to 
imagine how to engage with and understand interventions from a position which 
uses these as working assumptions. This will be developed in the next chapter.  
 
Conclusions 
 
  This chapter has shown how anti-colonial thought approached the problems 
of colonialism and imperialism, and how they dealt with the tensions emerging from 
trying to combine structural analysis with a humanist phenomenological orientation. 
The effect of these expansions was to create characterisations of these phenomena 
which were more experientially embedded and specific, explicitly ethically and 
politically motivated by the recovery/discovery of the political subject that 
colonialism sought to control, humanism, and which provided a basis for action and 
rejection of these structures.  They were able to do this through employing theories 
which were diverse, eclectic, affectively challenging and faithful to the specificities 
of their contexts. I argue that this made them powerful and compelling as critical 
theories of social relations, intended to effect what they considered to be 
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emancipatory change through analysis and engagement with the purported 
problems.  In the rest of the thesis, it is the philosophical orientation and intellectual 
strategies of engagement in these position that I am interested in taking forward as a 
platform for critique; that is, the re-conceptualisation of the subject, the 
development of a grounded, multi-dimensional framework and the engagement of 
an alternative humanist ethics of critique.  
 
 In response to the absence of the subject identified in Chapter Two, the next 
chapter goes to work on how subjecthood might be reconstructed in the liberal 
peace debate, informed by the broad philosophical orientations of anti-colonial 
thought as developed in this chapter. In order to do this, Chapter Four explores 
different specific intellectual and methodological strategies for engaging with 
embodied subjects who are the target of liberal peace transformations.  This sets the 
stage for the reconstruction of the subjects of the liberal peace offered in the later 
chapters of the thesis.  
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Chapter Four 
Reconstructing the subjects of analysis: alternative narrative 
strategies for the liberal peace debate 
 
 
  
 In the spirit of critical activism pursued by anti-colonial thinkers, the next 
stage for this thesis is to set out ways in which these alternative conceptual 
frameworks can help us to see the world differently. Specifically, the task of this 
chapter is to set out how the world of the liberal peace can be understood differently 
in the light of anti-colonial critique, and in particular to advance more specific 
strategies to this end.  The following discussion reflects on the project of 
reconstructing the target societies of the liberal peace as embodied, situated and 
multi-dimensional subjects of analysis, in response to the present debate.
 312
  It does 
so in anticipation of the discussion of Mozambique which will occupy the latter part 
of the thesis. 
 
In the discussion section of Chapter Two, it was argued that the existing 
critical accounts of the liberal peace have tended to exclude, abstract, obscure or 
marginalise the target society as a significant subject of politics within their analytic 
frameworks. Rather, analyses have tended to focus dominantly on the views, 
discourses and practices of a powerful, (neo)liberal, interventionist West as the 
major subject of analysis. Target societies, on the other hand, tend to be represented 
very briefly and schematically in ways which put them outside the realm of the 
analyst’s gaze or interest. We saw these exclusions or reductions happening in 
different ways, which were based in part on authors’ different accounts of the nature 
of the political subject – post-interventionary, culturally-circumscribed, modern and 
liberal or needs and welfare-oriented.
313
 I argued that these tended to reinforce a 
Eurocentric ‘paradox of liberalism’, whereby despite the incisive critiques of the 
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social transformations effected by a (neo)liberal West, the alternatives suggested 
could not really picture a political future beyond liberal and/or Western 
circumscriptions. In this sense, in these narratives the liberal West and the liberal 
project retained an exceptionalist character in the narrative, albeit one which 
inspired suspicion. 
 
The largely absent, irrelevant or heavily stylised character of the targeted 
political subject in the critiques of the liberal peace contrasts with the embodied, 
situated and multi-dimensional conception of the colonised political subject in anti-
colonial thought. As argued in Chapter Three, anti-colonial thought determined to 
resist the Eurocentrisms embedded in critiques of imperialism by refusing the 
narrower abstractions of a racialised or historically determinist gaze. Rather, they 
employed alternative philosophical foundations for thinking about the social world 
which asserted the centrality of embodiment and experience in understanding the 
political subject. These foundations also emphasised that there were multiple related 
dimensions of being, and that humanist understanding was possible based on the 
shared character of social experience.  
 
As Chapter Three indicated, there are several points on which anti-colonial 
readings of the political subject as embodied and situated can begin to offer an 
alterative framework of anti-imperial critique to those currently at work in the 
liberal peace debate. The first part of this chapter will seek to extend these initial 
points of entry into three more substantive strategies for re-thinking the liberal 
peace. These three strategies – broadly speaking, historical, political and material – 
are subsequently each developed by the last four chapters of the thesis, with the 
latter across two chapters.  An understanding of ‘what’ is done however also 
necessarily begs a discussion of ‘how’ it is done. To address this, the second part of 
this chapter discusses three further issues of importance which underpin the 
development of the project: the sources used for the empirical research on 
Mozambique, the modes of reading of these sources, and the broader issue of 
interpretive research itself.  Although the considerations of the chapter are 
principally aimed at the liberal peace debate and the place of this project within it, 
there are also ways in which this debate resonates with broader concerns within the 
field concerning the possibility and place of interpretive research in critical projects. 
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As such, the reflections within this chapter may also have a wider bearing in 
thinking about critique in IR. 
 
I. Three strategies for reconstructing the subject 
 
Before the subjects of colonialism in Africa and Asia could be liberated from 
European colonial rule, it had to be re-emphasised that they did in fact exist as 
proper subjects of history and politics. Anti-colonial thought had to overcome what 
it understood as existential negations upon which justifications for colonialism were 
built, which included mental incapacity, political ignorance, historical 
insignificance, cultural immaturity, spiritual backwardness, scientific inferiority and 
so on.
314
 These intellectual diminutions were effectively existential negations 
because they barred the colonised subject from being able to authorise and conduct 
political life on terms not already defined by the colonial powers. As has been 
mentioned, for Fanon, colonial ordering had declared that ‘the black [was] not a 
man’315, and for Cabral it had declared ‘that Africa does not exist’.316 As such, the 
basic legitimacy of the colonial enterprise was in part substantiated through the 
premise that colonised societies had no relevant existence in the first place.
317
  
 
Analogously, I am arguing that the reductive representations and non-
presence of the target societies of the liberal peace in the critical literature is a major 
problem for anti-imperial projects of critique, particularly insofar as they aim to 
challenge the justifications for hegemonic projects of world ordering.  Although 
Paris’ recent defence of liberal peacebuilding from its critics is flawed in many 
respects, his claim that “nothing in the recent critical literature provides a 
convincing rationale for abandoning liberal peacebuilding or replacing it with a non-
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liberal or ‘post-liberal’ alternative”318 nonetheless resonates with the problem of the 
paradox of liberalism discussed earlier.  In this, some form of ‘liberal peace’ is 
rendered inevitable by the invisibility of any ‘alternative’ ideas, agents and 
implementers of social order. Even if tweaks are made regarding wider 
participation, more emancipatory approaches and greater social equity, these are 
characterised by Paris as variations of liberalism.
319
 Even putting aside the very 
wide understanding of liberalism that Paris chooses to employ, he is perhaps right to 
query the extent to which the critiques are able to articulate and imagine 
alternatives. The present critical imaginary regarding the liberal peace specifically 
but arguably more broadly within international relations does not make space for 
itself to understand what a world of politics outside or beyond a liberal imaginary 
would entail.  
 
The intellectual space must then be created within critique before such 
understandings can emerge. Using ideas from anti-colonial thought I below suggest 
distinct but connected strategies which enable the creation of a different space for 
understanding the significance of the liberal peace based on a series of engagements 
with the target society. Whilst these strategies are certainly not exhaustive of the 
ways in which the project of ‘decolonising’ research might take place in a broad 
sense, they do speak to specific forms of absence within the liberal peace debate as 
it stands.
320
   
 
i. Reconstructing historical presence 
 
In anti-colonial thought, it was argued that the negation of a society’s 
historical presence was an important part of both colonial strategies of rule and of 
the Eurocentric political imaginary. As noted in the previous chapter, whilst Césaire 
directed this critique against French colonialism, and Cabral directed it against 
Leninist orthodoxies, both colonialists and Lenin regarded the histories of colonised 
societies as largely irrelevant to the political questions of the day and to the history 
of the world in general.  Without a sense of ‘African presence’, of past cultures, 
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events and practices, the existential crisis which colonialism had produced could not 
be challenged or rejected.  Although it often took a celebratory form, it did not have 
to be a history which relentlessly glorified a pre-colonial African agency or 
presence; indeed, as noted earlier, some of Césaire’s work can be interpreted as 
being about coming to terms with the painful historical miseries of slavery.
321
 The 
point was to bring attention to colonial subjects as having histories in order to 
challenge the idea that they were blank slates waiting to be civilised. As Chapter 
Three argued, anti-colonial thought re-emphasised the already-embodied and 
situated character of both colonised and colonising human subjects. 
 
It is noteworthy that the major critiques of the liberal peace have almost 
completely failed to analyse the target societies of interventions as having histories 
which may be relevant to understanding the significance of intervention in the post-
conflict period. Neither Chandler or Pugh regard the history of Bosnia as a useful 
part of their analyses of the post-Dayton period, Richmond has very little to say 
about pre-liberal peace Cambodia, Kosovo or East Timor, and Duffield mentions 
historical detail about Afghanistan, Mozambique and even Sudan in only a very 
limited way.
322
 Rather, these spaces are defined simply as being the non-liberal sites 
of interventionary post-war transformations, upon which projects of liberal 
governance are visited. Due to these sites lacking a historical presence, the 
attempted liberal transformations can only be evaluated in terms of general 
impressions created through ritualising a ‘liberal-local’ tension or a kind of 
Todorovian ‘new’ encounter. 323  Colour is given via some mention of contemporary 
actors in target societies but they constitute at best a form of background canvas for 
the portrait of the liberal peace.  
 
Developing the insights of anti-colonial thought with respect to the liberal 
peace requires us to advance an embodied and situated understanding of the subjects 
of intervention, which begins with an appreciation of their historical presence. 
History is, of course, invented rather than uncovered; as such, it is not enough to 
simply assert the need for ‘historical presence’ in the liberal peace debate, although 
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this is a crucial start. Taking cues from the principles of anti-colonial thought, it is 
further necessary to think, as David Scott has argued, about the ways in which 
specific types of historical negation beg particular kinds of response.
324
  
 
Beyond the general denial of presence, there are at least two ways in which 
the failure to articulate the targets of liberal peacebuilding as historical entities in 
their own right has had implications for the analysis.  In the first instance, it is 
generally assumed, but never actually demonstrated, that the liberal peace represents 
a novel form of governance-based liberal social transformation in post-conflict 
settings.  Indeed, in particular cases such as that of Richmond, it is made to sound as 
if engagement with the liberal peace not only represents a novel encounter with 
liberalism but somehow with modernity in general as opposed to the world of local 
custom and tradition.
325
 As I will show in Chapter Five, this is not only an issue of 
‘presence’ but also leads to analytic problems when trying to understand the origins 
and causes of particular practices within the liberal peace. 
 
A corollary to this is the insinuation that the liberal peace is by default 
therefore an alien and inauthentic form of politics, which those who adhere to it as 
simply co-opted into its ideology via false consciousness.  Whilst this may 
hypothetically be a useful interpretation in specific instances, to assume it in 
advance of an engagement with the specific political or social history of a society 
seems to assume some sort of ahistorical status to social difference. In this case, 
exploring the ways in which societies are long-inserted into global connections and 
conditions associated with modernity is highly relevant for a deeper appreciation of 
their historicity and historical presence, as well as the interpretation of 
contemporary political culture and consciousness.  
 
Across the remaining four chapters of the thesis, I re-construct Mozambique 
as a historical subject within a set of related narratives on the liberal peace. The first 
of the four, Chapter Five, develops a historical narrative of different forms of rule 
within Mozambique over the last century or so, which explores points of continuity 
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and change across the late colonial, post-independence and post-war periods.  In the 
first place, simply establishing it as a place and peoples with a significant history is 
important, in contrast to the general passing over of such history by interveners and 
many critics of intervention. Re-telling the history is thus a way of engaging with 
political subjects as already embodied and situated, as noted in Chapter Three. 
 
This narrative locates and substantiates the territory of present-day 
Mozambique as being the subject of a series of different projects of modern rule and 
social organisation, of which I suggest the post-war era is a recent iteration. Whilst 
the remaining three chapters are focused on more contemporary dynamics, the 
issues which they address, including political consciousness, political economy and 
agency, are all located in historical understandings of these themes.  
 
The strategy of reconstructing a historical subject of course carries its own 
risks. The most important of these is the problem of building analysis around the 
national boundaries of ‘Mozambique’, when these are themselves also a product of 
contested relations between state elites and populations in the territory. There is then 
perhaps a risk that the struggles and agendas of rulers come to stand in for the 
history of the country in general. This was a major preoccupation within 
postcolonial historiography as it developed amongst the Subaltern Studies scholars, 
who constructed social histories of particular subaltern groups as counter-narratives 
to their marginalisation from history.
326
  
 
In order to deal with this, across the chapters I have endeavoured to tease out 
some different historical dynamics of groups, classes and regions across the country 
to indicate both the diversity of historical experience within Mozambique as well as 
the tensions that emerge from this. Whilst Chapter Five focuses on a kind of 
national history, Chapters Six and Seven extend the focus to historicise political 
consciousness amongst a broader public and public sector workers, with Chapter 
Eight offering a historical analysis of the political economy of some of the 
peasantry. In reconstructing Mozambique’s historical presence then, we can begin to 
forward a critique which is grounded in a consciousness of the diversity of 
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experiences and realities of those subject to intervention, but which recognises the 
incompleteness of any single endeavour.  This kind of historical embodiment is 
necessary in the project to reclaim the negated subject from the zones of 
‘Nothingness and Infinity’ that Fanon described.327  As will be discussed in Chapter 
Five, this speaks to concerns of the historical decolonising movement within 
Mozambique also. 
 
ii. Engaging with political consciousness 
 
If the critiques of the liberal peace have been happy to more or less ignore 
the historical presence and substance of target societies, they have been equally 
willing to disengage from the expressions of political consciousness that emerge 
around them within target societies, regarding them as either irrelevant to the 
question of the liberal peace’s legitimacy, or largely tainted or co-opted and thus 
unable to make authentic or relevant comment upon it.   Echoing Fanon’s critique of 
colonial mentality, this over-determination within the analytic gaze means that the 
political consciousness of target societies can end up being understood as a form of 
empty mimicry without its own significance.
328
 This construction mirrors the 
ahistoricism of the analysis, in terms of denying presence and significance to people 
as proper subjects of politics.  For some analyses this is the result of a focus on the 
constitutive character of liberal discourses of governance, which are thus understood 
as analytically prior to the political consciousness of people who discuss them.
329
 
However, for others it seems to mark yet more distance between interveners, who 
are unproblematically authentic bearers of liberal peace consciousness and people in 
target societies who are not.  
 
Getting away from these reductive representations of the political subject 
must then involve dealing with forms of political consciousness in a way which 
recognises and engages with it rather than discounting its relevance. In anti-colonial 
thought this act of engagement had two particular advantages. First, exploring with 
the ways in which the colonised understood their world helped articulate the 
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embodied dimensions of colonialism, including its modalities of reproduction and 
the forms of suffering that it caused. Thus there was a kind of interpretive benefit to 
engaging political consciousness. Second, however, engagement was in its own 
right a decolonising act; it was a form of recognition to counter the de-recognition 
effected by colonialism. In terms of forwarding the ethics of humanism discussed in 
Chapter Three, mutual recognition of political consciousness carried its own 
importance in establishing shared bases of embodied humanity and changing the 
terms of debate.  
 
In the remaining chapters of the thesis, most prominently in Chapter Six but 
also elsewhere, I engage with political consciousness in Mozambique around 
specific issues associated with intervention, and the general politics of co-operation. 
This strategy further draws out Mozambique as a substantive political subject rather 
than an empty cipher, and helps articulate important dimensions of the experience of 
the liberal peace. As will be shown later on, however, this strategy does not imply 
that political consciousness, in Mozambique or elsewhere, is unitary or 
straightforward, either within individuals or at a group level.  
 
Rather, in reconstructing political consciousness in Mozambique, I lean on 
the insightful accounts of ‘double consciousness’ offered in anti-colonial thought as 
a way of dealing with the ways in which subjects often use different framings and 
identifications for understanding particular issues – in this sense they are 
‘pluralistically’ conscious. Du Bois originally articulated the notion of ‘double 
consciousness’ to reflect the binds of black identity in America:  
 
One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two 
thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark 
body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
330
  
 
For Du Bois, writing in 1903, the imputed freedoms and liberation associated with 
being an American were consistently in contradiction with the situation and 
experience of being racially segregated, isolated and terrorised as a black. Blacks 
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were destined to see themselves through the eyes of others who defined them, yet 
were themselves aware that these images both defined and did not correspond to 
their sense of being and historical selves.  
 
As such, ‘double consciousness’ of this sort produced intellectual 
contradictions, alienation and tensions within black identity. Yet within these 
tensions it was also possible for Du Bois to affirm the usefulness these could have in 
a concrete sense towards a redemptive form of self-realisation.
331
 Indeed, 
experiencing political consciousness as non-unitary was simultaneously a burden 
and a kind of ‘gift’ or ‘second sight’.332 It allowed black people to articulate forms 
of consciousness and identity outside those allotted by racist social orders.  
 
 For Fanon, ‘double consciousness’ took on a sharper complexion. As for Du 
Bois, consciousness of oneself as a black racialised subject and a human being 
produced this internal war of ideals, leading to a profound sense of alienation.
333
 
Fanon similarly identified that this sense of alienation was sociogenic – produced by 
social constructions of race and racial value – rather than intrinsically a ‘black’ 
experience. Yet for him, any potential redemptive power of straightforward cultural 
reclamation was largely, although not entirely, blunted by its fetishisation, which 
had the power to maintain structures of racial objectification. Instead, disalienation 
had to come through one’s own repudiation of both racial stereotype and oppressive 
social structures – a re-appropriation of the terms upon which one would engage 
with the world.  The split caused by double consciousness was thus a productive 
one. 
 
The notion of double consciousness as developed in Du Bois and Fanon is 
useful in addressing some of the issues raised in Chapter Two regarding the 
exclusion of the political subject in contemporary critiques of the liberal peace. This 
is principally in understanding that political subjects in actuality are not of a single 
essence or dimension, but that that multiple images of the self and the group are 
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common ways of making sense of the world.
334
 In particular, by establishing 
political consciousness and political subjecthood as plural, it gives us leverage for 
establishing a critique of the ‘authentic’ political subject imagined by Richmond as 
‘local’ and Chandler as ‘liberal’. In Chapter Six, I use this framework as a way of 
making sense of the ways in which corruption is understood in contemporary 
Mozambique. Whilst this does not speak to the kinds of existential split that Du Bois 
and Fanon were driving at in using ‘double consciousness’ as a lens for 
understanding black identity under colonialism, it does speak to the ways in which 
appreciating plural forms of public political consciousness can help understand the 
content of political struggle.  
 
Engaging with political consciousness also allows a more concrete 
discussion of particular forms of alienation that are experienced under the liberal 
peace, as covered in Chapter Seven. For anti-colonial thinkers, articulating the 
nature and character of social and political alienation under colonial rule was a very 
important element of critique for the heuristic and humanistic purposes already 
mentioned. It is one which forms an important part of the analysis here also. For the 
purposes of this thesis, I understand alienation in a mundane sense rather than the 
more technical sense of Fanon. For Fanon, alienation was specifically a product of 
the mental conflicts produced by black/white double consciousness and of the de-
humanising character of racism.
335
 Whilst there are cognate dynamics at work 
within the experience of the liberal peace, my usage of the idea of alienation 
pertains in a more general sense to forms of discontent, disengagement and 
withdrawal from forms of authority. Clearly, alienation is not then limited in scope 
to the relations between intervening agencies and national citizens but has pervasive 
potential in relations throughout society. Whilst I will generally focus on dynamics 
of alienation surrounding relationships with interveners to discuss issues with the 
liberal peace, these are of course embedded in and interact with the broader social 
order. 
 
                                                 
334
 I do not have the space here to extend the argument, but my instinct is that it is not just 
postcolonial or feminine political subjects that experience double/plural consciousness but political 
subjects in general – there is likely some excellent work to be done or being done on ‘double 
consciousness’ amongst intervener communities.   
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iii. Re-thinking material structures and experience 
 
In addition to substantiating the target society as a historical and political 
entity in its own right, it is also important to appreciate how its material experiences 
may significantly exceed that which is covered by structural narratives of neoliberal 
expansion. As argued in Chapter Three, anti-colonial thinkers were often not content 
with Leninist analyses of imperialism – for Cabral, for example, it was disembedded 
from the social realities and histories of colonised spaces, and moreover suggested a 
lack of historical and political agency within them.
336
 For Fanon and Césaire 
colonial experience in both its bodily and economic dimensions exceeded its grand 
narratives in ways which were crucial for understanding the production of suffering 
and alienation, which was a central focus of analysis.
337
 What might be understood 
in another context as forms of phenomenological excess were thus important points 
of departure for different, more deeply connected and embodied forms of critique.  
 
Insofar as the present critical debate engages with the material content of the 
liberal peace it does so generally through the particular lens of a structural critique 
of neoliberal economics and of the general associated depredations in social welfare 
or insurance. This has been the general thrust of Pugh’s critique, as discussed in 
Chapter Two. Moreover, some more recent contributions, such as those of Neil 
Cooper, have drawn out analysis in the context of particular industries and 
countries.
338
 While these point to important dynamics at play in the liberal peace, 
the framing of this problems tends to be within a critique of recent neoliberal 
economic policy, which itself is understood as a working out of tendencies within 
capitalism.  This critique of its structural tendencies is an important strategy for 
understanding the commonalities between different situations and I am not 
suggesting that it should be abandoned. 
 
However, in the spirit of understanding the political subject as always 
embodied, and understanding this embodiment as a central starting point for 
critique, it is important to get beyond a primarily structural interpretation of the 
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economic dynamics of the liberal peace. In Chapters Seven and Eight, I pursue more 
specific and situated analyses of the political economies of intervention as 
understood and experienced by different groups of people, including public sector 
workers, media commentators, government officials, donor representatives and 
farmers.  Within these analyses emerge narratives of the liberal peace’s material 
impact that are too distinctive and/or long-standing to be contained under the more 
general framework of neoliberalism; rather they hint at questions emerging from 
more specific social relations of hierarchy, income and production which may not 
all be a product of IFI-endorsed neoliberal policy specifically but speak to more 
general principles of economic distribution and entitlement underpinning 
interventions. 
 
Re-thinking the material dimensions of the liberal peace relationship opens 
up various different platforms for thinking critically around its practices. On the one 
hand, an appreciation of the details of its impact supports an understanding of types 
of multiplicity produced in social hierarchies, although these are not the main focus 
of the analysis. It is nonetheless important to recognise the widely differentiated 
impact that the liberal peace has had amongst different groups who operate at 
various degrees of distance from it. Chapters Seven and Eight for example offer 
different narratives of its impact across different sectors.  
 
In addition, however, these more specific relations also give a context and 
meaning to forms of political agency and political consciousness that emerge in 
response to the liberal peace. A significant element of this is the ways in which the 
details of the political economy of the liberal peace also become reflective of a 
perceived moral economy. As will be discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight, 
exploring the actual distribution and allocation of resources and benefits within the 
liberal peace becomes an important element for evaluating its broader significance 
as a set of political relations. In Chapter Seven, various contradictions between the 
intended economic effect of the liberal peace and its actual material impact on the 
operation of the state are brought to the fore, whereas in Chapter Eight I look at the 
relative absence of effect in generating rural transformation for the peasantry.  
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This platform of critique exceeds a general account of neoliberalism’s 
structural impact through its embedding in lived experiences and forms of political 
consciousness.  This is important in terms of generating an embodied conception of 
the political subject – through an exploration of the particular material conditions 
and structures instituted by the liberal peace, it is possible to understand political 
subjects as real agents making meaningful choices. As indicated in Chapter Three, 
however, it is also a platform from which to think more laterally and in a more 
localised and concrete way about political alternatives – as Chapters Seven and 
Eight will show, this is already partly underway in Mozambique.   
 
As with the other strategies previously discussed, thinking about the material 
dimensions of the liberal peace in this more detailed way is a specific kind of 
response to the absence of lived experience within the present liberal peace debate, 
amongst both supporters and critics of intervention. Selected in this way, the 
narratives do not purport to offer anything like a systematic assessment of the 
economic impact of the liberal peace across the country. Rather, I focus on more 
detailed analysis of particular parts in order to illustrate tendencies which may be 
more widespread. In Chapter Seven, I explore political consciousness and agency in 
the context of large economic inequalities, both between Mozambique and the 
donors, and within the practices of the liberal peace. In Chapter Eight, I 
problematize the automatic desirability of a statist solution to the question of rural 
development through an engagement with historic peasant ambivalence towards the 
state and its contemporary form. Together they articulate differentiated but 
connected experiences of the political economies of the liberal peace, which point 
towards a deeper engagement with questions of wealth distribution and political 
control.  
 
 
II. ‘Reading’ Mozambique 
 
In Chapter Three, I argued that anti-colonial thinkers conceived of human 
existence as a necessarily multi-foundational and embodied affair, in which various 
concrete elements combined to produce the experiences of the subject. Thinking 
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critically about its politics – particularly in the service of a project for historical 
change – thus could not be done either transcendentally or through abstractions from 
other times and places. Rather, it needed to be done through an embedding in the 
multiple dimensions of existence and in reflection on how these interacted with each 
other, in terms of both structural and phenomenological dimensions. 
 
In the chapters that follow, I aim as far as possible to sustain a multi-
foundational approach to the analysis of Mozambique’s experience of the liberal 
peace, both within particular chapters, and in the arrangement of the chapters as a 
whole by combining the strategies outlined above.  In general terms, Chapter Five 
focuses on reconstructing Mozambique as a historical presence, Chapter Six mainly 
engages with the question of political consciousness, and Chapters Seven and Eight 
look at the political economies of aid and agriculture. However, although each of the 
chapters places special emphasis on one or other particular strategy, elements of all 
of them are woven throughout the thesis. It is in the combination of these strategies 
that I aim to begin to re-construct Mozambique and its peoples as substantive 
subjects of analysis in the context of the liberal peace debate. In the spirit of anti-
colonial critique, the experiences and evaluations of these subjects are not simply 
‘relevant’ but central to this critical approach to the nature of intervention.   
 
Yet, in this thesis, and in any interpretive project, these experiences are 
necessarily mediated by my own reading and representation of them through 
particular intellectual lenses and based on particular sources, and articulated in a 
dialogue with a particular audience.  It is thus helpful to reflect on and discuss how 
the research strategy for reading Mozambique has proceeded over the course of the 
project, and the implications that this has for the kind of conclusions that can be 
reached.   
 
i. Sources 
 
A key concern for this project was to engage with a wide and detailed range 
of sources to inform its different strategies, in order to generate a rich general 
understanding of Mozambique through which more specific narratives pertinent to 
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the liberal peace debate could be developed. In the earlier stages of the project, the 
guiding principle for reading sources was more or less simple voracity and 
immersion in anything even slightly related to Mozambique; this eventually gave 
way to a more structured and selective reading of sources based on their relevance 
for the specific areas of interest.  What follows is a summary of the range and types 
of sources engaged in the course of the project, which have both directly and 
indirectly informed the narratives. Whilst the details of formally published works 
are to be found in the bibliography of the thesis and in the footnotes of the empirical 
chapters, it may be helpful to articulate generally how these were used alongside 
others in developing the fuller picture of Mozambique ‘as a subject’.339  
 
In the context of this project, I occasionally make some distinctions of 
convenience between ‘scholarly’ and other sources, but this is not to be understood 
as a distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ sources in the conventional 
sense, but a kind of self-identification of purpose, style and audience. Indeed, in the 
context of the assumptions of this project, the conventional dualistic distinction 
between ‘primary’ sources as principally points of data / information and 
‘secondary’ sources as analytic’ makes no sense. This is particularly so in a place 
where the community of people who do scholarly work so obviously overspills 
boundaries of political involvement, public engagement, material interest, 
nationality, or any other subject-object distinction. It is in some senses difficult to 
argue that a detailed evaluation report co-written by British academics and 
Mozambican academics / consultants / activists for a European donor agency and/or 
the Government of Mozambique is either obviously ‘primary’ material or 
‘secondary’ analysis.  
 
More fundamentally, the distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ 
ceases to hold in a conceptual framework whereby the views and analyses of those 
involved in the area of interest are not simply data points to be processed but 
interpretations to be engaged and reckoned with.  Allowing these interpretations to 
present significant challenges to the (non)/representations of politics in the liberal 
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peace debate and in policy discussions is a basic concern for this research project. 
As will be discussed in the next sub-section on modes of reading, whilst it is not 
possible to discuss these without some form of mediation and evaluation, both 
encouraging other interpretations to emerge and treating them seriously are 
important aspects of reconstructing subjecthood. Again, this inhibits any attempt to 
understand them as falling into classes of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ material. 
 
The sources for the elements of historical reconstruction were relatively 
varied, and included scholarship produced both within and outside Mozambique. 
Whilst the ‘big-book’ histories of Malyn Newitt and others were useful general 
references, particularly for understanding the pre-colonial and colonial periods, 
social and economic histories of the colonial period such as those of Allen and 
Barbara Isaacman, Leroy Vail and Landeg White, Judith Marshall and Bridget 
O’Laughlin enabled the development of a less elite-centred historical understanding.  
In turning to the more recent history of the independence struggle and post-
independence politics, the work of Joseph Hanlon, Yussuf Adam, Bertil Egëro, João 
Paulo Borges de Coelho, Marc Wuyts, Lars Rudebeck, Barry Munslow, Michel 
Cahen, João Mosca and João Cabrita offered different and sometimes conflicting 
interpretations of the state of politics and the relations between the Frelimo regime, 
Renamo and the population. The Centre for African Studies within Eduardo 
Mondlane University (UEM) has been an important base for many of these 
researchers at different times, and has published relevant volumes on the questions 
of Mozambican identity and economic development. Carolyn Nordstrom’s narrative 
of the war was also particularly important for offering an account of the effects of 
violence amongst the non-militarised population and their survival strategies.  These 
were complemented by the use of a few other historical sources where available, 
which largely comprised the various reports of the Central Committee to the 
Frelimo Congress from independence until the early 1990s, some of the 
contemporary reports of USAID, the British Foreign Office and the IMF, but also 
included press cuttings and government propaganda made available through 
websites such as Mozambique History Net.   
 
 Reading scholarly literature to understand trends in post-war (1990 onwards) 
intervention in Mozambique has also been varied across sectors, subject areas and 
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types of research. Many of the authors mentioned writing on historical sources have 
continued in their analyses to cover the period after the peace deal with Renamo. 
Hanlon’s production of both books and more detailed periodic reports on the 
political process in the post-war period are important repositories of processes, 
events and interpretations of both government and donor activity in particular.  
Other relevant scholarly literature on changes in the political economy in the post-
war period includes work by Anne Pitcher, Chris Cramer and Nicola Pontara, Carlos 
Castel-Branco and Carrie Manning amongst others. Detailed ethnographic studies of 
the transformation of rural governance include those of Harry West and Graham 
Harrison, who develop portraits of the impact of ‘democracy’ in the north of the 
country amongst communities who appear less immediately integrated into the 
apparatus of the state and donor interventions.   
 
Another important set of sources about the nature and effects of intervention 
have come from research centres within Mozambique both working for and more 
independently of ‘liberal peace’ donor agencies. Thus, for example, the Michigan 
State University team working on agricultural policy on Mozambique and part-
funded by USAID has produced a series of reports on the details of agricultural 
interventions, headed by David Tschirley. Other important research centres within 
Mozambique include the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE), Centro 
de Integridade Pública (CIP) and Cruzeiro do Sul, who work on a range of social 
and economic research problems and also undertake advocacy on particular issues. 
Indeed, many academics working within Mozambique tend to work within these 
research centres either instead of or alongside universities.  As noted, many of these 
reports are both of interest as sources of information but are also to be considered as 
forming part of public political consciousness around particular issues; indeed, it is 
not uncommon for newspapers to pick up and editorialise reports of particular 
interest. A decent quantity of research from organisations from donor countries 
operating also outside Mozambique has shown similar intent and quality. For 
example, Norway’s Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) recently sponsored some 
excellent jointly written in-depth and multi-year qualitative studies about the 
character of poverty. Although it is necessary to be somewhat circumspect about the 
purposes and audiences for which such studies are written and produced, and as 
138 
 
such the overall purpose of the narratives, they are nonetheless very relevant both in 
terms of what they relate and what they represent.  
 
 Although not much of the detail will appear in the later chapters, a highly 
interesting and useful set of sources were donors’ own national and sectoral 
strategic plans, budgets, press statements and monitoring and evaluation reports. 
More recently, the details of much official aid funding, including the amount of 
money, the sub-contractors, the project aims and their MDG connections has been 
lodged in the ODAMOZ database,
340
 which was also used to track down some of the 
interviewees.  In terms of getting an overall understanding of the recent quantities 
and distributions of some aid flows it has been useful, although its usage amongst 
various parties is quite uneven. More interestingly perhaps however is the light these 
reports shed on how the donors represent intervention both to themselves and to 
societies and governments targeted by reform.  
 
 On the government side, public records of activity, including election 
manifestos, planning documents and the Agência de Informação de Moçambique 
(AIM) fortnightly press archives have supplied a different set of sources relating to 
how the Government of Mozambique has acted and the representation of those 
actions to public audiences. Of particular interest within these sources are the 
changing representations of the relationship between the Government and its 
development partners, as well as the ways in which the prominence of particular 
policy agendas and trends have risen and fallen. Some of these are discussed briefly 
in Chapter Seven. 
 
 In the course of reading widely around the question of the liberal peace in 
Mozambique, it became increasingly clear that it would be impossible to deal with 
interventions across all sectors in sufficient detail for the project. As such, a decision 
was taken after an initial period of reading to focus the research around three 
important sectors of intervention activity: governance, health and agriculture.  
‘Governance’, and particularly good governance, is a central theme in the liberal 
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peace agenda, both in terms of what it purports to promote and in terms of the 
controversial question of compromising political sovereignty.  This has become 
increasingly the case during the re-interpretation of peacebuilding as statebuilding, 
discussed in Chapter One, and reflects the general increased concern within 
development circles around the issue of ‘governance’ in recent years. That former 
President Chissano also received the first Mo Ibrahim Foundation Award was an 
indication that by and large Mozambique was perceived to have relatively ‘good 
governance’ compared to other countries in the continent, insofar as Chissano also 
did not seek a third term in office.
341
  Health is another central issue in the liberal 
peace debate. The health sector in Mozambique is, just in front of education, the 
largest public recipient sector of international aid in terms of recorded equivalent 
cash value. Given that one important aspect of some critiques of the liberal peace, 
such as that of Pugh, has been its failure to develop social welfare, the fate of the 
health sector is especially relevant for the discussion. Finally agriculture was also 
selected as the sector in which the livelihoods of the vast majority in Mozambique 
are based. As the analysis offered within this project aims to be more inclusive and 
grounded in the experiences of the population than the existing critiques, an 
engagement with agricultural policy and the rural economy beyond this is a useful 
way in. Furthermore, given the importance of poverty reduction and development as 
central contemporary legitimating discourses of intervention, understanding the 
particular impact of interventions on this sector is also of broader political 
importance.
342
  
  
 A significant proportion of the source material used for the analysis in the 
later chapters was gathered during visits to Mozambique in the summers of 2008 
and 2009, totalling about four months. Research was undertaken based in the cities 
of Maputo, Beira and Nampula, and included visits to the districts of Nhamatanda, 
Lunga, Monapo, Namialo and Ilha de Moçambique. During this time I conducted a 
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series of around sixty interviews with nationals and expatriates both working within 
and outside of ‘liberal peace’ structures, and across different levels of social and 
political hierarchies. These included a Government minister and opposition 
politicians, high level, mid level and former civil servants, people working for donor 
agencies, people working within the health service, former agricultural technicians, 
directors of national and provincially based NGOs, students working and 
volunteering for various NGOs, students not working or volunteering for NGOs, 
farmers working with development projects, journalists and other public 
intellectuals.
343
 In seeking people out for interviews, I used a rough grid to ensure 
coverage of different levels of engagement and power across the different sectors, 
which was largely successful, although the final distribution was somewhat uneven. 
Interviewees were often ‘cold-called’ following my own identification through 
reading project documentation, websites or newspapers but a significant number 
(around half) were also introduced or suggested by others. In all cases I explained 
who I was, where I was from, the general terms of the project and that I was 
interested in learning more about, and understanding the interviewee’s opinions on, 
various forms of international co-operation. By and large, I sensed that I was being 
received in a relatively open and comfortable manner by the interviewees. During 
my visits, I also took regular diary notes within workshop and project settings as 
well as more generally, recording events, statements, conversations and my own 
impressions.   
 
 Being in Mozambique itself also allowed me to immerse myself more 
generally in public discussion and debate that was being undertaken in the 
newspapers, on television and on the radio. After following these during my visits, I 
retrospectively went through the 2007-2009 online archives of three major 
newspapers – the (largely) government-controlled Noticias and the more 
independent MediaFax, Savana and O País – reading for commentary on 
development, co-operation and intervention.  Unsurprisingly, the profile of the 
newspaper-buying public in Mozambique like anywhere reflects levels of income, 
literacy and time, all of which are in varying supply across the country; however, at 
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the time of the visit it was clear that there were resonances between what was being 
written in newspapers and urban gossip more generally, particularly around political 
scandals and crime reports.  
 
 Another increasingly interesting source of commentary within Mozambique 
is from the ‘blogosphere’; although the readership for this is likely even smaller than 
that of newspapers, it provides a uniquely legible space for commentary and 
discussion which is not as centrally controlled and publically contentious as the 
newspaper, television or radio. Although the President Armando Guebuza has also 
had his own blog since the 2009 election campaign, longer-running, more 
independent/oppositional blogs include sociologist Carlos Serra’s Oficina dum 
Sociólogo, Ideias Críticas, Voz da Revolução, Moçambique para todos, and that of 
former opposition politician Manuel de Araújo, as well as those publishing satirical 
cartoons. Again, these were read generally for impressions about international co-
operation, the politics of aid and development, and commentary relevant to the 
particular sectors discussed. Finally, the provocative but popular music of 
rapper/scholar/politician Azagaia provided another source of interesting 
commentary on the political elite and its relation with international donors, seeming 
to relate to some of the opinions of the urban youth. 
 
 Engaging this range of sources, and a few others, for me simply strengthened 
the conviction that the critical debate on the liberal peace had thus far both 
conceptually and empirically excluded the subjecthood of societies targeted by the 
liberal peace.  Rather than the silence or wordlessness of target societies which had 
echoed in the critiques of the liberal peace, in this range of sources there was rather 
a lot of noise regarding its impact, legitimacy and significance. This was not as 
irrelevant as existing critiques of the liberal peace had suggested it would be by their 
omissions – rather, it seemed the opposite.  Although I was consistently conscious 
of the socioeconomic and demographic unevenness of these sources to which I had 
access as a whole, which undoubtedly produced particular kinds of narrative, it was 
clear that even so important things were being said. 
 
However, both reading and reconstructing the ‘noise’ as alternative 
narratives of subjecthood is not a straightforward task; it opens out into various 
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important debates about the representation and interpretation of subjects that have 
preoccupied some scholars across interpretive disciplines for some time. In the 
context of this project, an important concern to deal with is perhaps whether the 
conditions of possibility even exist for an anti-colonial interpretive project which is 
neither self-defeating through its complicity with the colonial gaze nor incoherent. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, I argue that they do, both in general and for this project in 
particular. Moreover, I will suggest that the ethics of humanism which emerge in 
anti-colonial thought can help counteract or assuage some of the anxieties that 
characterised postcolonial deconstructions of representation.  
 
ii. Interpretive methodologies, authenticity and anti-colonial humanism 
 
In Chapter Two, I noted that within the liberal peace debate, Chandler had 
lightly ribbed Richmond for his epistemic caution towards any attempt to ‘know’ 
the local as a form of hegemony.
344
  He is right to draw attention to Richmond’s 
anxiety on this front; however, this anxiety is not trivial, nor can it be satisfactorily 
resolved by Chandler’s simple withdrawal altogether from the political context of 
intervention. Richmond’s anxiety has a longer pedigree, particularly within 
deconstructionist thinking about the nature of representation and the political 
contexts of speech-acts. Moreover, some of his suggested moves in terms of a more 
‘ethnographic’ engagement in his most recent work are not completely different to 
those that I am mobilising for this project. However, he is not actually reflecting on 
the practices of his own research so much as on the practical ethics of peacebuilding 
and intervention itself, in which he advocates a change towards a less hegemonic 
and more empathetic mode of engagement in a post-liberal peace.
345
 The possibility 
that a re-evaluation of his own critique – and its own articulations of difference – 
may also be necessary does not seem to enter the frame. So, ironically perhaps, the 
empirical studies that he offers of various ‘liberal peace transitions’ are in and of 
themselves not actually interpretively engaged at all with the societies in 
question.
346
 Mac Ginty’s project also engages minimally at an interpretive level with 
the societies discussed as part of ‘hybrid peace’ situations, with the exception of 
                                                 
344
 Chapter Two, 74-75. 
345
 Richmond, ‘Resistance and the post-liberal peace’. 
346
 Richmond et al, Liberal Peace Transitions 
143 
 
Northern Ireland in which there is a deeper reading of the political movements and 
the meaning of their actions.
347
 
 
Whilst I characterise the present study as, broadly speaking, ‘interpretive’, I 
am not characterising it as ‘ethnographic’ as such; there are ongoing controversies 
within anthropology and related disciplines over the definition of ‘ethnography’ that 
I do not have any particular stakes in claiming a position within.
 348
 However, 
various debates within ethnography are of relevance to the interpretive approach 
used in this project, which is the perception and reflection of conscious meaning, 
forms of agency and intentionality within human social relations.  
 
Ortner characterises the ‘ethnographic stance’ “as much an intellectual (and 
moral) positionality, a constructive and interpretive mode, as it is a bodily process in 
space and time.”349 This resonates with Jackson’s distinction between ethnographic 
‘method’ (data-gathering techniques) and ‘methodology’ (ways in which 
philosophical premises are work out in research).
 350
 In the first place, she argues, it 
is  
a commitment to what Geertz has called “thickness,” to producing 
understanding through richness, texture, and detail, rather than parsimony, 
refinement, and (in the sense used by mathematicians) elegance.
351
 
 
Typically, ethnographies produced by trained cultural anthropologists involve ‘the 
bodily process in space and time’, that is, relatively lengthy stays in a particular 
location, deep training in language and research on culture, particular styles of 
participant-observation and interaction and so on.   
 
 As regards the bodily process, the research undertaken for this project did 
not conform to such a method in specific ways. Some elements were certainly 
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present, including habits of observation, recording and the conduct of in-depth 
conversations and interviews. Language training was also undertaken; however this 
was only in one language of national administration, education and commerce 
(Portuguese), whereas many others are spoken across Mozambique and would have 
likely provided an entirely different register of discussion. Moreover, my research 
was generally ‘mobile’, moving from the capital to other cities and districts on a 
relatively regular basis. Whilst I developed some relationships in the capital across 
the duration of my two visits, this was not a lengthy engagement with a single 
community.  These were conscious choices in order to allow a wider and more 
diverse range of engagement across different regions of the country, different social 
groups and different spheres of liberal peace interventions. I think these were the 
right choices given the context of the project and the debate into which it seeks to 
intervene. 
 
 As Ortner also stipulates however, ethnographies also involve particular 
kinds of intellectual and political commitments to the relevance and significance of 
human meaning and human agency within the analysis of societies in general, i.e. as 
a ‘methodology’. On this front, regarding the mode of reading and interpretation, I 
aimed to understand and see things as being part of, and making sense within, 
particular worlds of meaning, practice and consequence. In this sense, as far as 
intellectual and moral positionality and the spirit of interpretation go, this project 
shares some of the sensibilities outlined by Ortner for an ‘ethnographic stance’. 
These correspond to and reinforce the overall conceptual strategies articulated 
within Chapter Three with regard to seeing subjects as embodied and situated, and 
in social realities as being multi-dimensional.  
 
 There are a few further issues that need clarifying here though with regard to 
the project’s aim of ‘reconstructing the subjects’ in Mozambique, which also speak 
to tensions and controversies in the debates on ethnographic methodology. These 
are the questions of authenticity and representation, and the place of the researcher 
within the social context. Apart from very tangentially, these reflections are more or 
less absent from writing on the liberal peace – indeed, they can only arise in an 
intellectual framework where grounded interpretation and detailed engagement with 
those subject to power are seen as important to projects of critique. Although they 
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can only be dealt with relatively briefly here, they also connect to some of the 
theoretical orientations articulated in the previous chapter, and in particular the 
question of how interpretive engagement can offer better or different grounds for 
critique.  
 
 First, addressing the issue of ‘authenticity’ is important in terms of moving 
away from seeing subjects as inauthentically ‘co-opted’ by the liberal peace, which 
was challenged in Chapter Two.  Such a move makes it easy to dismiss the 
articulated views or claims of various people as having any relevance to the critique 
of the grand vision of liberal/neoliberal power. Rather, the threat of inauthenticity in 
the politics of intervened-in societies is central in allowing the critical theorist to 
disengage from the contexts of intervention and to forward an external, un-co-opted 
and epistemically purer form of critique. For Richmond, it is also the basis for a call 
for ‘untainted’ knowledge to be developed within targeted societies.352 An anti-
colonial position however has to articulate an alternative account of the status and 
nature of the self and of ‘authenticity’ if it is not to collapse into a similar position of 
critical escapism. Here, two sets of reflections are useful: Walley’s interrogation of 
the ‘authentic’ self, and Ortner’s critique of ‘ethnographic refusal’.  
 
 Christine Walley outlines a feminist, humanist case for questioning the 
implicit premise of a singular inner core as the authentic articulation of human 
being.
353
 In her discussion about the controversies of female genital operations, she 
explores her experiences of interacting in different settings with different young 
women who had undergone initiation procedures: 
 
I began to recognize the naïveté of my search for “real” voices, for clearly the 
girls’ voices shifted according to context depending on whether they were at the 
ceremonies, with adults or peers, in mixed-sex settings or among female 
friends, or, I surmised, alone. Given the legacy of both Freud and Erving 
Goffman, it seems evident that each self has a public as well as a private side 
and many more layers within it, from the conscious to the deeply unconscious. 
What happens, however, when these apparent layers of the self contradict each 
other? Do these young women, and indeed all of us, have straightforward “best 
interests” or are our interests, on the contrary, multiple and contradictory? And, 
where would one locate the “authentic” self? In Western thought, we tend to 
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privilege that which is most interior or private. Yet obviously, as critics of 
Freud's universalism would emphasize, our unconscious is also a product of the 
times and places in which we exist, thus challenging the idea of a “layered” self 
that possesses an inner core untouched by our contemporary surroundings.
354
 
 
Walley poses these problems as questions to be asked rather than resolved in any 
particular way within the context of this article.  Yet even formulated as questions, 
these thoughts do present important challenges nonetheless to the assumptions in 
‘Western thought’ about the ‘authentic’ self and how it is represented. This can be 
related more or less directly to the concerns articulated by anti-colonial thinkers 
such as Fanon to recognise and affirm the sociogenic and embodied dimensions of 
human subjectivity; that is, produced and articulated in the context of collective 
frames of meaning as well as socioeconomic conditions. Most obviously, it relates 
to the problematic of ‘double consciousness’ elaborated by Du Bois and then Fanon 
as the way in which racialised people have been forced to encounter themselves and 
their identities.   
 
 If the possibility of multiple selves and double/plural consciousness becomes 
a central assumption of the analysis, clearly both the stakes for claiming 
‘authenticity’ and the grounds on which one might do so would change. The 
authenticity stakes are important in Walley’s context of a debate which frames 
female genital operations as either inauthentic/privately-despised/inherently-
oppressive or authentic/privately-affirmed/legitimately-expressive, but not possibly 
both. Walley’s ethnographic work however challenges this as an adequate account 
of social reality, and as an adequate ‘humanist’ engagement. Rather, to engage in an 
interpretive project in good faith is to some extent to abandon a simple notion of a 
search for ‘inner’ authenticity in the voices of the people one is researching; indeed, 
in oneself and more generally also.  As such, the act of interpretation is in some 
sense simply the attempt to make sense of how human behaviour expresses meaning 
and intentionality in particular frames and contexts, even when those frames and 
contexts may not be of their choosing. 
 
 Ortner makes the point more strongly in her critique of what she terms 
‘ethnographic refusal’ in studies of resistance; that is the refusal of such studies to 
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engage in substantial interpretive work on the grounds of doing violence to the 
(mostly subaltern) subject of study, and in light of the recognised impossibility of 
holistic or exhaustive representation.
355
 The result of such interpretive refusal is, she 
argues, ultimately more threatening to an engagement with subjects than is the 
attempt to interpret and engage with what is visible. This is because it leads to a 
sanitised politics wherein the internal struggles of groups are left out, a thinning of 
culture whereby actions are denied the meanings they have for the subjects, and 
ultimately the dissolution of the subjects per se into a set of subject effects.
356
 This 
is also to dodge the important relationship between frames of domination and 
resistance, in which subjects do often both accept and creatively interpret particular 
framings in order to forward alternative ideas or agendas.
357
 This point grounds the 
orientation of much of the analysis in the following chapters, in which embodied 
subjects are also understood as political agents developing particular strategies. 
 
 The anti-colonial critique of the subject articulated in Chapter Three can also 
contribute to Walley’s and Ortner’s visions of research which must still engage in 
interpretation, even long after the possibilities of innocent or unmediated 
engagement have vanished and the possibility of ‘discovering’ or representing a 
singular ‘authentic’ is long past. They can be understood as sharing a sense as to 
what constitutes ‘authenticity’; that is a sense of conscious engagement in a form of 
struggle or politics. But ‘authenticity’ in and of itself is not an expression of some 
general validity in any particular political struggle. Nonetheless, it seems to generate 
some kind of demands in terms of interpretive research. What is missing from 
Walley’s, and indeed from Ortner’s, story of interpretation is an account of why a 
‘humanist’ engagement would need to affirm the multiplicity of selves and 
meanings which were present in a particular situation. For Walley, the content of 
‘humanism’ is not fleshed out as such in this article; for Ortner, in order to conduct 
interpretive work at all which engages with human subjects, one must assume a 
certain authenticity and coherence to these subjects – it is in some senses a pre-
condition for the possibility of interpretive research.  Whilst I would agree with 
Ortner, she perhaps does not flesh out the problem enough. 
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 Both of these approaches resonate with the views of the embodied 
understanding of the subject and of the ethics of engagement within anti-colonial 
thought that were laid out in the previous chapter. Yet, anti-colonial thought was 
also articulated and written as a kind of overtly political critical engagement with 
the practices of colonialism, rather than a guide to social theory and research. As 
such, it had the advantage of, first, being able to operate in a sphere where its ethical 
dimensions were already meaningful and relevant – one could make appeals based 
on human suffering, on injustices and indignities as these were ‘admissible’ in the 
context of the political appeal. This open coherence of purpose and analytic framing 
was important in the development of – and I think the strength of – these approaches 
– particularly as ‘humanist’ approaches. The second element of this is that these 
approaches openly endorsed a politics of recognition as part of their humanism. 
Looking back at Chapter Three, much of the dissatisfaction articulated with older 
critiques of imperialism was the failure to recognise people within the struggles first 
as people, and second, as having distinctive experiences of the world. 
 
Clearly, such open coherence between a politics of recognition and the 
adoption of particular interpretive methodologies within the context of 
contemporary academia is more difficult to express; even if we accept that work is 
all ‘political’ in a broad sense and in the setting of the research questions, it has 
historically been expected to stand or fall, and to articulate its worthiness, outside of 
any particular politics. Nonetheless, it seems to me that it is difficult to address the 
various controversies in the interpretive stance as a methodology without 
understanding its deeper connection with a politics of recognition – not just as an 
orienting factor in research but also written into the logic of the methodology and 
what it prioritises i.e. the perception of meaning and intentionality. This does not 
resolve the important issues of ‘whom’ is recognised, nor what prominence they are 
given, but does make a strong claim in favour of the recognition of subjects per se 
within forms of critique. 
 
As a further point of note, anti-colonial humanism can also help place the 
importance of the aesthetic within interpretive projects. Ethnographic writing is 
typically rich in what can be understood as aesthetic expression, that is, forms of 
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description which are evocative of the sensory dynamics and physical experiences 
of social interactions, as well as their emotional or poetic resonances with the 
author/reader.
358
 A reflected sense of physicality, pain, empathy and fun were all 
important elements for example of Walley’s account of initiation rituals. Indeed, 
without these aesthetic and poetic elements of experience, the account is greatly 
impoverished as a basis for reflection on the politics of female genital operations.  
Yet in the debates around the status of interpretive research, these aesthetic/poetic 
elements are often exempt from the consideration and reflexivity that is brought to 
the value of interpretive methods, not least because they are often conducted in 
contexts which deliberate on the extent of their conformity with other methods of 
data collection.
359
 Yet, within the context of the anti-colonial critique of the subject, 
spelled out in Chapter Three in Césaire’s poetics of humanism, these dimensions of 
the interpretive stance have in some senses a clearer purpose and mandate; they are 
necessary elements which make certain kinds of substantive solidarity and 
interpretation possible.  In the context of this thesis I do not offer any 
poetic/aesthetic engagement of my own, although in the context of anti-colonial 
approaches in general these dimensions are an important grounding for humanist 
engagement. As the conclusions in Chapter Nine show, poetry can be a useful way 
of communicating the complex political ethics which the decolonising project 
demands. 
 
What follows in terms of this thesis is a reconstruction of subjecthood in 
Mozambique – not just subjects in general, but subjecthood in related historical, 
political and economic dimensions, and from a stance which recognises both the 
possibility and the importance of interpretive engagement with in the service of a 
critical humanist project. I am not making the case that some form of pure 
interpretive engagement is possible/desirable; on the contrary, a variety of sources 
of information and modes of analysis are necessary and useful to help contextualise 
human agency and give behaviour meaning in the following chapters. In these 
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reconstructions of subjecthood, the authorial narrative and purpose also plays a 
deeply formative role in editorialising, authorising and shaping the accounts of 
subjecthood under discussion, which I have done with reference to the liberal peace 
debate in this project.   
 
However, as Ortner argues, although the process is directed and constructed, 
it is not possible to give entirely fictional accounts of relationships and meaning. 
Not only are interpretations forced to reckon with the evidence of subjects, which 
‘textual refusal’ pushes against textual violence, but they are also subject themselves 
to forms of interrogation and scrutiny from the context in which they are produced.
 
360
  In the thesis, what emerged in these reconstructions are re-interpretations of 
social relations and power structures that I as the author found initially both 
surprising and to some extent counter-intuitive to my initial thinking on post-war 
interventions.
361
 It was only in the attempt to re-construct a sense of meaning and 
intentionality in actions and situations – that is to engage with the situations 
interpretively – that the alternative understandings could emerge of what the liberal 
peace represented for various parties and subjects within Mozambique.  Whilst there 
is scope for debate on the ‘authenticity’ or completeness of such representations, I 
hope at least to have contributed to a pluralisation and opening up of the discussion 
via forms of interpretive engagement. 
 
Conclusions  
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a methodological bridge, 
between the critical reading of the liberal peace debate elaborated in the previous 
two chapters on its exclusion of the subject, and the forms of reconstruction of the 
subject that follow in the rest of the thesis.  It began with a discussion of what the 
reconstruction of the subject could involve in the context of this debate, responding 
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to the marginalisation of historical presence, political consciousness and distinctive 
experiences of political economy in societies targeted by liberal peace reforms.  The 
following chapters seek to begin to remedy these exclusions in various ways 
through empirical and interpretive reconstructions.  
 
The second part of the chapter moved on to discuss the ways in which these 
reconstructions would and could take place. This first entailed a discussion of the 
range of sources of information chosen and used in the project, as well as the 
decision to focus on three particular areas of intervention.  I then went on to discuss 
issues of representation and authenticity that have been explored in the ethnographic 
literature, and which seem to have been haunting some of the writers within the 
liberal peace debate. In this discussion, I noted that not only could some of these 
deliberations contribute to a type of anti-colonial methodology, but that the anti-
colonial vision of humanism could also help substantiate the politics of interpretive 
research as a politics of recognition.  
 
In the next chapter begins the work of the more grounded aspects of 
reconstruction, in a historical engagement with the territory now known as the 
Republic of Mozambique, star performer in the canon of international conflict 
management in the last two decades. Although both intervening parties and critics of 
the liberal peace have had little use, in general, for history, this is not necessarily the 
case for the societies targeted by intervention. Conscious adult memories are rather 
longer, and perhaps those elements memorialised in public narratives and 
socioeconomic dynamics make them longer still.  In this context, the liberal peace 
can be understood as both disruptive of and continuous with particular practices, 
distributions of power and modes of thinking which have a longer heritage.  
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Chapter Five 
Reconstructing historical presence: antecedent forms of rule, 
struggle and social transformation in Mozambique 
 
 
 
 One of the hallmarks of the ‘liberal peace’ as a form of interventionary 
conflict management was its generally de-historicising and non-historical treatment 
of societies in or just after an episode of conflict. Following on from the discussion 
in Chapter One, conflict was not to be understood as the manifestations of specific 
or particular political struggles grounded in particular distributions of power or 
competing ideological claims which needed to be addressed; rather it was 
understood that violent conflict stemmed from the general failures of liberal 
democratic governance to take hold and of human needs to be fulfilled.  Since all 
conflicts had basically common causes, conflict management and conflict resolution 
could take a more-or-less common form via the introduction of multi-party electoral 
systems, liberalisation of the economy, endorsements of human rights principles and 
programmes of governance reform.
362
 This de-contextualised, universalist and 
technocratic response became the general modus operandi of the liberal peace.   
  
 Although critiques of the liberal peace have honed in on the formulaic 
character of its prescriptions, some, such as Richmond have framed this as a 
violation of unexplained cultural difference in target societies between the liberal 
and local, rather than of historical specificity.  Even where this cultural focus is not 
so obviously the case, such as for Pugh, critiques of different types have continued 
to ignore the particular historical presence and character of societies which were the 
site of liberal peace interventions. As discussed in Chapter Two, this absence of 
substance in the analysis of target societies has tended to reproduce such societies as 
non-subjects of politics and in doing so has maintained the paradox of liberalism as 
a circular trap for critical thinking. One aspect of the paradox can be understood as a 
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problem of recognition, whereby the failure to recognise the subjecthood of others 
re-produces the conditions of their marginalisation. Mac Ginty’s tends to be the 
exception, noting that critiques of the liberal peace have neglected the historical 
dimensions.  
 
 In Chapters Three and Four, it was argued that in order to respond to this 
problem, and recover such societies as ‘subjects’ in analysis, it would be necessary 
to attempt a multi-dimensional reconstruction of subjecthood. An important 
dimension of this would be the reconstruction of a historical presence within, and of, 
Mozambique. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this was also the conclusion reached by the 
post-independence Mozambican government after 1975. It supported a number of 
scholars, who have over the last thirty years or so produced a fascinating range of 
rich historical works in the general project of “decolonising Mozambique’s 
history”.363 The Centre for African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University has 
been most obviously at the centre of this research, driven by academics with much 
initial support from the government. As the years have passed, important 
contributions have also been made by scholars not based there. As such, a set of 
histories exist which have sought to recover or recognise a sense of historical 
presence for the various peoples within Mozambique. 
 
 This is not to say that the production of these histories was subject to the 
political control of the government, nor that they were meant to serve only as a 
validation of Frelimo’s right-to-rule. Of course, Frelimo did – and continues to – 
lean heavily on favourable interpretations of their role in Mozambique’s 
independence struggle as a central pillar for validating their political pre-
eminence.
364
  Some of the historical work produced during this time also provided 
some kind of general support for Frelimo’s attempted revolutionary reforms in the 
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first decade of their rule. Hanlon’s Revolution Under Fire perhaps falls into this 
category.
365
  
 
 But Hanlon, like many others, also experienced the kind of ‘textual refusal’ 
that Ortner raised – that is, the phenomenon of the author being forced to deal with 
awkward dimensions of social experience that do not necessarily conform to a 
particular narrative or ideological bent, and, indeed, being open-minded enough to 
understand this. A number of schisms in the scholarship suggest that there is neither 
a homogeneous intellectual line at work, nor consistency in the various forms of 
textual refusal that have presented themselves as scholars have tried to corroborate 
particular interpretations in different settings.   
 
 This empirical awkwardness has however also been a welcome element 
within the historical literature on Mozambique, as well as by parts of Frelimo. 
Beyond the recovery of a historical presence, it provides a further rationale for 
engaging with the historical presence of Mozambique; i.e. to support a kind of 
analytic critique of political economy and social relations.  This was important to 
figures within the Mozambican scholarly community after independence. For 
example, Aquino de Bragança and Jacques Depelchin’s widely-circulated critique of 
John Saul and Hanlon points towards the importance of history as a resource for 
reflection and re-assessment as well as recognition and presence, and cautions 
against histories as confirmatory triumph for the socialist revolution.
366
  
 
The need to recover the dialogic functions of history as a way of reflecting 
on and contextualising present activity seemed to become clearer to many around 
Frelimo’s leadership as its grand projects were seen to be failing in the 1980s. It is 
also important for this thesis in terms of reflecting on the liberal peace as a post-war 
project of radical social transformation  – a designation that the critiques have 
stressed. Clearly, without a substantive historical understanding from which to make 
this claim, it is difficult to sustain. Nonetheless this type of historically informed 
understanding is generally lacking in the critiques of the liberal peace, which tend to 
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presume that these interventions have been high impact in a general sense without 
reference to the pasts of target societies. 
 
The purpose of the chapter is to re-construct Mozambique as an embodied, 
situated subject of modern history, and then to use this as a platform to ask 
alternative questions about the significance and impact of the liberal peace as a set 
of politically transformative strategies of intervention. In this sense, its general place 
in the thesis supports a recognition of presence and subjecthood, but the substance 
of the chapter is directed towards a kind of reflective analysis. To do this, I draw 
largely on the works produced in the post-independence context just described to 
sketch out changing forms of rule in the territory, their relations to issues of political 
economy, and elements of politically organised resistance that were activated along 
the way. Following the trajectory within the historical research just mentioned, I 
begin with pre-Portuguese political organisation, look at the impact of imperialism 
and colonialism, and go on to focus in more detail on the emergence of a unitary 
state authority in the twentieth century and its various forms of rule. I trace some 
forms of continuity into the contemporary era which present issues for thinking 
about the critique of the liberal peace. 
 
 Two brief but important points need to be made at the outset. Although very 
interesting, it is not possible within the context of this chapter to discuss more fully 
the relevant issues associated with whether it is possible to escape completely some 
form of ‘Eurocentrism’ in the practice of constructing a social and political history, 
given the modernist biases and presumptions of such a project.
367
 For this, 
Bhambra’s discussion of modernist historiography indicates some limits and 
problems to bear in mind for would-be decolonising approaches which use 
modernist categories of analysis, such as many of those within the tradition of 
historical sociology.
368
 Nonetheless, the analysis which I undertake here and in 
Chapter Eight is broadly informed by James C. Scott’s understanding of the modern 
state as a peculiar institution which seeks to project authority over peoples in 
particular ways through practices of ordering and making legible populations and 
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territories.
369
 As such, although I will invoke some classically ‘modernist’ tropes in 
understanding for example the political economy, I would not want this to imply an 
uncritical affirmation of the universal validity of such lenses. Rather, Scott’s 
framing consolidates themes which have been long present in the works of post-
colonial social history which constitute many of the sources for this chapter. As 
such, Scott gives us a handle on how to think about the history of political rule that 
does not naturalise authority but points to its location in contested relations. This 
approach resonates with the ways in which anti-colonial thinkers understood the 
historicity of colonised peoples. 
 
The second related issue pertains to the question of positionality and the 
historian’s gaze in the reconstruction of historical presence and subjecthood. 
Chakrabarty has developed a postcolonial critique of Eurocentric historiography 
which has been influential in stimulating thinking on this front.
370
 For reasons of 
space I cannot go into the details of this argument, but in summary, it should at least 
be clear that I am not offering a positivist defence of ‘objective’ historical analysis, 
but hope to present an engaged reflective reconstruction of historical being. 
Chapters Three and Four emphasised in particular the need to engage with situated 
accounts of political experience in order to understand and reflect on domination in 
a critically engaged way. The way I evoke  ‘situatedness’ in this chapter however 
more heavily leans on a sensitivity to analysing dynamics of  rule and struggle 
rather than presenting diverse subject interpretations of these struggles.
371
  This is 
important in terms of the context of the purpose of the chapter – namely, to establish 
bases of recognition and historical understanding in support of a less exclusionary 
engagement with Mozambique as a target society of the liberal peace within the 
present debate.  The narrative offered here is however generally focused on more 
‘organised’ struggles between groups for political-economic power, and thus has not 
fully emphasised the important ‘People’s Histories’ that have also emerged in this 
period.
372
 Chapter Eight takes up the historical political-economic experiences of the 
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peasantry separately as a grounding for an assessment of the contemporary political 
economy of rural interventions. Many of the histories that I do use have themselves 
been constructed in part through the use of oral histories and testimony from non-
elite sources, and as such do not only or necessarily represent the histories of the 
‘big’ people. Nonetheless, this is not a ‘subaltern’ history in the sense of the 
Subaltern Studies scholarship, which elaborates a more fundamental critique of 
historiography.
373
 In terms of pursuing the demands of a decolonising project more 
generally within the study of world politics, a deeper engagement with, and 
recovery of, non-elite narratives of history would nonetheless be an important aspect 
of the wider project. 
 
 The chapter structures Mozambique’s history into unequal periods of ‘rule’ 
and resistance, with a central focus on the twentieth century including the 
emergence of the ‘liberal peace’. In response to a critical literature which has 
emphasised the foreignness/Westernness, novelty and transformative character of 
the liberal peace in its target societies, the chapter will argue that there have 
nonetheless been important continuities in forms of political authority, political 
economy and public administration, as well as recurrent forms of crisis, rebellion 
and resistance against that rule. It also elaborates various ways in which Africans 
have been political agents and subjects within this history, in contradistinction to 
narratives which have cast Mozambique as only a terrain for the working out of the 
histories of others: European colonialism, Cold War socialism, Western 
neoliberalism.
374
 In the last part of the chapter, there is a discussion of the 
implications of such historical patterns for critical evaluations of the liberal peace in 
Mozambique. Most of all, this closing discussion calls into question the extent to 
which the programme of the liberal peace can be interpreted, with a consciousness 
of historical presence and subjecthood, as a radical developmental agenda of social 
transformation.  
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5.1: The southern part of the East African coast around 1500, map produced in 
Britain, c. 1902, Copyright source: Wikimedia Commons 
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I. Southern East Africa before Berlin 
 
To understand the current politics and political economy of Mozambique 
historically, as well as its constitution as a state, it is important to understand the 
significance of the legal political fiction that the 1884 Berlin Conference and 
subsequent Anglo-Portuguese treaties performed in recognising it as a bordered 
entity under Portuguese occupation. As the section after this one shows, it was not 
until three decades after Berlin that the Portuguese could claim military control of 
this massive territory. By contrast, the brief history recounted in this section shows 
that for the four centuries prior to this, social, political and economic life in these 
territories was organised around a variety of kingdoms, empires and lineage groups 
of varying power, trading networks, spiritual powers, patterns of settlement and 
migration. Importantly for our reflections on contemporary forms of political rule, 
there was a diverse and non-integrated set of economies in Mozambique, little in the 
way of military stability, and a succession of African and Afro-Portuguese 
leaderships dominated systems of political authority amongst the people. The arrival 
of Portuguese traders, soldiers, missionaries and some setters had some impact in 
shaping and re-shaping the social and economic order in the region, especially the 
coast, and in the emergence of this powerful mestizo class, but by and large they did 
not dominate the lives of the majority within the region until much later on.
375
  
 
Before the arrival of Vasco de Gama and other Portuguese travellers from 
1498 onwards, the southern coast of East Africa was largely dominated by Arab-
Swahili trading networks operating out of Kilwa in what is now Tanzania, Angoche, 
Quelimane, and Sofala (see Image 5.1). These were integrated into trading routes in 
the Indian Ocean which were linked by merchant ships carrying gold, ivory and 
cloth from the interior of the land to markets across Asia, reaching China and Italy. 
At this time, politically important figures included the Angoche sultans, the ruling 
families in Kilwa, and the territorial chiefs of Quelimane and, inland, Tete. Trade 
flourished alongside boat-building industries in the islands between Kilwa and 
Mozambique Island. The arrival of the Portuguese in increasing numbers, with 
arms, over the next few decades led to the establishment of permanent bases and 
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captaincies at Mozambique and Sofala, and substantially re-oriented these trading 
networks as a result of their presence towards Portuguese imperial monopolies of 
trade. Patterns of control were however not uni-directional; although the Portuguese 
could and did make particular trading demands through the use of force, they often 
had to pay tribute in the other direction towards the African chieftancies. Moreover, 
their reliance on local food production for survival inside the barracks and factories 
tended to create demands for less hostile relations with the existing communities.  
 
Further inland, there were larger African chieftancies organised via lineage 
and systems of tribute, and settlements which were connected to the coastal 
communities through networks of trade but were largely not part of the same 
political and social systems. One of the most famous of these at the time of the 
arrival of the Portuguese was the Monomotapa lineage, which they named and 
treated as an empire, and which claimed seniority over many other chiefly lines in 
the region (see Image 5.2). This lineage may have been the direct descendants of the 
rulers of Great Zimbabwe – a civilisation known through its vast and complex ruins 
inland, which had been settled for a thousand years prior to the Portuguese arrival 
but had disappeared. Monomotapa was to a great practical extent a significant ruling 
dynasty for the interior areas south of the Zambesi river, and collected tribute from 
many other Karanga chieftancies.  Trade during this period, especially in gold, was 
conducted at fairs established in the interior, which would be taxed by the 
chieftancies, who also exercised powers of dispute resolution and punishment over 
traders.  When the Portuguese attempted to gain access to these fairs, in some 
instances one of the conditions upon which they were permitted to do so was that 
they would police their traders under the name of the Monomotapa. These fairs were 
important loci of economic organisation for the region’s various groups, and were 
already integrated to a certain extent into the commercial systems of the Indian 
Ocean featuring Indians, Chinese, Persian, Venetian and Jewish traders. 
Nonetheless, the mainstay of wealth in the popular economy was the trade and use 
of cattle, in which trade the imperial powers did not participate. In the first instance, 
the arrival of the Portuguese did not present any immediate military challenges to 
the inland states and empires; however, their effect on the distributions of arms 
allowed some internal secessions from the Monomotapa regime. Over the next two 
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centuries, however, there were increasing incidents of military confrontation over 
the control of the gold trade, rather than the right to settle, in the Zambesi basin.  
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5.2: Map of south eastern Africa in 1780 made by Dutch explorers, indicating 
the presence of a reputedly large Monomotapa empire. Source: Wikimedia 
Commons. 
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The Portuguese remained largely based on the coast in the sixteenth century, 
on Mozambique and at Sofala, although increasingly departing from the barracks 
and marrying with the African populations. This led to the development of muzungo 
(Afro-Portuguese mestizo) classes who were integrated into African families and 
culture, connected to Indian commercial and capital networks, but also looked to 
Portugal for social and political recognition. It is argued by Newitt that it was these 
classes – the node in relations between Africans in the interior and the ‘outside’ 
world, largely prevented the consolidation either of a colonial state or an African 
monarchy in their areas of influence.
376
 Moreover, they were an important element 
in the strong resistance mounted to direct economic domination over these centuries.  
 
A particular institution which illustrates the various limitations on the 
presence of official Portuguese control in the eighteenth century were the Zambesi 
prazos: large land estates often seized or purchased from Tonga chieftancies whose 
titles were in the gift of the Portuguese crown. They were largely controlled by 
muzungo families – often by women, in the pattern of the matrilineal practices of 
Tonga society – who identified themselves and their slaves as Christian, but who in 
practice were also integrated into the African cultures around them. In particular, 
spirit mediums and practices of spirituality held some sway over prazero society. 
Attempts were made to send white settler couples and poor women from rural 
Portugal to create a white colonial society, although these were limited and 
sporadic, with people often dying of disease. As a result, the ownership and culture 
of the nominally Portuguese prazos was distinctive to this area and this social group, 
neither of particular profit to the Portuguese crown, nor a useful instrument of 
colonial settlement. Many prazos collapsed as a result of their enthusiastic 
involvement in the profitable slave trade, which violated the agreements that had 
been made with the local Tonga populations regarding slavery, and had caused 
much death and suffering. This left the prazos and the surrounding area depopulated 
and debilitated, and vulnerable to takeover by the mid-nineteenth century. Much of 
this was propelled by the enslavement of the achikunda, traditionally the African 
military protectors of the prazeros, who finally revolted and deserted these estates.
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377
 However, in the nineteenth century, the former owners of the prazos and their 
descendants continued to constitute an important force in Zambesian society as 
warriors and traders. 
  
 In thinking about the territory of present-day Mozambique during this time, 
it is important to stipulate just how geographically limited formal Portuguese 
presence was. The prazos represented the high point of Portuguese efforts to 
consolidate its authority and physical presence, and as we have seen, these were 
largely a failure in this respect. Further north than this, there was very little contact 
with the Makua sheikhs who had a consolidated predominance in the area which is 
now northern Nampula. South of Sofala, the area was home to a number of different 
groups who also had little contact with the Portuguese, who had managed to 
establish only a semi-permanent trading presence at Lourenço Marques which was 
frequently sacked. 
 
 An important group in terms of impact over the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, now celebrated in Mozambican school books, was the Gaza 
kingdom, ruled by the Nguni, who did establish political relations with the 
Portuguese, including the exchange of ambassadors. The Nguni had migrated to the 
region from central southern Africa as part of the displacement from the Zulu wars, 
and established a much more organised militarised presence in the south of the 
country, gradually consolidating a more centralised form of authority and taxation 
over most of what is now south Mozambique. Led by Soshangane from the 1830s, 
later ruled by his son Uwzila and grandson Gungunhana, the powerful Gaza Empire 
at its height got as far north as the Zambesi prazos, taking over some forcibly and 
sending the tribute back to the Gazan capital. It became increasingly involved in the 
ivory and slave trades in Zambesi regions, capitalising on the drought and famine 
that had weakened many of its competitors. It also had military, commercial and 
political dealings with the British South Africa Company in Transvaal and Natal, 
who had urgent need of African labour from what is now southern Mozambique to 
grow the mining and sugar industries. Gungunhana sought to negotiate duties from 
the British for each contracted labourer. Although they did not succeed in this 
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particular effort, the involvement of centralised authorities in contracting labour for 
South Africa has been a lasting legacy in the political economy of Mozambique.  
 
By the time of the Berlin Conference in 1884, Portugal’s presence in current 
Mozambique was highly scattered, and mainly concentrated on the coast. The 
British had begun to exercise increasing influence over Lourenço Marques in the 
south as key port for the Transvaal and Natal, and the Gaza Empire remained 
powerful. The Zambesi area, formerly in the gift of the Portugese crown, was the 
site of a range of new chiefly secondary states, including that of the Yao, the Tonga, 
the Makanga, and the Manganja, as well as former prazero warlords with 
Portuguese names.
378
 Many of these offered armed resistance to the establishment of 
Portuguese authority, both before and after the Berlin Conference. The interior of 
the north, and especially the Mueda plateau, had recently become populated by 
Makonde from Tanzania, but elsewhere was becoming largely converted to Islam 
and controlled by families allied to Indian merchant capital. The slave trade, the 
central point of interest and wealth creation for Portugal in terms of the trade with 
Brazil, Cuba and the United States, was rapidly collapsing as a result of a sudden 
drop in world sugar prices and the increasing enforcement of abolition treaties.  
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5.3: Famous portrayal of the capture of Gungunhana, installed in the colonial 
fort in Maputo, picture taken by the author, June 2008. 
 
 The recognition of Portugal’s ‘right to occupy’ Mozambique at Berlin thus 
represented a kind of performative aspiration rather than a concrete reality. Portugal, 
itself very poor, had difficulties mustering the resources that would allow it to 
successfully occupy, let alone politically organise Mozambique.  Immediately after 
Berlin, and the signing of further border treaties with Britain, attempts were made to 
develop an administrative presence and more settled patterns of production and 
trade via the establishment of colonial concession companies, who were leased the 
land in return for pacification. These included the Niassa Company, the 
Mozambique Company, the Zambesia Company and the Mozambique Sugar 
Company, which later became Sena Sugar Estates. Work songs recorded by Vail 
and White about the infamous Paiva Raposo emphasised the suffering of the 
labourers and spread across different estates, resonating with the experience of 
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labourers across the region.
379
 However, these attempts to consolidate control and 
production, which often included the use of forced labour, were often resisted.  
Although Gungunhana was defeated eventually in 1895, (see Image 5.3) military 
rebellions still caused problems. In 1917, a substantial organised military rebellion 
against the Portuguese in Barue, involving thousands of fighters from a range of 
different lineages, exposed the relative frailty of the colonial order in Tete and the 
Zambesi.
380
 Isaacman and Isaacman argue that this was the first organised anti-
colonial rebellion, in both form and collective intent, and in which there was long-
term planning, open anti-colonial sentiment and strategic co-operation.   
 
 In this long period, very briefly sketched here, it is possible to draw out at 
least three issues which are relevant to contemporary reflections on the liberal 
peace. The first is the relatively non-integrated character of the political economy, 
which is oriented towards different modes of production, trade and labour exchange 
throughout the territory from north to south and from the inland areas to the coast. 
In this period, we see strong connections developing between the southern region 
and South African industrialisation, with the central regions developing a growing 
slave trade, large agricultural estates and the links with what became southern 
Zimbabwe, and in the north links are deepened with the networks connecting to 
Indian capital and Muslim traders. The second is the absence of any substantive 
monopoly of military force or political authority in this period, Portuguese or 
otherwise.  Whilst Christian missionaries to some extent managed to maintain a 
marginally independent presence from the Portuguese crown, by and large the 
period reflected, a ‘civilising’ – i.e. culturally, socially and politically transformative 
– mission in name only. Third, the territory was dominated by a series of shifting 
and overlapping authorities of African and Afro-Portuguese leaders, some of whom 
were more organised and centralised than others who variously collaborated with 
and resisted imperial and colonial structures throughout the period. As such, there is 
a great extent to which they exercised significant agency and influence over the 
lives of the inhabitants – African and European – within the territories. The 
hierarchical tribute structures of these relations in political and economic terms was 
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a central feature of the southern Gazan kingdoms in particular, although there is 
evidence of a greater degree of horizontal linkages and organisation in the centre 
and north as power was more broadly dispersed.  Whilst it is not very useful to draw 
very direct connections between this and the impact of more recent attempts at 
transformation, it is indicative of the broader frailty of conquest and control upon 
which the twentieth century modern unitary state was built, as well as the 
dependence of the economy on the export of labour.   
 
If future Mozambicans begin to be understood as subjects of history in this 
period, it is as groups of people, pluralistically constituted in terms of origins, who 
are not particularly compliant with attempts at imperial rule, but who use a wide 
range of political and economic strategies to manage their fates between different 
would-be rulers.  This immediately begins to resonate with some of the issues 
surrounding the exclusion of subjecthood in accounts of the liberal peace, which 
have framed the encounter as a generic one between the ‘liberal’ and ‘local’, or have 
simply failed to contextualise target societies. By paying attention to the historic 
experiences of the peoples in a territory such as Mozambique, as told by 
‘decolonising’ accounts of history, we can begin to think about the liberal peace not 
as being visited on a ‘blank slate’ of the ‘local’, but as a recent articulation of the 
complex historical relations both between shifting groups based permanently in the 
territory and those connected outside the territory. As I will discuss further in the 
final section of this chapter, a sense of historical presence and an understanding of 
historical dynamics opens up alternative ways of thinking about the liberal peace. 
 
   
II. Mozambique and the New State (Novo Estado), 1928-74 
 
A more substantive assertion of unitary colonial political rule over the 
sizable territory known now as Mozambique took place from the 1930s under the 
reforms of the New State (Novo Estado) in Portugal. The re-configurations of public 
administration, political authority and political economy undertaken in this recent 
period were substantial and in many senses long-lasting – as we will see in the years 
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afterwards, many legacies from the Salazar
381
 period continue to shape tropes of 
political authority and practices of public administration in what became the state, 
and the contours of the political economy thereafter. In this period however, we also 
see various forms of resistance to the state emerge more prominently. As such, the 
authority of the state remained fragile in various regions and dimensions, as 
indicated by the early successes of the independence movement.  
 
The reforms of the New State were marked in particular by the promulgation 
of the Colonial Act of 1930, which declared the integration of overseas territories 
into the Portuguese state, and the Organic Charter of 1933, which was a kind of 
colonial constitution which reconfigured the relationship between Mozambique and 
Portugal.
382
 These changes in Portuguese policy were accelerated by a new 
government. A set of crises within the First Republic had resulted in a successful 
coup in 1928, with the new conservative nationalist dictatorships pledging to wipe 
out what it saw as disorder, economic crisis and corruption, both in Portugal and the 
lands it laid claim to overseas. Incidents such as the sustained Barue rebellion were 
seen as nationally embarrassing and demoralising; moreover, the colonial 
companies which were the proxy administrators of the territory after the Berlin 
Conference were manifestly failing in the job assigned to them of raising money, 
competing with other imperial producers and pacifying the African populations. In 
fact, they were mostly in a state of financial ruin.
383
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5.4: Colonial administrative divisions, 1943. Map reproduced in Gengenbach, 
H., Binding Memories, Source: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique 
 
The Organic Charter of 1933 attempted to radically change the basis of 
public administration within Mozambique. Colonial Companies were disbanded, 
and passed into the control of the state, which installed state Administrative Posts 
throughout the country. The map above shows that the territory was marked out into 
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around 100 administrative divisions, which sometimes followed the boundaries of 
the old concession company territories.   The enforcers of the colonial companies – 
the cipais – were recruited instead by the state as native police, and conscription into 
the colonial army increased.  Another significant layer of native administration was 
created in the shape of régulos; these were ‘traditional leaders’ whom the state had 
chosen to recognise as the representatives of particular groups, as well as the 
instruments of their orders to these groups.  Depending on the locality, these could 
be people who were recognised as having leadership roles within various 
communities previously, who thus became an institution of continuity between the 
colonial state and the population. However, it was also common for leaders who had 
been troublesome for the colonial powers to have other régulos recognised instead 
in their areas, and to thus be displaced by the new administration. Régulos were 
treated differently to the general population; exempted from various forms of 
taxation and labour themselves, they had some powers of compulsion over the 
community as a whole. Their authority could derive from multiple sources, 
including spiritual authority, lineage authority, political authority and the forms of 
patronage and privilege resulting from their position in the colonial order.
384
 Yet the 
role was very much a ‘modern’ confection, fulfilling the functions of an under-
resourced colonial state. Under the régulo system, the visible physical presence of 
the Portuguese state in the countryside was increased, with the raising of Portuguese 
flags, and physical construction of state property at each administrative post.   
 
 Also codified in the Organic Charter of 1933 was the indígenato system, 
formalising a division between subject ‘native’ indígenas and citizen ‘non-natives’ 
which had be first introduced in law in the 1899 Labour Law, which had in principle 
banned slavery. This attempted to consolidate a distinctive legal political status for 
the ‘citizens’ who could own property, move freely, participate in various public 
institutions and had no labour obligations, and the ‘natives’ who were excluded 
from colonial social and political life, and ‘morally’ compelled to work in various 
forms of contract labour.
385
  The former were subject to the laws of Portugal, the 
latter those of Mozambique, consolidating the performance of racial bifurcation 
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within the system of colonial political authority. Under some pressure, a category of 
assimilados was created: the assimilated. These would be those natives who had 
sufficiently ‘advanced’ in their adoption of European culture and language to be 
treated under the same legal codes. In practice, these constituted a tiny minority of 
the population – perhaps 5,000 out of 8.2 million by Independence.386 Often, they 
had been educated in Catholic mission schools and took on petty administrative 
roles in the cities thereafter.  
 
These assimilados were crucial in Portugal’s attempt to buttress its political 
authority in portraying its colonial possessions as part of a developmental, civilising 
multi-racial lusophone community to the outside world.  Under increasing pressure 
from internal agitation and the civil rights movements in the 1960s, the legal 
category of ‘indígena’ was dropped, and public services such as schools and 
hospitals were extended in a limited way to the black population. Yet this was also a 
period in which mass Portuguese and Indian settlement was being encouraged, 
which directly undermined job opportunities for the assimilados, who became 
increasingly disgruntled under the openly racial discrimination practised in the 
cities. Many of those who settled in this period, particularly from Portugal, had 
equally come from backgrounds without formal education, giving a particular lie to 
the notion of their superior qualifications for the kind of work, status and property 
which they were given on arrival. As Amílcar Cabral had pointed out in his critique 
of Portuguese colonialism, the majority of Portuguese in Portugal at the time would 
not have met the criteria to be considered assimilado.
387
  
 
The patterns in political authority, and particularly the apparent attempt to 
establish a more open and egalitarian order including racial inclusiveness and 
ownership of one’s labour were nonetheless systematically undermined on two 
connected fronts. On the one hand, widespread racism was socially normalised and 
in this sense, day-to-day relations between Africans and Europeans were practically 
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indistinguishable from earlier periods, and in some senses intensified by the new 
settler class who expected to have their ‘white’ status translate into social power.388  
 
On the other hand, the way in which the new dispensation was systematically 
undermined was by the labour requirements of the new drive for economic autarchy. 
The same Organic Charter which established the new forms of public administration 
and political authority also established a new vision for the economy based on the 
autarchic development of a Portuguese imperial system, in which Mozambique and 
other ‘overseas territories’ were to supply foreign exchange, taxes and raw materials 
for processes of industrialisation in Portugal. In principle, although native labour 
was free to contract where it chose, in practice, the laws were systematically flouted, 
either through a loophole which allowed authorities to compel ‘vagrants’ (those 
without employment cards) to forced labour as punishment, or that which required 
people to labour on ‘public works’, which were generously defined. These forms of 
forced labour were known as chibalo, widely detested but enforced by the structures 
of decentralised public administration. Moreover, native taxes were vastly increased 
as a proportion of wages, meaning that many peasants were necessarily compelled 
to work in wage labour for at least half a year to cover this tax. Those natives who 
could not pay would be taken for chibalo. This was convenient for the colonial 
companies’ estates, now owned and financially guaranteed by the state, whose 
production was relatively uncompetitive compared to commodities produced 
elsewhere. As will be further discussed in Chapter Eight, these practices led to 
widespread malnutrition and the disruption of food production. Yet for the colonial 
authority, these were justified as necessary for the ‘development’ of the colony, for 
the first time elaborated through a series of Five Year Plans by the colonial state. 
These set out targets for export and the construction of infrastructure, such as 
railways and roads to serve the investment projects, and schools and hospitals to 
serve the African populations. As resistance accumulated to the colonial state, its 
developmental necessity and rationale was re-affirmed both to external and internal 
audiences. However, the colonial administration was also forced to abandon chibalo 
and the growing of forced crops as an official policy in 1961, although in practice it 
continued for some time after this. 
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 The tensions between colonial attempts to reproduce sources of very cheap 
human labour whilst nominally making improvements in political status and access, 
whilst reassuring and encouraging white settlement, were both obvious and 
problematic. Many white settlers had an expectation of virtually free labour, and 
there was much complicity in terms of rule-interpretation by petty administrative 
structures to ensure this. Practices of chibalo were central to many of the dynamics 
that emerged from these tensions.  Urban migration and industrial labour was one 
way of escaping chibalo, offering both higher wages than plantation work, and the 
possibility of protection through the patronage of a padrinho or godfather.
389
 This 
created a new set of identifications and class dynamics in the form of urban workers, 
who made efforts to agitate for better recognition and conditions in Lourenço 
Marques.
390
 It also furthered economic migration into the South African mines, 
where wages were higher and conditions slightly better. It also became a central 
focus of identification between the masses and the anti-colonial movement which 
was gathering a small amount of momentum in the 1950s.  
 
Despite a much more deliberate attempt to exert direct control over the 
public administration and political economy of the territory, the colonial state did 
not last very long and it was brought down by a left-wing military coup in Portugal 
in 1974. This was in large part because the army was reluctant to continue fighting 
the colonial wars. The history of the Mozambican independence movement and the 
foundation of Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) in 1962 in Dar-es-
Salaam is well covered, event by event, by the post-independence historical 
literature.
391
 The movement, headed by former UN official and anthropologist 
Eduardo Mondlane, received funding and arms from a wide range of sources, 
including the Kennedy administration, China, Nyerere, and the Soviet Union. Whilst 
there is some disagreement as to the role played by Frelimo militancy in driving out 
the colonial authority, it is clear that much of the discontent within Portugal 
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stemmed from the heavy burden that colonial counter-insurgency entailed on the 
army and the state in general, absorbing up to 8% of the entire national income.
392
  
 
 Within Mozambique, this was because the anti-colonial movement was able 
to mobilise substantial parts of the population and to disrupt colonial authority in 
various regions through military and political activity. This was initially localised in 
the northern provinces such as Cabo Delgado, where both cross-border guerrilla 
activity and brutal counter-insurgency led to widespread Frelimo support. In 
particular, the massacre of unarmed protesting Makonde villagers at the 
administrative headquarters in Mueda in 1960 became emblematic of the brutality of 
the regime and helped radicalise people against it.
393
 This radicalisation translated 
into practical support for the movement in its early days, particularly as one of its 
central promises was the full abolition of chibalo. The relatively flimsy presence of 
the colonial state in many areas in the north receded quickly, which allowed Frelimo 
to set up ‘liberated zones’; areas of settlement which were re-organised towards 
collective production and self-sufficiency, with various new participatory 
administrative structures. These contrasted with the strategic villages (aldeamentos) 
set up by the Portuguese as part of counter-insurgency vigilance.
394
  
 
 In reconstructing the historical presence and dynamics of Mozambique, this 
period between the late 1920s and early 1970s was fundamental in laying the 
foundations of the contemporary state, physically and intellectually, in establishing 
the consolidation of a bordered territory understood as ‘Mozambique’, and in 
stimulating changing forms of national and class identification amongst urban and 
rural populations. Although, this was contested, and had to accommodate a variety 
of extant systems of authority through its forms of indirect rule in the provinces, 
these dynamics are nonetheless important in understanding the constitution of 
Mozambique as a particular kind of ‘collective’ historical subject in the present.  
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As was the case in the earlier period, the limited reach of the administrative 
structures across the country continued to pose problems for the colonial state’s 
attempt to control, instrumentalise and regulate the behaviour of the population. 
This became more acute in the face of the spread of more fundamental critiques of 
colonialism and calls for independence. As such, the authorities had to attempt to 
maintain supplies of labour in the face of discontent, leading to a retrenchment of 
public authority towards ostensibly ‘developmental’ objectives without a change in 
the basic orientation of the economy. Moreover, the dual and sometimes plural 
sources of social authority in communities more distant from the central control of 
the state continued to be a feature of the lives of many. As will be discussed in the 
final section, understanding the history – and the late colonial history in particular – 
of public administration, political economy and political struggles in Mozambique 
begins to render the rationales and activities of the liberal peace – as delineated in 
policy and the critiques – both less novel and perhaps more problematic than they 
have been portrayed thus far in the debate. 
 
III. Independence, Socialist Revolution and Frelimo rule 1975-1989 
 
 The uncontested handover of state power to Frelimo upon independence in 
1975 laid the platform for a renewed attempt at ambitious state-driven social and 
political programme for transformation in Mozambique, based around the 
dismantling of colonial power, the collectivist modernisation and development of 
rural society along socialist lines, and the forging of a new model of citizenry based 
on scientific socialism.
395
 Despite these radical intentions, within a decade the 
project of transformation was both failing and being unmade on several fronts, 
including through the violently destabilising force of Renamo, failures of 
management, vision, economic crisis and natural disaster amongst other factors. 
What did emerge however was a substantial fusion of the Frelimo party structure 
with the state, creating a new relatively cohesive ruling social group which was 
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widely dispersed across the country and in many places integrated into existing 
structures of authority.
396
  
 
The economic basis of the new state was however fragile; much of the 
human capital, particularly in the sense of classes with secondary education, 
managerial and organisational capacity, had been evacuated through the flight of 
settlers and other privileged groups in the process of independence. Although 
sympathetic cooperantes from Scandinavia, the UK and the Eastern bloc amongst 
others were sometimes used to fill these positions, their numbers, skills and 
experience did not always match the vacancies. During the first years following 
independence, those with any training or formal education at all were promoted 
rapidly and often worked in several posts simultaneously. This was especially the 
case in education and healthcare, which the government was keen to rapidly expand.  
 
In terms of physical capital, often equipment and assets had been stripped, 
mined or simply destroyed to prevent further use. Trading networks and shops 
closed down and disappeared. The government’s programme of rapid 
nationalisation of industries and shop networks was in some sense the only logical 
reaction to this collapse.
397
 Simultaneously, the new government was attempting to 
industrialise rapidly and extensively imported heavy machinery from both the West 
and Eastern bloc countries. The agreements with South Africa regarding the use of 
Mozambican labour in the mines – a significant earner of state finance, household 
earnings in the south of the country and foreign exchange – were suspended given 
the anti-apartheid politics of the new regime and their supportive relationship with 
the ANC.  Due to the imports and the loss of foreign exchange, Mozambique went 
quickly from having virtually no foreign debt in 1980 to becoming very heavily 
indebted by 1984 as a result of this policy. Crucially, it was as early as 1984 that its 
first economic agreements with the IMF were signed and, soon afterwards, moves to 
partially liberalise the economy were made.  Chapter Seven explores in more detail 
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the importance of this period of economic crisis as a foundation for the relationship 
between the government and foreign government donors.  
 
This is not to say that the government was not ideologically motivated; 
indeed there seemed to be coherence at the time just after independence between the 
vanguardist Marxism-Leninism that Frelimo had adopted, and the need for 
substantive intervention in the political economy.  Frelimo also set about creating 
political structures throughout the country as a means of involving and connecting 
with the population, which Harrison argues were intimately connected with existing 
forms of social authority.
398
 A hierarchical network of Party cells became the central 
engine for the spread of its influence, which also became highly fused with the 
structures of the state. The charismatic authoritarianism of President Samora Machel 
lent a particular character to both politics and public administration in this period. 
For example, he believed that the vestiges of the bureaucracy that had operated with 
the colonial government were reactionary, and so sought to gradually co-opt and 
undermine them as an independent force, most notably in the anti-bureaucratic 
Presidential Offensive of 1980.
399
 Chapter Six will look at ways in which during this 
period there developed various discourses against corruption and self-interest in 
both public servants and the wider population. 
 
At the centre of Frelimo’s ideological programme was, importantly, a fairly 
radical vision of the New Man (Homem Novo) which all were expected to emulate – 
an image of an educated, healthy modern citizen with an understanding of socialist 
principles and a desire to devote himself to the national project, who eschewed 
feudalism and ‘traditional superstition’ (obscurantismo) in favour of equal gender 
relations and scientific practices of production.
400
 To promote this, there were 
massive anti-illiteracy campaigns and substantial efforts at political ‘education’. The 
political agenda was strongly developmentalist and transformationalist in 
orientation. Machel declared 1980 the beginning of a Ten Year Plan for the Decade 
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of Mozambique’s Victory over Underdevelopment.401 There was also an effort to 
form mechanisms of direct popular participation in the political system. Poder 
Popular in Mozambique were seen as directly countering the legacies of colonialism 
– specifically political exclusion, denial of access to welfare provision and 
economic exclusion.
402
 Yet, simultaneously, and certainly in tension if not 
contradiction with the principles of Poder Popular, Frelimo had declared itself a 
vanguard party of the revolution in 1977, a designation which stood unmodified 
until the Fifth Congress in 1989.
403
 
 
What were the popular experiences of this period? Marshall’s account of the 
attempts to introduce literacy training into the CIM factories outside Maputo offers 
deep insight into the very limited ability of these transformation programmes to 
make definitive breaks with colonialist hierarchical social relations in the classroom 
and on the factory floor, to get to grips with the daily problems of workers such as 
the lack of food, to empower women, and more generally to use literacy as a tool for 
popular empowerment rather than for ‘development’.404 Rather, they tended to 
reinforce structures of authority in management and social class, make more 
onerous demands on workers’ time and reinforce the privileged status of Portuguese 
as the language of political participation. As such, literacy programmes – at the 
heart of the government’s vision for a modern population – often ended up 
establishing new forms of alienation amongst the population.  As Chapter Eight will 
discuss further, other elements of the government’s new programme such as the 
creation of communal villages, co-operatives and collective production showed 
similar tendencies in terms of reinforcing various relations of hierarchy and being 
disconnected from the realities of those whom they sought to empower.  
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This authoritarian tendency also manifested itself in a fairly heavy-handed 
treatment of dissidents or those that did not conform to the party line. For those 
labelled ‘enemies’ of the regime, there was also the option of ‘re-education’ at a 
punitive labour camp in a remote province. Yet it seemed relatively easy to become 
an ‘enemy’ of the state. For example, despite official state control of the economy, 
much of the population bought and sold their goods through candonga, the 
unofficial market. This parallel and often intersecting system of trade in the country 
was a relatively large proportion of economic activity, although it is of course 
unknown exactly how much.
405
 Seen as an enemy of the revolution, it was publicly 
punished, although Hanlon also reports that state enterprises themselves even relied 
on it for supplies of goods and materials.
406
 However, given the large levels of 
antipathy towards it from the Party, and in particular the President, this led to the 
deepening of divisions between the economic strategies of the state and those of the 
broader population, especially during periods of drought and famine in the early 
1980s. 
 
Compounding drought and famine in the early 1980s, economic and political 
sabotage was undertaken prominently, effectively and deliberately by the 
Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo herein). The origins of this group of 
rebels is somewhat historically contested, although it is now broadly agreed that the 
Rhodesian security services and after 1980 the South African security services 
extensively funded, trained and supported the group of disgruntled ex-Frelimo 
leaders as part of a deliberate policy of destabilisation of the new Frelimo regime.
407
 
At later stages, support was received from right-wing groups within the United 
States and Europe as part of a Cold War framework of opposing socialism. This 
group deliberately targeted infrastructure such as roads and railway lines, 
particularly those linking Southern Rhodesia to Mozambique in the Beira corridor 
and those supplying productive industries, as well as any symbols of state power, 
including communal villages, health and education posts, and bureaucratic 
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apparatus.
408
 The impact of the attacks on productive capacity were pervasive and 
substantial, both through the damage caused and the reduction in activity due to fear 
amongst civilians. Various witness accounts testify strongly to the brutality of the 
war, which produced massive displacement and caused many deaths and 
mutilations.
409
 The war itself also provoked forms of armed resistance within 
communities that were neither aligned to the government nor Renamo; for example, 
the Naparama soldiers who defended communities in Zambézia under the leadership 
of the spiritual healer Manuel António.
410
 Nonetheless, a substantial parallel war 
economy also flourished, based on logistical risk-bearing and mobile  or migrant 
wage labour.
411
 
 
 Despite the seemingly senseless character of some of the particular acts of 
violence, it is nonetheless hard to escape the conclusion that where Renamo did 
come to a modus vivendi with populations, it was sometimes tapping into a certain 
kind of alienation or distance between Frelimo’s projects of social and political 
transformation and the broader population, particularly in terms of spiritually-based 
social practices and hierarchies of power.  Geffray’s study of the experience in Erati 
district in Nampula province notes that Renamo, although coercive and violent, 
emphasised dimensions of land restoration and respect for spiritual power, including 
religious institutions, and dealt largely through the chiefs of villages.
412
 This 
interpretation is supported by Hall, who emphasises the change over the course of 
the war in the character of Renamo as being also related to the government response 
of intensifying policies of forced villagisation of the peasantry.
413
 Yet, increasingly 
crippled by the war effort, the state could not make the villages function in the 
promised way, compounding the dire situation of the population, who were 
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increasingly fleeing the country.  In this sense, the outcome of Renamo’s violence 
exactly cohered with its intentions – to destabilise the state and make normal life 
unviable, and to challenge Frelimo’s attempts at ‘modernist’ social transformation. 
 
In some senses, the post-independence period is the most critical to 
recognise, understand and re-construct, in order to put ‘liberal peace’ relations into 
conversation with an understanding of historical subjecthood. It is a period when a 
self-consciously ‘Mozambican’ state came into being, when the ideas underpinning 
the basis of colonial authority were openly challenged, and when sincere and 
ambitious designs to transform the lives of the population were pursued with 
enthusiasm. Yet, as will be discussed in the concluding section of this chapter, there 
are some strong elements of continuity between the colonial and socialist regimes, 
in terms of their modernising visions, labour-intensive political economies and 
hierarchical, authoritarian practices and structures of rule. Such continuities, which 
will be understood as also persisting into the post-war period of liberalisation, are 
important in understanding the kinds of political and social relations and struggles 
that have underpinned living memory, and in which the liberal peace is itself 
embodied.   
 
IV. Liberalisation and the one-party state, 1989 to the historical present 
 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, many of the critiques of the 
liberal peace have emphasised its fundamentally transformational character. As 
noted in Chapter Two, for example, Duffield opens his discussion with the idea that 
the liberal peace represents a “radical developmental agenda of social 
transformation”414 which marries the politics of liberalisation to a concern for 
conflict resolution, thus overturning Third World alternatives. However, as the 
discussion in the chapter thus far has intimated, when engaging with and 
interpreting Mozambique as a historical entity, this may only tell half the story. In 
this section, I will briefly outline some of the reforms which happened in 
Mozambique that are understood within the liberal peace literature as ‘radical’, 
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before pointing to how these reinforce some important elements of continuity as 
well as change in the relationship between state and society.  
 
By the end of the 1980s, it had become clear that the condition for the end of 
the now unwinnable war with Renamo was political liberalisation and the move to a 
multi-party system. Anticipating this ahead of the Rome peace talks with Renamo, 
the Frelimo Fifth Congress removed references to Marxism-Leninism from its 
political rubric in 1989, and the Government made unilateral changes to the 
Constitution of Mozambique in 1990 allowing for contested multi-party elections.
415
 
Following the General Peace Agreement signed in Rome,
416
 the subsequent electoral 
process in 1994, shepherded and closely scrutinised by the UN mission ONUMOZ, 
resulted in the formation of fourteen eligible parties, of whom three (Frelimo, 
Renamo and Udemo) won seats in the National Assembly. Subsequent 
parliamentary and presidential elections have been held regularly, if not entirely 
smoothly, every five years.   
 
At the same time, and under heavy personal lobbying from the journalist 
community within Mozambique, it also legally wrote in provisions for freedom of 
the press and the right to information. Interestingly, the government had blocked 
recent attempts at press freedom fearing that these would result in greater criticism 
of Western donors, with whom it was building relations.
417
 Since 1990, the number 
of newspapers in circulation has greatly increased, with organs such as Savana and 
Zambeze able to pursue a line openly critical of the government. Whilst the 
harassment of such entities by the government has not entirely ceased, they are 
nonetheless able to operate. In recent years, an independent television network STV 
and its associated newspaper O País have become much more widely available. 
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These two elements: multi-party elections and freedom of the press can be 
understood as representing significant departures from previous principles of rule 
enunciated throughout the socialist period within Mozambique and demonstrate that 
important elements of political liberalisation occurred.  
 
Economic liberalisation can be dated from some years before this period, and 
appears no less substantial. In 1984, the government approved an Economic 
Rehabilitation Programme at the behest of the IMF in return for debt rescheduling. 
Official co-operation with the World Bank and EEC under the Lomé Convention 
also began. Although some measures to liberalise the economy had been taken even 
before this, this was the marker of significant upheavals in state involvement in the 
economy, including the removal of prices of production inputs and exchange 
controls on the currency. These measures also appeared to mark something of a 
significant shift from the state’s previous principles of a planned economy and as 
such a significant ideological re-orientation within the state, much to the dismay of 
some of the ‘hardline’ elements within Frelimo.  
 
Equally if not more visible was a rapid influx of (mostly European and North 
American) bilateral aid agencies, multilateral aid agencies and NGOs, carrying out a 
massive range of humanitarian and developmental missions, often setting up parallel 
structures to those of the state and in competition with each other. This is what 
Richmond has called the ‘alphabet soup’ of agencies which are, according to the 
liberal peace, ‘reordering state and society’.418 They were seen to be vitally 
necessary. By 1989, the population was heavily reliant on food aid from donors, and 
by 1994, foreign aid counted for 60% of Gross National Income.
419
 Donations at this 
stage more than overwhelmed the public sector and thus naturally had to be 
administered to the population directly. Duffield argues that these practices 
challenged relations of sovereignty and articulated alternative ‘non-material’ visions 
of development.
420
 Again, this has been seen within the liberal peace literature as a 
radical departure from previous models of political sovereignty. 
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 Closely linked to the changes in economic policy and to the influx in foreign 
aid were changes in the appearance of public administration – mostly clearly evident 
through the institutionalisation of various forms of ‘technical assistance’ to support 
the delivery of policies and state functions. These were people, either permanent 
staff or consultants who were seconded from foreign embassies or multilateral 
institutions to work inside the institutions of government. This has been argued by 
Harrison and Duffield amongst others to have heralded the beginning of ‘post-
conditionality’; that is a fundamental shift away from the idea of a border between 
national and non-national state functions, and towards a ‘frontier’ interpretation of 
sovereignty.  The far-reaching influence of western functionaries within institutions 
of public administration has been seen as a critical aspect of the liberal peace and 
symptomatic of its overall power for re-orienting government.  The high point of 
these may be considered to be the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PARPAs in 
the Portuguese acronym) which the government now regularly produces under the 
initial guidance of the IFIs. These provide a framework which the donors may use to 
hold the government to account in terms of its performance on various economic 
measures, which correspond to international agendas such as the Millennium 
Development Goals and macroeconomic austerity. Pugh has been particularly 
critical of the ways in which this ‘post-Washington consensus’ agenda reinforces 
policies of structural adjustment and neoliberal ideology.
421
  
 
The critiques of the liberal peace which have emphasised these reforms have 
done so with good reason – these interventions into the economic and political 
policies of the state and the nature of public administration, were unusual, deep, 
ideologically driven, have been largely unaccountable to politicians and the 
population in general, and in a number of cases made life worse on various fronts. 
Yet, the largely ahistorical character of the critiques has meant that they have tended 
to marginalise the past as a resource for reflection on the significance of such 
measures. This tends, perhaps bizarrely, to also de-politicise the stakes around 
intervention, and in particular how it has re-constituted or re-constructed the politics 
of rule within society.  In the rest of this section, I will argue that there are also very 
important, and often visible, elements of political continuity between prior periods 
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and the recent post-war years, which call into question the claim that the liberal 
peace has ‘radically’ transformed it.  
 
It is perhaps extraordinary to remember that, although much has happened 
over the last century, particular in terms of shifting ideologies, the state of 
Mozambique has been ruled by only two identifiably different elites since 1930: the 
Salazar-Caetano regime and the Frelimo Party. Whilst I would definitely not want to 
overdraw the similarities between the two, particularly ideologically, it is difficult 
not to see some interesting parallels when reflecting on a re-constructed history 
across the different regimes. These can be grouped under the chapter’s themes of 
political authority, public administration and political economy.  
 
i. Political authority 
 
Across this period, for example, political authority of regimes over the 
masses in Mozambique has been continuously constituted through ideologies of 
‘development’. For the colonial regime, there was a combination of ideas of moral 
and spiritual development through the Catholic Church, coupled with the 
‘progressive’ political and economic effects of colonialism on backward races. 
These provided important public rationales for both the necessity of the colonial 
state, and justifications for particularly strong exercises of its power. For Frelimo 
after independence, the core critique of colonialism was that it had led to 
underdevelopment and backwardness in Mozambique, thus requiring a very 
widescale programme of social, political and economic change, to be advised by 
those sufficiently knowledgeable and educated within the regime. Mahoney has 
commented in particular on the similarities between the colonial ‘New State’ and 
Frelimo’s ‘New Man’ authoritarian and modernising developmental ideologies.422 In 
the period since the end of the war, although apparently different policies have been 
pursued to secure development, it has continued to loom large as the basic rationale 
for the legitimate authority of the state, as well as for international co-operation 
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insofar as it is able to do ‘capacity building’.  This reinforces and maintains the 
basic didactic hierarchies established by development. The integration of 
Millennium Development Goals and other markers of ‘development’ into political 
activity is thus not necessarily a rupture from the basic rationale of the state, but an 
important continuation of colonial and post-colonial relations of political authority. 
Unsurprisingly, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, a primary instrument of 
liberalisation interventions, have been required to present themselves in 
‘developmental’ terms to establish their credentials and authority, as well as 
increasingly to show ‘developmental’ outcomes such as reductions in poverty. 
Although the definitions of what constitutes ‘development’ have somewhat 
changed, the structure of the epistemic authority deriving from notions of 
development has not. Moreover, specific elements of the developmental visions, 
such as the undifferentiated subsistence character of a smallholder peasantry have 
not.
423
 
 
Neither is the retrenchment and reform of this developmental political 
authority via liberalisation a particularly novel aspect of state politics in the face of 
rebellion. If the colonial regime was forced in the 1960s to permit various kinds of 
reform to try to stay in power, such as the nominal abolition of the indígena 
category and of chibalo, Frelimo was required from the late 1980s to allow forms of 
political and economic liberalisation to contain the internal (Renamo) and external 
(donor) forces of opposition. Since the end of the war, the transition from the 
Chissano to the Guebuza government can also be seen as another such form of 
retrenchment, following a nearly-lost 1999 Presidential election.
424
 In substantive 
terms, however, none of these retrenchments resulted in forms of change within the 
core personnel of the regime, nor their ability to exercise power through the state. 
Yet on the surface these seemed to be signs of substantive political change; indeed, 
the feting of both the regularity of elections and Chissano’s ‘voluntary’ step-down 
have been seen to be signs of the health of Mozambique’s democracy.  
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ii. Political economy 
 
The persistence of the centrality of the state elite is made clearer when we 
consider the political economic relationship between the state and large companies 
in a historical perspective. Again, reading off the critiques of the liberal peace, we 
would expect the enforced liberalisation and privatisation of state enterprises to 
constitute a radical departure from forms of prior ownership, and further evidence of 
the deeply transformative character of interventions. Pitcher has argued that there 
are several elements worth unpicking on this front, which suggest that changes have 
not been quite as radical as all that, suggesting some continuities on the basic 
ground of co-operation between the state and large enterprises.
425
 The colonial state, 
as mentioned, sought first to operate through large colonial companies, before 
taking them over directly as instruments of the state under the New State. This was 
to secure monopolistic control of production which propped up the state and its 
political economy. The post-independence government’s policy was essentially one 
of continuation with this structure of ownership, in terms of investment coming 
from the state and profits being returned to the state. Whilst the state itself was 
much more oriented towards the needs of the population than the colonial regime, 
there were nonetheless continuities in the mutually supportive relationship between 
the state and large enterprise, which operated monopolistically.  
 
Today, the processes of privatisation and liberalisation that have taken place 
in the post-independence period have not necessarily undermined some parts of this 
relationship and we see interesting elements of continuity, although importantly 
profits are now not returned to the state. Yet. almost all large enterprises now must 
have a fairly direct relationship with the regime via either the state, or via 
partnership with members of the Frelimo nomenklatura – a party elite who are 
highly fused with the state elite. Thus, for example, the President controls large 
stakes in the ‘privatised’ public utilities sector, the former President has significant 
interests in mining, and even the party itself has an investment arm.
426
 The laws 
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regarding ownership of large enterprises have meant that foreign investors are 
required to partner with a national investor, who is almost always directly connected 
with the Party in some way. This is more obviously true of the so-called ‘mega-
projects’, such as Mozal (Mozambique Aluminium) which are half-owned by 
foreign investors and half-owned by the state. Monopolistic structures of industry 
also persist in many markets; although legally permitted, competition between the 
companies of the state-elite is generally minimal.  
 
As Pitcher argues, this signals that privatisation in Mozambique has not been 
the wholesale re-orientation of public enterprise towards the private sector, but has 
contended with and reinforced structures of political power. I would further contend 
that this has in some sense always been the case.  The recent re-emergence of 
colonial-era companies such as Sena Sugar Estates – this time co-owned by the state 
and Mauritian investors, and backed by World Bank guarantees rather than the 
colonial state – is perhaps a more obvious reminder of such continuities.427 This is 
particularly the case when thinking about the way that these large estates shape 
opportunities for wage labour in the central provinces where many operate, which 
often represent generational continuities for workers and their families. Although 
this is now not chibalo nor war labour, and workers are entitled to various minimum 
wages, these wages are often inadequate and strongly eroded by inflation. Such 
generational continuities are also obvious in the patterns of migrant labour to South 
Africa from the southern provinces, cash-cropping in the northern provinces, and the 
structure of Mozambican Indian ownership of businesses across the country. The 
significance of these forms of continuity is particularly important in problematizing 
the idea that the liberal peace has represented a ‘radical agenda of social 
transformation’, in light of the continued but mutating forms of collusion between 
the state elite and large enterprises, the patterns of wage labour and merchant class 
formation, and the contribution of this to reinforcing social and political hierarchies.  
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iii. Public administration 
 
 Public administration practices have also shown interesting forms of 
continuity as well as change. The story told by critiques of the liberal peace has 
emphasised that neoliberal policies have served to ‘hollow out’ the state, making it 
simply a regulatory agency rather than a substantive distributor and arbiter of 
political goods.
428
 Intuitively, the claim seems plausible, and fits with the general 
story about the character of liberal intervention’s overall aims to reduce the size of 
the state. Yet, the actual practices of public administration seem to have worked in 
some contrary ways. For example, both the colonial state and socialist state were 
marked by substantial planning architectures in order to integrate the political reach 
of the state with the desired economic outcomes concerning production and 
autarchy. Salazar’s Five Year Plan for Mozambique and Machel’s Ten Year (later 
Five Year) Plans for addressing developmental problems were thus a significant 
feature of rule. One would expect that liberalisation would thus reduce the size and 
scope of national planning architectures as the country was moved away from a 
planned economy.  
 
However, the opposite seems to have happened; planning architectures and 
processes within Mozambique are now, perhaps more than ever, the central activity 
of politics and political life, across not just the state but a wide range of 
organisations and agencies. For example, the government continues to present its 
Five Year Plan (Plano Quinquenial do Governo), which is now the apparent basis 
for the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA), which fulfils 
the donor led PRSP planning requirements. Each sector is also required to develop a 
Sector –Wide Action Plan (SWAP), with implementing agencies also required to 
produce strategic plans at the level of the organisation. These plans are important 
because their negotiation is an important interface between government and donors, 
and perhaps because they represent a concrete output of co-operation. Although 
what is planned has to a substantial extent altered, from production targets to 
development targets, the bureaucratic culture, architecture and importance of 
planning has not diminished per se. Indeed, the establishment of a more powerful 
planning ministry in Mozambique – the Ministry for Planning and Development – 
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indicates the centrality of this activity to the state under the liberal peace, as well as 
reflects the increasing desire of the Mozambican state to have as much influence 
over the outcome of planning processes as possible.
429
 Again, this points to a 
reconfiguration of state power via a reconfiguration of administrative mechanisms 
rather than its collapse.  
 
 Further recent trends in public administration, normally associated with 
liberal peace, have also been far less transformative than is normally implied. One 
of the more recent trends within the liberal peace agenda has specifically been an 
emphasis on ‘decentralised’ governance, which is articulated as countering the 
dysfunctional, centralised bureaucratic post-colonial state through local 
participatory mechanisms, including ‘traditional authorities’. Yet, as West and 
Kloeck-Jenson have showed, the internationally-sponsored decentralisation efforts 
have in places been greeted and treated as, variously, the re-invigoration of the 
colonial régulo system, the re-appointment of Frelimo Party representatives, the re-
recognition of Renamo mambo representatives, or as the recognition of other diverse 
roles such as the mwene amongst the Makonde, or the tinganakana structures in 
Inhambane.
430
 In particular, some of the régulos who have been engaged have 
requested to have powers over local taxation and labour returned, as well as 
uniforms, flags and transport with which to project their authority. Although these 
latter requests have not been granted, the return of some of these figures to positions 
of recognised political authority, and exercising some authoritative functions, 
indicates once more that there are important continuities and resonances between the 
various episodes of the state attempting to exercise closer authority and influence 
over the population.  
 
Moreover, in recent years, decentralisation processes have begun to involve 
the transfer of budgetary power down to the district level (created by the colonial 
administration), as in the ‘sete milhões’ initiative under Guebuza.431 As part of a 
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perceived national trend of the resurgence of the links between state and Party,
432
 
this has also served to re-invigorate Frelimo networks in the rural areas in particular 
as a form of potential patronage. In the recent presidential campaigns for example, 
many complained that funds were being diverted towards the projects of people 
affiliated with the party or their relatives.
433
 From the historical understanding of a 
networked party elite substantially fused with the state and operating through its 
structures, such trends are perhaps unsurprising and resonate strongly with strategies 
of government in the past, who devolved power precisely in order to reinforce its 
longevity.  
 
 In a broad sense and with a consciousness of its history, it is possible to see 
that public administration has mutated rather than been rolled back, and that many 
of the apparent strategies of liberal reform have not necessarily succeeded in the 
pursuit of a radical agenda of social transformation as such. Indeed, flagship reforms 
of the liberal peace including decentralisation and planning already have a long 
tradition in projects of statehood in Mozambique. There are even resonances – 
perhaps more amusing than substantive – in the resurrection of the ‘villagisation’ 
idea via the Millennium Development Villages. A number of these have been 
constructed in recent years, including one in Chibuto, Gaza province, which Jeffrey 
Sachs ‘opened’, arriving with 500 mosquito nets, a plough and four yokes.434 In the 
colonial era, the peasantry were herded into ‘aldeamentos’ as part of the 
‘development-security’ strategy of the colonial state in keeping them separated from 
the rebels. These promised access to water and other infrastructure within the 
context of counter-insurgency.
435
 Frelimo essentially repeated the strategy with the 
aldeias commnuais, which served security functions during the Renamo conflict as 
well as developmental ones for the purposes of building the socialist vision. These 
are not remembered particularly fondly either, for reasons that are further elaborated 
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in Chapter Eight.  Clearly, in the present day, there is a far lesser threat of 
widespread violence from either the state or an insurgency, and the population is not 
physically compelled to remain there. These are important differences. What is 
interesting however is the continuity in the administrative imagination, which gives 
rise to the enduring appeal of the model village as a vehicle for progress, 
development and better administration.
436
  
 
With a consciousness of the histories of political authority, political 
economy and public administration, it is difficult to sustain simplistically the critical 
interpretation that the liberal peace represents a ‘radical developmental agenda of 
social transformation’, which has been ‘reordering state and society’.437 Rather this 
historical reading of reform suggests that there is much in the way of continuity in 
this relationship, including in the discourses that govern political authority and 
legitimise the state, the ownership and orientation of the political economy, and the 
modalities and personnel in public administration. Clearly, this does not indicate 
that nothing has changed. As noted in this section, important changes include the 
diminution of widespread physical violence, compulsory free labour and the shift 
away from economic autarchy, which are important features both of everyday life 
and in the relationships between state and society. Yet these are not by and large as 
central to forms of rule as some of the elements discussed, which pertain to the 
issues concerning the claiming, distribution and structuring of political power, 
wealth and control.  The next section will discuss the significance of this kind of 
historical reconstruction for wider reflection on the liberal peace and its critiques.  
 
V. Discussion: Implications of reconstructing a historical subject  
 
In Chapter Two, I argued that the existing critiques of the liberal peace 
embraced an anti-imperial logic of critique, but persistently excluded the 
subjecthood of the target societies as worthy of inclusion or elaboration in any real 
sense. In Chapter Three, I argued that other anti-imperial traditions of thought – 
specifically anti-colonial thinking – had put forward both the urgency and 
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complexity of what it meant to reclaim the subject of politics, and in Chapter Four I 
elaborated some strategies for how reconstruction could proceed. In this chapter, I 
have suggested that the cultivation of a sense of historical subjecthood of some kind 
is essential to the attempt to ‘decolonise’ the grounds of discussion in critical 
research. This is necessary, both in terms recognising those people and societies 
targeted by the liberal peace and in terms of articulating a historical consciousness 
from which to reflect the particular issues raised by the liberal peace debate.   
 
As the foregoing argument has begun to indicate, both of these elements are 
subversive, both to the liberal peace interventions themselves and for the critiques of 
the liberal peace.  The first – the recognition of historical presence – is in some 
sense obviously uncomfortable for a number of actors who are now agents or 
supporters of the liberal peace, be they the governments of countries which pursued 
violent conquest and set up structures of political and economic exploitation within 
Mozambique, a century ago or less, such as Portugal, France or Britain, or who 
supported or funded the political violence of either the state or the rebels, such as 
the US, or who profited vastly from the slave trade such as Brazil or again the US.  
The altruistic, generic and pristine nature of ‘development aid’ in the context of 
liberal peace interventions is thus undermined by a counter-narrative which locates a 
longer term relation of debt or obligation stemming from a web of contested 
historical relations, which include much personal, political and economic violence. 
The re-articulation of historical presence of societies targeted by the liberal peace  as 
already and deeply connected to the ‘developed’ or ‘secure’ world thus forces a re-
engagement with the particular and embodied character of historical and political 
relations.  
 
In terms of the second element of historical consciousness, this too is 
somewhat subversive of liberal peace policies, and in particular the elements of 
legitimacy that depend on its technical effectiveness, developmentally ‘innovative’ 
and democratising character.  Yet, as the previous section has indicated, there has 
been little transformation in the bases of political authority, which remains a one-
party-controlled hierarchical developmentalism. The wage economy, a central 
element of official, taxable ‘development’, is still fundamentally founded upon the 
cheap supply and export of labour, either to large enterprises which are supported by 
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the state, or to neighbouring countries. As Chapter Eight will discuss, many of the 
ideas from previous eras about how to develop agriculture have been re-activated in 
recent years. Public administration has counter-intuitively developed wider planning 
architectures than it could under either the colonial or socialist bureaucracies.  These 
elements suggest either that the liberal peace is simply repeating policies of the past, 
or that it is only superficially changing them, or, I think the most compelling 
interpretation, that is in some sense fundamentally unwilling or unable to overcome 
some basic structures of rule and production that are articulated in the state structure 
and the relations between state and society.  All of these conclusions however 
problematise the potential sources of legitimacy that it has often assumed politically.  
 
For the critiques of the liberal peace, there are also subversive elements to 
the historical reconstruction developed in this chapter.  As discussed in Chapter 
Two, the critical accounts of liberal intervention exclude at a conceptual level the 
recognition of meaningful presence for societies targeted by the liberal peace.  This 
importantly extends to both the recognition of historical presence per se, and the 
critical engagement with such presence as a space for analytic reflection. Engaging 
with historical presence per se is disruptive insofar as it subverts the unchallenged 
authority of the critical voices in the debate, and forces a re-orientation of 
standpoint away from a distant assessment of liberal exceptionalism. In this case, 
acknowledging Mozambique as a historical presence, with a long-standing and deep 
integration into global modernity, is to offer a potential threat to the divisions and 
narratives implicit in the critiques of the liberal peace as an encounter between a 
global structure of liberal power and an unsuspecting local community. 
 
More disruptive however is the substance of the historical reconstruction 
when it is used as grounds for critical reflection. For critiques of the liberal peace, as 
noted, the liberal peace often represents a powerful and ‘radical developmental 
agenda of social transformation’. However, at least for Mozambique, this is to miss 
the very anti-radical, socially and politically conservative dimensions of its effects 
on structures of power, wealth and authority in the country. This is different to 
Chandler’s line that intervention is itself illiberal and has brought nationalist elites 
to power in Bosnia, and different to Pugh’s line that it is neoliberalism that has 
caused suffering. It is a more like Mac Ginty’s line which allows for 
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accommodation and unexpected outcomes, although this still frames such outcomes 
as a process of ‘hybridisation’ rather than a political move or strategy. From a 
perspective which uses history as a terrain of reflection, reforms have allowed for a 
entrenchment of power and modalities of rule, whilst appearing to increase their 
contestability. In this sense, intervention has provided the background and means for 
the elite to retrench without being substantially disturbed – indeed with the 
increased possibility of cementing their position within society more generally. As 
such, it also presents a challenge to Duffield’s account that Third World alternatives 
were displaced. To some extent he is right in terms of what political ideologies have 
been permitted to govern, but in the historical perspective adopted here the 
structures of power in society may be as important. In this sense, the fixation on the 
changing meaning of ‘sovereignty’ is important but perhaps also misleading insofar 
as it emphasises only one dimension of the political.  
 
This historical perspective allows us to see that dissent in Mozambique is not 
necessarily suppressed for long. There was substantial discontent with the election 
results of 1999, which triggered opposition demonstrations. The recent social unrest 
triggered by rises in food (February 2008) and fuel prices (September 2009) in 
major cities has demonstrated that there is an increasing sense of dissatisfaction with 
the government. This took it very much by surprise, and the government is trying 
desperately to respond through appeals to its historic mission and to the value of 
‘peace’ in establishing ‘development’, thus re-articulating and re-asserting a 
longstanding rationale for government in Mozambique.
438
 Yet, it is unclear how 
long it will be able to maintain this under the present structures of power and 
wealth, which have sharpened inequality in Mozambique, as in many other places in 
the world.  
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Conclusions 
 
Reconstructing a historical subject in this way is to have a sense of pasts, 
presents and futures, and a critical terrain from which to reflect on the present. In 
this particular reconstruction, developed in the context of the liberal peace debate, a 
sensitivity to the relationships of rule, particularly those within living memory, puts 
the novel radicalism of the liberal peace into doubt, and also begins to change the 
ways in which critique is mounted around the present regime of intervention. In 
particular, an understanding of the continuities and resonances of the present order 
with the historical past is to throw into doubt the narrative of radical change, 
articulating its many conservative elements. 
 
It might be argued that such a reconstruction is also justifiable in more 
conventional analytic terms – after all, is it not good practice in the discussion of 
case studies to add a bit of historical background? Perhaps it could be argued that if 
the existing critiques of the liberal peace covered in Chapter Two had a bit more 
space, they could have added historical chapters or sections to their work and 
accomplished the same. As I have noted in the discussion in this chapter however, to 
take such historical narratives and presence seriously would be to disrupt the set-up 
whereby the liberal peace is the principal subject and focus of the conceptual set-up, 
with the critics themselves as the principal interlocutor. To try to reverse the 
marginalisation of the target society, it is necessary to reclaim a sense of past 
presence, which the anti-colonial thinkers discussed in Chapter Three well 
understood. Without a politics of recognition, forgetting past historical relations 
becomes easy, and allows both rule and critique to be projected through 
disembodied, transcendental tropes of justification. As noted in Chapter Three,
439
 
this reproduces the paradox of liberalism in which critiques of the liberal peace but 
find it difficult to articulate grounds for alternative transcendental or theoretical 
foundations of being.  
 
By engaging with historical presence, we begin to move discussion to the 
embodied dimensions of the relations between subjects, and can begin to see these 
relations in a more multi-dimensional and concrete manner.  This opens up further 
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the ways in which historical consciousness can also become an important tool for 
immanent political critique and the reconfiguration of political consciousness in the 
present. Chapter Six shows how appreciating political consciousness in a non-
unitary and reflexive way furthers the project of reconstructing the political subject 
as less bounded, more creative and more articulate than existing critiques have 
allowed for.  As we move on through Chapters Seven and Eight, we will show how 
an appreciation of the material experiences of interventions from the perspectives of 
those targeted by it can also ground critique in a more relevant and engaged political 
stance. 
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Chapter Six 
Reconstructing the political subject: double consciousness and the 
question of good governance 
 
 
Reconstructing political subjecthood needs to be attempted, at least partly, 
via political consciousness. In some sense this follows from the logic of subjecthood 
– in a meaningful sense one cannot have subjecthood without the implicit 
assumption of consciousness. In moral philosophy, it is the presence of the capacity 
for self-reflection – conscience – that renders it possible to discuss action as having 
moral significance: without this it is difficult to ascribe moral agency as generally 
understood.
440
 Similarly, being able to appreciate a self as a political subject and 
imputing political meaning to his/her actions must assume a form of political 
consciousness. It is precisely this capacity for political consciousness and reflection 
that was routinely denied or deferred by colonial powers as a means of legitimating 
ongoing control and stewardship in colonial territories, and which a series of 
thinkers have sought to reclaim and re-assert as part of the decolonising project in 
social theory.
441
  
 
In Chapter Two I argued that the existing critical literature on the liberal 
peace had failed to treat people targeted by intervention as proper subjects of 
politics, either by excluding them altogether from discussions, or by including them 
only via reductive signifiers of cultural difference, political cynicism or some 
combination thereof. This tended to de-politicise subjecthood by emptying its 
content of specific meanings or intention. Mac Ginty’s work on local resistance in 
the ‘hybrid peace’ in some senses maintained this framing, although with some 
examples such as in Northern Ireland, there was a greater sense of interpretive 
engagement with the political significance of people’s behaviour. Nonetheless, this 
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was a relatively limited aspect of the framework, which was more targeted at an 
account of agency rather than intentionality as such.  
 
 In a preliminary sense, the justification for engaging with political 
subjecthood within anti-colonial critique shares some elements with the justification 
for reconstructing historical presence; that is the importance of simply recognising 
such presence is an important step away from Eurocentric modes of analysis in 
itself. As noted in Chapter Four, there are important ways in which interpretive 
methodologies are closely connected to a politics of recognition. Thus, the 
reconstruction of political subjecthood in different contexts is an important way of 
broadening the intellectual terrain of discussion and imagination.  
 
In the context of the thesis, however, the reconstruction of political 
subjecthood has some more specific functions. In Chapters Three and Four, I 
mapped out ways in which an anti-colonial critique would emphasise the importance 
of political consciousness as a point of critical engagement and a source of political 
knowledge. In the first place, political consciousness is a reflection and expression 
of the embodied, situated subject of politics, which it was argued provided a better 
starting point for understanding the world than a transcendental political subject. To 
engage with political consciousness is thus to begin one’s critical engagement with 
the world on the terms in which it appears given and the realities that it presents.  
 
However, as also noted in Chapter Three, and again in Chapter Four, 
subjects themselves can use aspects of political consciousness as forms of immanent 
criticality towards the political order. In Chapter Four, I noted how for Du Bois and 
Fanon, the framework of double consciousness was a source of critical power in 
terms of the way it highlighted the politics of race and racism, and also allowed the 
space for black political subjects to develop and maintain an alternative self-
understanding to those encouraged by racism. In this chapter, I read plural forms of 
political consciousness around corruption as articulating different forms of critical 
consciousness, through traditions of thought from before the liberal peace as well as 
its recent discourses.  In looking at the content of these discourses, it is possible to 
discern the broadening of anti-corruption discourse to incorporate anti-plutocratic 
elements as well.  
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 The chapter begins by briefly reflecting back on the importance of the 
‘governance’ agenda within the liberal peace, and the ways in which the existing 
critiques have articulated the political significance of ‘good governance’ 
programmes. The central section of the chapter looks at two contrasting forms of 
consciousness around corruption in Mozambique – that associated with the legacy 
of Samora Machel and that associated with the ‘good governance’ agenda, before 
exploring how they have been simultaneously deployed and why. Drawing on a 
range of contemporary and historical sources, texts and observations, I argue that 
corruption is a live issue in Mozambique not as an ideological artefact, imposition 
or interpellation of the liberal peace but deriving from reflexive forms of political 
consciousness and understood in a variety of ways. In particular, some elements of 
this consciousness link corruption specifically to the changes in politics and 
economy brought about by the liberal peace’s transformation agenda, although this 
is narrative interacts with other elements of political consciousness such as a 
specific moral narrative. The final section offers a discussion of the significance of 
non-unitary consciousness as a means of reconstructing political subjecthood in 
critique.  
 
 
I. Governance and corruption in the liberal peace debate 
 
In Chapter One, it was argued that the liberal peace has over the last twenty 
years become increasingly characterised by a concern with the nature of 
‘governance’ in post-conflict spaces, as its focus has shifted from peacebuilding to 
statebuilding. It has become central to approaches to conflict, via the concept of 
‘fragile states’ (such as in OECD/DAC guidelines), development through the 
‘poverty reduction’ agenda (World Bank, DfID) and democratisation through 
‘democracy and governance’ (USAID) programmes. There is considerable overlap 
between the various definitions, as well as divergences in definition that reflect 
divergent priorities between agencies. For example, the World Bank’s 2007 paper 
Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption 
defines governance as “the manner in which the state acquires and exercises its 
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authority to provide public goods and services”, broadly divided into ‘bureaucratic 
capacity’ and ‘accountability’.442 DfID’s 2006 White Paper, Making Governance 
Work for the Poor, shies away from defining governance strictly but states that it is 
“about the use of power and authority and how a country manages its affairs”, 
broken down into questions of ‘capability’, ‘accountability’ and ‘responsiveness’.443 
Unsurprisingly, there is considerable debate amongst the development community 
in the quality and value of current indicators of ‘governance’.444 
 
This said, in practice, the governance reform agenda has led donors to focus 
on a few primary areas to effect transformation. One of the most prominent of these 
has been in the area of anti-corruption, which has led to a proliferation of donor 
strategies based on “an international consensus [that] has now emerged that 
corruption and poor governance fuel state failure, deter foreign investment, and 
cripple economic growth and development.” 445 Based on the power of this 
consensus, it has become one of the most prominent and well-funded aspects of the 
liberal peace, spawning a wide array of strategies, forums, conferences, grants, 
working groups, government agencies and advisers, and increasingly integrated as a 
form of conditionality into wider transformation efforts.
446
  
 
Existing perspectives on the liberal peace have engaged the specific question 
of corruption particularly well from critical political economy perspectives. As 
argued in Chapter Two, many have developed a compelling narrative explaining the 
causes of corruption under the liberal peace. Specifically, many of these narratives 
link the presence of corruption with the opportunities presented by economic 
liberalisation and structural adjustment policies encouraged by the international 
financial institutions and other donors.  Divjak and Pugh for example argue that 
corruption in Bosnia can be explained by the legacy of war economies in the 
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absence of welfare strategies, liberalisation processes which dissolved the social 
contract between state and citizen, and the emergence of specific opportunities for 
corruption in non-transparent privatisation deals.
447
  
 
However, there has been a conspicuous absence of the politics of the anti-
corruption agenda itself, despite the important questions the analysis raises. In 
particular, there is a kind of paradox or tension that arises within critiques that 
simultaneously argue against the overly politically intrusive character of liberal 
peace interventions, largely characterised by ‘good governance’ reforms, and 
“sweeping liberal assumptions”448 but are simultaneously critical of the failure of 
these assumptions to effect change in a society apparently based on patronage. 
According to Richmond and Franks: 
 
The hegemonic domination of political power underwrites the patronage 
system and allows networks to be constructed from the top down, based 
on loyalty and rewards…These are sweeping ontological claims to make 
about another political system, but they help explain how the 
Cambodian polity is overlaid by a network comprised of a 
multidimensional clientelism and patronage that links individuals to 
power centres. From the perspective of international peacebuilders, such 
an analysis helps explain why local social, political and cultural 
dynamics are responsible for a lack of progress, rather than inadequacies 
in the liberal peacebuilding framework itself.
449
  
 
Richmond and Franks are right to note that these are sweeping ontological claims. 
However, they do not hesitate to base their own analysis on precisely such claims, 
preferring to shore up this undifferentiated, non-political view of (in this case 
Cambodian) society and its subjects. The only distinction made is for people 
engaged in civil society building programmes, who are summarily dismissed, 
without in any way being engaged: 
 
Civil society is quite possibly an illusionary ‘virtual’ or ‘parallel’ society 
created by the presence and funding of the internationals, and mainly 
visible to international eyes. Far from aiding the development and 
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sustainability of an indigenous civil society, it is representative of 
conditionality and dependency rather than local agency.
450
 
 
So, although any ultimate assessment “should rest on local voices”451, they are also 
made analytically irrelevant in the framework offered. 
 
 As argued in Chapter Three, an ostensibly pluralist or pluralising research 
framing which fails to re-centre its analysis around different subjects and their 
experiences is in danger of falling short of its own critical and progressive 
objectives. Not only do these provide interesting and illuminating analytic points of 
entry into the structures being analysed, but they furnish grounds for a fuller and 
more inclusive political dialogue about the problems of power and legitimacy in 
international relations. As such, it is imperative to reconfigure the analytic 
imagination under the presupposition that the subjecthood of the non-West is 
already significant in world politics, and that our narratives of it should reflect this.  
 
II. Political consciousness and corruption in Mozambique 
 
 This section elaborates the ways in which political consciousness around the 
issue of corruption is both non-unitary and reflexive, and can be translated as critical 
commentary on the shape of political structures being apparently transformed by the 
liberal peace. In important ways these commentaries both overlap and contrast with 
the ways in which donor agencies have themselves analysed and narrated the 
question of corruption, as well as the ways in which the target government itself 
deals with the issue.  They reveal a contested, historically grounded and non-unitary 
political consciousness which needs to be engaged with seriously in understanding 
the significance of the liberal peace as a form of political order. Specifically, as will 
be discussed, this ‘double consciousness’ framework opens up the tensions and 
fluidities that characterise political subjecthood, and as such offers new questions of 
critics of the liberal peace.  
 
 
                                                 
450
 Ibid. 
451
 Ibid., 28. 
205 
 
i. ‘Isso não acontecia se Samora estivesse vivo’- ‘This would not happen if 
Samora was alive’452  
 
 A useful place to start in addressing contemporary political consciousness 
around corruption is in understanding the role it has played in Mozambique’s 
political past. One of the most potent and most common responses to contemporary 
public scandals is via unfavourable comparison to the political leadership under the 
first ten years of the post-independence government after 1975. Although the latter 
part of this is also commonly known as the tempo de fome (time of hunger), it is also 
memorialised in many circles as a time when public institutions functioned with a 
keen sense of purpose, transparency and enthusiasm.  
 
With regard to corruption, the Frelimo government, and most particularly the 
President Samora Machel, was seen to vigorously attack, denounce and severely 
punish corruption in the public sphere as simultaneously colonialist, immoral and 
counter-revolutionary.
453
 Machel’s lengthy political discourses, broadcast nationally 
via the only television and radio channels, elaborated passionately and in detail the 
distinctions between a corrupt colonialism and the kind of society that Frelimo 
aimed to build: 
 
That’s what colonialism means: bribery, corruption and immorality; 
robbery; nepotism, favouritism and patronage; individualism and 
ambition; servility and subservience… Destroying all this was the aim of 
the armed struggle for national liberation.
454
 
 
In particular, Machel’s presidency is remembered for the stringent and vigilant 
punishment of transgressions in public administration. One famous tactic involved 
personal unannounced spot checks on various parts of the state machinery across the 
country, including then state enterprises and farms. Irregularities of any sort would 
result in public castigation, which would be often followed by summary 
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dismissal.
455
 More serious criminal transgressions were punished much more 
severely, culminating in several public executions.  One of the most high-profile of 
these cases was execution by firing squad of the prawn merchant Gulam Nabi who 
had been bribing customs officials.
456
 Moreover, it was made understood that 
Machel’s attitudes to corruption were widely shared – the suicide of Francisco 
Langa, a Frelimo cadre who had embezzled funds, was publicly attributed to very 
intense personal shame caused by the party making an example of him.
457
   
 
During the 1980s, government propaganda on the theme revolved around the 
image of ‘Xiconhoca’ (Image 6.1) – a character who was seen to collaborate with 
Portuguese secret agents in the independence struggle but pretended to support the 
new government, and who was lazy, drunk, corrupt and self-serving. 
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6.1: Xiconhoca (c. 1979)
458
 “He’s a saboteur of the national economy, he has no 
class consciousness, he’s a dead weight in the office, to summarise, he’s a 
Xiconhoca”. 
 
‘Xiconhoca’ was seen to embody a corruption which was as much moral and 
political as it was economic. In this sense, corruption was perceived as an active 
threat to the programme of radical revolutionary change which Frelimo aspired to 
bring about in this period.  Much of this focused on, and indeed depended on, the 
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personal conduct of the citizens and their embrace of the ‘New Man’ ideology 
elaborated by the party’s ideologues. Public education, which rapidly expanded in 
the post-independence period, was tasked with the ongoing formation of ‘New 
Men’, who would be literate, technically proficient and morally dedicated to the 
construction of the Revolution.  Those who were compromised by corrupt or anti-
revolutionary behaviour were often dispatched to remote provinces to be ‘re-
educated’ in drastic and violent ways.  
 
* 
 
Samora Machel was killed in a plane crash in 1986 in suspicious 
circumstances, yet his figure looms large in contemporary political consciousness. I 
would argue that this has not been so much a continuous memorialisation but a 
particularly recent phenomenon, especially amongst younger generations,
459
 which 
has sought to critique the contemporary political environment through the recovered 
figure of Samora. This critique is increasingly invoked by different internal factions 
within Frelimo as well as, surprisingly, a large number of opposition and non-
partisan figures.  At the core of this consciousness is a narrative of moral rectitude, 
transparency and decisiveness which Samora is seen to embody.  
 
This recovery itself needs situating politically in terms of what came after 
the death of Samora, namely the structural reform of the economy through IMF 
conditionality, the end of the war, and the vast influx in aid money both in response 
to famine and in the period after the war.  Under Joaquim Chissano’s leadership, 
Mozambique was opened up economically and politically, and aid money was seen 
to have flooded in.
460
 For various reasons, including to do with the context of 
emergency and the lack of oversight, much of this money and these resources were 
never accounted for.
461
 Mozambique nonetheless became a prominent ‘donor 
darling’ on the international scene, broadly endorsed for its wise post-war political 
and economic choices and strong growth rates, forgiven much public debt and the 
recipient of one of the highest per-capita aid flows of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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This coincided with a visible change in the wealth of elites, particularly 
those in and connected to the Frelimo party. Many scholars, including Hanlon, 
Pitcher and Harrison have explored the role of donor money, privatisation and 
liberalisation in the emergence and distribution of this wealth.
462
  During this period, 
however, various corruption scandals emerged regarding thefts and embezzlements 
from formerly state enterprises, which were of widespread public knowledge and 
disquiet. The most notorious of these related to the banking sector, during the course 
of which the country’s leading investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso, and the 
interim director of banking supervision Siba-Siba Macuacua were murdered. Those 
implicated in the murder included a number of the Presidential Guard as well as 
Chissano’s son Nyimpine463, whose testimonies in the trial were televised.464 This 
episode accelerated what had been an increasing level of political dissatisfaction 
with the perceived ‘deixa-andar’ (let it go) attitude of Chissano regarding the 
widespread criminality and corruption in the state at all levels. His famous response 
to this dissatisfaction seemed to encapsulate this attitude: “goats eat where they are 
tied”.465 Chissano’s decreasing public popularity could already be seen in the results 
of the 1999 Presidential Election, which resulted in only a narrow victory under 
rather dubious circumstances. 
 
 The reclamation of Machel’s political legacy as a form of political 
consciousness needs to be seen in this context – in response to this situation of 
visible corruption and increasing inequality. This recovery of a tradition of moral 
opposition to corruption has emerged on several different fronts, including within 
the ruling party, amongst public academic and political commentators in the press, 
in the opposition, amongst the urban youth and middle class, amongst the unions 
and within the blogosphere.  As will be discussed later on, this is a consciousness 
that has become more publicly prominent and compelling as a means of combating 
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corruption than the liberal peace emphasis on good governance, although one which 
interacts with it at crucial junctures. 
 
Within the Frelimo party this consciousness emerged from Guebuza’s 
faction, who were seen by themselves and others as inheritors of Machel’s mantle, 
claiming it in the run-up to the 2004 Presidential election, when Chissano’s 
administration was criticised for its ‘deixa andar’ attitudes on corruption.466 As 
Hanlon reports, Guebuza’s new populist administration from 2005 visibly re-
activated many of the political discourses, practices and habits of Machel, including 
unannounced spot-checks in public institutions and services.
467
 Guebuza’s 
administration has also taken care to publicly celebrate Machel, including building 
new monuments to him and declaring 2011 Samora Machel Year.
468
 In the most 
recent presidential election campaign in 2009, Guebuza found himself on the 
receiving end of widespread public complaints and pressure about corruption in 
local government, to which he responded with vigorously moral imagery, as 
reported in the press: 
 
The Mozambican President, Armando Guebuza, said that to promote 
corruption, in the State or in the private sector, is the same as “drinking 
or even sucking” the blood of a brother. Speaking today, in a grand 
public rally taking place in the municipality of Manica, Guebuza said 
that even now promoters of corruption spend a lot of time coveting the 
few means of those who sweat night and day to earn a living. Given a 
standing ovation by the people, the statesman highlighted that “to 
practice corruption is essentially the same as putting logs on a public 
way.” He explained that a road filled with logs will not let anyone 
pass.
469
 
 
It is important that this kind of moralistic tone around corruption emerged explicitly 
when the government was under the rare spectre of public pressure and disgust. 
Guebuza’s choice of imagery – the drinking of blood – not only elicits responses of 
horror but read another way resonates with historic beliefs in the practice of 
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vampirism to gain advantage or fortune.
470
 However, the message is a clear one – 
corruption is not only an impediment to development, but deeply immoral. 
 
 Guebuza’s narrative of his own moral, Machel-like stand on corruption has 
been sold to, but not entirely bought by, a wide range of audiences, who have 
continued to use Samora and the socialist legacy as a political resource in critiquing 
corruption within contemporary Frelimo as well as the effects of Mozambique’s 
liberalisation. It is perhaps unremarkable to note that this has been a feature of 
internal Frelimo struggles, particularly in factions associated with Samora’s widow 
Graça Machel, who argue that honest people have been excluded from the 
government in order for corruption to continue.
471
  
 
But this line of argument has also been a feature of the more independent 
press. Even as Guebuza promised to restore a sense of morality in the state, he was 
accused of doing so only in speeches but not in practice by journalists such as 
Machado da Graça, who argued that Guebuza lacked the political will to do so, 
unlike Samora.
472
 Borges Nhamirre, a commentator on CanalMoz has also pointed 
out that under Samora the salaries of high-ranking state officials were fixed by law, 
were public knowledge and that perks of the job were not permitted, in clear 
distinction to today’s practices.473 These are commentators who occupy different 
parts of the political spectrum and speak outside the Frelimo party but who engage 
in the recovery of Samora as part of a critical and broadly salient form of political 
consciousness.  
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 Perhaps more surprising is the resurrection of Samora by more openly 
political opposition. In a recent TV debate on the political thought of Samora 
Machel – the holding of which is perhaps in and of itself revealing – Máximo Días, 
a former Renamo deputy, argued that if Samora were alive, many of today’s leaders 
would be in jail for their failure to uphold transparency.  
 
According to him, “some have the understanding that ‘I have already 
liberated the country, and now I must liberate myself from myself”, and 
each takes his own decision to enrich himself. 
474
 
 
At this same debate, he asked for financial contributions for a Samora Machel 
Academy, which would be dedicated to “the promotion of the ideas of Samora 
Machel, namely: the fight against corruption, transparency, amongst other virtues 
the remains of which are in question today”.475 Whilst the sincerity of this 
resurrection by the opposition is questioned, particularly by a sceptical public 
spotting opportunism,
476
 it is clear that its political resonance in terms of public 
consciousness is real in terms of the critique of profiteering offered. 
 
 Yet perhaps most tellingly, the consciousness of Samora’s era as an 
uncorrupt one is particularly visible as a form of political consciousness amongst the 
urban youth who were not alive during his rule. As Sumich notes, this group, some 
of whom have taken to wearing t-shirts bearing Samora’s image, tend to speak 
favourably of this more equal, more honest time.
477
 Across my own discussions this 
was a repeated theme – that under Samora these sorts of transgressions did not 
occur, and that people used to work for the public good.
478
 This critique is also 
borne out in various aspects of popular culture.  As an example, the popular MC 
Azagaia, Edson da Luz, has interspersed clips of Samora’s speeches against 
corruption into his music videos, in which his own lyrics condemn the ‘liberators’ 
i.e. Frelimo, as mere soldiers of fortune, enriching themselves, lacking ideology and 
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selling images of hunger to make a profit. In the closing frames of the video, 
Samora is shown giving a public address, saying “We cannot build happiness or 
well-being with bandits and thieves… Correct? But it must be you who dislodge the 
bandits and thieves. Denounce them. Kick them out.” 479  
 
As a form of political consciousness which confronts the issue of corruption 
under the liberal peace, the recovery of Samora is both widespread and highly 
politicised. Given Samora’s iconic and heroic status as the leader who was seen to 
lead Mozambique to independence in the armed struggle against colonialism, it is 
also very powerful when deployed as a metric for judging the contemporary 
political situation, and in particular the perception that the ruling elite has become 
heavily corrupted. As the last examples, show, however, the popular images and 
discourses which recover Samora as an anti-corruption icon are importantly 
different to the elite versions insofar as they also make a strong link between 
corruption and self-enrichment as the same kind of moral failing, with the latter a 
form of corruption in and of itself. In this sense, as part of the resurrection of 
Samora, we see an emerging critique of neoliberal capitalism and the moral values 
which it has institutionalised, mocked neatly in Mia Couto’s phrase cabritalismo.480 
This is one that spills into a broader critique of the liberal peace and its 
transformations – one which exceeds the horizons and lenses which have been 
employed thus far in the debate.  
 
 
ii. ‘Africa, Mozambique without coherence will have no good 
governance’:481  ‘Good governance’ as a basis of radical critique? 
  
 However, nostalgia for Samora’s values are not the only form of political 
consciousness responding to the issues of corruption and governance. In this section 
it will be argued that good governance discourses themselves are also increasingly 
the foundation of a form of critical political consciousness on these issues, as well as 
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the structure and effects of the liberal peace. For many, these forms of political 
consciousness can and do run parallel to each other as modes of understanding the 
contemporary political situation, providing what might be well understood as a form 
of ‘double consciousness’ around questions of corruption and governance. 
 
As already noted, the move towards the goal of ‘good governance’ in 
shaping international aid flows and development agendas as part of a ‘liberal’ 
transformation agenda has been in the gradual process of institutionalisation for 
around two decades. ‘Good governance’ demands are thus viewed in much of the 
critical literature as a key site of deep Western intrusion into the social and political 
orders of aid-recipient countries.
482
 One of the important questions for this argument 
is the extent to which this way of thinking resonates with or affects political 
consciousness in a way which shapes responses and action. For example Harrison 
has argued that states like Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique can be considered 
‘governance states’ in which external and internal political agendas in the state are 
no longer distinct and where there is an institutionalisation of particular structures of 
international intervention within public administration. As such, in this framework 
of ‘post-conditionality’, the power of international institutions does not lie so much 
in their ability to impose various arrangements on recipient countries, but in the 
regularised embedding of these norms into the machine of government itself. 
Accordingly, this shrinks the array of political choices open to national politicians 
and publics to those which conform with the requirements of the bureaucracy, which 
is itself inter-woven with the international institutions.
483
  
 
 Harrison’s analysis of these processes is sharp and lucid, and does much in 
and of itself to reconfigure the understanding of the ‘liberal’ and ‘local’ that 
underpins the liberal peace debate. In particular, it highlights this binary as in some 
senses anachronistic in the analysis of the bureaucratic spheres of governance states, 
where there seems to be a broad consensus on the need for ‘good governance’. In 
Harrison’s analysis, this framework is a limit or closure on political choices, which 
is a compelling and important point. However, I would argue that his analysis does 
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not capture the ways in which even working ostensibly within the ‘good 
governance’ agenda, various subjects have also used and reconfigured the ideas as a 
form of immanent critical consciousness towards the existing political order. As will 
be evident, this is nowhere near as widespread a form of political consciousness as 
is the public recovery of Samora just discussed, but nonetheless it is an important 
one given the government’s attempts to articulate its own ‘good governance’ 
credentials.
484
 
 
This recovery is one which deals with the questions of the political power 
and legitimacy of both government and international interveners, in a way which 
attempts to change the terms of debate. Specifically, it has used the framework of 
‘good governance’ to highlight not just the big corruption scandals and lower-level 
rent-seeking in public life, but also to critique the hegemony of the ruling party, the 
breaking of rules, and the impact of external aid as creating various political and 
economic disequilibria within the country as a whole.  As such, it too provides a 
framework for an immanent critical political consciousness to emerge. 
 
 The case that the ‘good governance’ agenda may have critical potential 
despite its problematic origins in conditionality is one which various political 
commentators have picked up on. Noe Nhantumbo, a journalist working across 
various independent press outlets, argues for this passionately in a recent book:  
 
… the most important thing is that the political forces of civil society 
know how to take advantage of this genuine ‘external aid’, and make the 
‘Good Governance’ question their own, taking in full and with all its 
consequences… To know how to take advantage of and use the small 
open windows for the evolution and growth of international political 
relations is a necessity… It is in this way that we must look at the issue 
of ‘Good Governance’. The risk that we currently run is to view this 
issue as being appropriated by politicians and leaders, to be later sold to 
the international community when they invite them.
485
 
 
Some outlets have been attempting to use these “small open windows” as a 
way to forge political consciousness, such as non-aligned think-tanks and research 
projects, often funded with donor money earmarked for ‘good governance’, 
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‘capacity building’ and ‘civil society’ support.  The re-shaping of the political 
landscape in these directions is, of course, what the funding agencies might desire 
by and large. However, as will be shown below, this has also produced voices which 
question the roles these agencies play in political life.  
 
By way of example, one of the currently most prominent and best-funded 
NGOs for ‘good governance’ in Mozambique is the Centro de Integridade Pública, 
(CIP) run by Marcelo Mosse, an investigative journalist and public commentator, 
and Adriano Nuvunga, a lecturer at Eduardo Mondlane University, and funded by 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, Norway, the Ford 
Foundation and International Budget Partnership.
486
 Much of the work of the Centre 
is given over to the monitoring and advocacy of corruption and governance issues, 
the provision of training and the evaluation of the effectiveness of government 
policy. As such it might be seen to function as an exemplar of a civil society 
organisation that operates to transplant or translate ‘liberal’ values in a post-conflict 
space – the kind of organisation seen as co-opted by the liberal peace through 
hybridisation in Mac Ginty’s framework. Indeed, many of the angles of analysis 
used to diagnose political problems and corruption seem to reproduce many aspects 
of donors’ analyses, including ‘weak accountability mechanisms’ and ‘lack of 
implementation of laws’.487 Yet in many cases, the quality of investigation and 
commitment to analyse various problems vastly exceeds efforts made by either 
government or development partners. Although outwardly concerned with ‘good 
governance’, it nonetheless retains a focus on the idea of ‘public integrity’ as a 
moral activity in important ways, which echo the tenor of debates on the post-
socialist order just discussed. 
 
However, and perhaps more pertinently, the members of CIP have also used 
the framework of what constitutes good governance to offer a more substantive 
critique of how the liberal peace operates at a structural level. Nuvunga, for 
example, has made it clear that in the governance of Mozambique: 
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Aid appears to have helped build, but also fragment, the State machinery 
and institutions. It appears that dependence on aid has created an 
incentive structure that makes civil servants reluctant to get involved and 
commit themselves to public duties unless there is a prospect of direct 
personal benefit in the form of perks.
488
  
 
He goes on to argue that the movement towards central budget support has in fact 
led to perverse consequences for ‘governance’: 
 
…donors not only control national policy through aid conditionality, 
they also control key institutions through their direct involvement. This 
has long-term consequences for institutional sustainability in the 
country.
489
 
 
Although using the framework of ‘good governance’, Nuvunga clearly demonstrates 
a reflexive and critical engagement with it, which provides a platform for a gently 
stated if far-reaching structural critique of the role of aid in the political sphere of 
Mozambique, and one which is directed at the donors as well as the government. 
This is supplemented by a number of political commentaries co-published regularly 
with Joe Hanlon which interrogate the relationship between donors and government 
closely, and underscore the problems of political legitimacy and accountability with 
it.
490
 This interpretation of ‘good governance’ thus puts emphasis on the specifically 
democratic rather than bureaucratic ways in which the term can be understood, 
opening up the political space for a different kind of critique. Indeed, donors’ own 
discourses of what constitutes ‘good governance’ in Mozambique appeared to have 
changed over the years as a result of arguments articulated by activists such as those 
in CIP, including regarding the dominance of Frelimo in political life. As Hanlon 
notes, for a long time there was a deep reluctance by the donors to engage with 
issues of governance in anything other than a technical fashion.
491
   
 
 The idea that the structures of the liberal peace promote governance failure 
through its economics is one advocated by Marcelo Mosse, who argues strongly 
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from a good governance platform that cuts in public sector salaries imposed by 
structural adjustment policies were a major cause of corruption that both the 
government and donors wanted to ignore.
492
 Carlos Castel-Branco has also argued 
that the idea of ‘ownership’ as promoted through governance models is deeply 
inhibited by the structural conditions of multidimensional aid dependency.
493
 These 
critical investigations of the meaning of ‘good governance’ and the causes of failure 
are not simply repeating donor and government agendas but challenging them. In 
particular, Castel-Branco’s engagement forces discussion of governance towards an 
engagement with Mozambique’s broader economic situation, an issue which is often 
left out of discussion. Chapter Seven will look further at this as a dimension of 
critical consciousness towards intervention.  
 
 In this kind of re-appropriated ‘good governance’ consciousness, donors 
themselves are also accused of failing to uphold ‘good governance’ in their dealings 
with the government of Mozambique. Since the Paris Accords and movement 
towards aid harmonisation, the government itself has launched a number of audits of 
bureaucratic delays within the aid system. These have presented findings that the 
majority of delays in processes were attributable to delays at the World Bank or EU 
rather than the government, which has been since used to pressure the donors 
politically.
494
 Others have noted more ironically that despite pressing for legislative 
reform, donor agencies have undermined the ‘good governance’ they promote by 
not following these procurement and employment laws themselves in their own 
practices.
495
 This is supplemented by the idea that there has also been a failure of 
governance in donor countries, as noted by another public intellectual: 
 
The other thing that needs to happen is that European citizens need to 
ask their governments where the money is going – what are you doing? 
Because it is going from the taxpayers of Europe – the working people – 
to the rich of Africa. [laughs] I was asked to give advice to a lady from a 
Finnish organisation who was working on a poster to raise funds for her 
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organisation. It was a poster of an African child who was hungry. I 
advised her to add a picture of the politician’s mansion across the road. 
She didn’t do it… but this is what I mean. You have your own internal 
mechanisms for monitoring… but you need to go and see.496 
 
A political consciousness of ‘good governance’ in Mozambique can be 
understood as not one which simply reproduces a technocratic ideology of donor-led 
development (although it may also do this) but one which also looks at the structure 
of the political and economic order more broadly and critically through the lenses of 
inequality and unaccountability. For Nhantumbo, the idea of ‘good governance’ is 
amenable to be rescued from “the deceptive mires of the mouth” as the basis for a 
much more radical critique of the international order through a more widespread 
democratisation of power and resources. Yet, he argues, that this has implications 
that neither the politicians of Africa nor the West will embrace: 
 
On both sides, in Africa and in the West, politicians are using or 
presenting a version of policy which is double-faced. They know that 
they need to keep ‘Good Governance’ as a continued factor and 
condition of cooperation but they are aware that to take it to its logical 
conclusions would infallibly destroy the bases on which their economies 
sit. From here we may gather that the politicians and governors will 
never sufficiently advance, in the implementation of the totality of this 
strategy or policy because this will contradict their interests in this 
domain. Only a change in the fundamental strategies between the 
partners is what can bring about an open and profound approach to the 
issue of ‘Good Governance’.497 
 
Nhantumbo’s analysis is critical of the excessive structures of planning, workshops, 
aid dependence and passivity that the current relationship with international 
cooperation partners has involved.  However, he does not advocates for a rejection 
of international assistance and cooperation but for a more radical reappraisal of how 
it is approached and whose interests it serves. This vision of how Africans might 
approach and use the idea of ‘good governance’ illustrates perfectly how a 
seemingly technocratic and politically innocuous discourse might itself be turned 
towards a more far-reaching critique of political leadership, the distribution of 
wealth and international interventions. 
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III. Double consciousness under the liberal peace 
 
 These two forms of political consciousness, the morality of Samora and 
‘good governance’, run in parallel and are occasionally intertwined throughout 
discussions in Mozambique on the politics of governance and corruption under the 
liberal peace. On the opening of the new headquarters for the government’s new 
Gabinete Central de Combate a Corrupção (GCCC), a key pillar of its good 
governance strategy, its director, Ana Maria Gemo, argued 
 
…that Samora Machel fought corruption vehemently and advocated an 
equitable distribution of national wealth. “He dedicated his life to the 
building of a fair and transparent public administration, whether through 
creating legal instruments, or otherwise in his vigorous speeches, 
teaching Mozambicans to be determined and persistent regarding 
obstacles to any development of our young nation… in following the 
teachings of Samora, in this room, we will develop strategies for crime 
prevention, civic education, which are aimed at promoting citizenship, a 
culture of transparency, integrity and good governance. Strategies will 
be aligned to the establishment of trust in institutions of public 
administration and justice, because, after all, corruption is a challenge 
within our grasp.”498  
 
Here there are, seamlessly interspersed, two different forms of political 
consciousness, but both of which are very contemporary in character and 
significance.  Clearly, as do all forms of political consciousness, they seek to 
establish or order particular kinds of relations between subjects past and present, and 
are directed towards a number of different audiences. In this sense they can also be 
understood as the kind of ‘strategic essentialism’ Spivak identifies as necessary for 
political action.
499
 Yet, their non-unitary character also expresses particular kinds of 
tensions and fluidities.  The tensions seem to come from the contradiction of 
striving for the still-important idea of ‘self’-determination at the same time as 
striving for forms of internal political critique which are enabled by discourses 
originating from ‘outside’.  The new and fluid nostalgia for Samora in particular 
speaks to the politically disorientating and alienating effects of the post-war order, 
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characterised by economic shocks, political change and disillusionment. But 
crucially, given the legitimating strategies of those in power as former liberators and 
inheritors of Samora’s mantle, it is also an importantly immanent political weapon 
when used against the regime.  Similarly, the use of, identification with and creative 
re-appropriation of the notion of ‘good governance’ reflects an ambivalent relation 
with ideas that contain somewhere the promise of a more democratic and 
progressive set of political relations but the practices of which can structurally 
inhibit their realisation. 
 
In terms of understanding political subjecthood, the framework of double 
consciousness here illustrates several issues of relevance to the debate on the liberal 
peace and particularly with regards to corruption. As a preliminary point, it cuts 
through the insinuation that corruption is part of ‘traditional’ values in this African 
context. Harrison’s work makes the point very well, but it is worth repeating.500 This 
is especially so in the context of studies that attribute the presence of corruption 
under the liberal peace to ‘endemic’ ‘feudal’501 social relations or to culturally 
specific ‘patrimonial’ practices.502 These analyses are based on the underlying 
assumptions that political life in the non-West can be adequately analysed and 
characterised as a system of ‘patron-client’ relations which are a re-animation of 
pre-colonial or colonial social orders, and thus demand no contemporary political 
engagement with their substance.
503
 As argued in Chapter Three, these assumptions 
are problematic, not only in being descriptively lazy, but also in reproducing the 
non-West as a non-subject of politics.   
 
In terms of the political economy critiques, such as those of Pugh and to an 
extent Duffield, such an engagement with political consciousness might help to 
advance and substantiate a comprehension of the specific experiences and political 
consciousnesses produced by the global economic order. Yet in order to do this, 
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there would have to first be a re-appraisal of the nature and importance of the 
political subject within analysis. As argued in Chapter Two, on some levels there is 
an unavoidable tension between analyses which locate the site of power at a 
structural level, in which human experiences and ideas although interesting are 
epiphenomenal, and those which presuppose a more multi-dimensional or 
differentiated framework of analysis. In Chapter Three, I argued that a move to the 
latter was significant in thinking about the specific experiences of domination and 
potential sources of political change. If one starts from the perspective that political 
consciousness can be, and often is, plural or non-unitary, then engaging with this 
consciousness substantively becomes an important way into articulating concrete 
responses to the effects of power structures. It is here where the epistemological 
move of the ‘double consciousness’ framework is significant insofar as it locates an 
important source of critique within the framework of lived political subjecthood. As 
such it is not incompatible with the basic idea that power is reproduced through a 
particular patterning of the global political economy. However, it does suggest that 
this is an inadequate method of critical analysis and engagement.  
 
In fact, decolonising work on ‘double consciousness’ such as that of Du Bois 
both pre-dates and anticipates the debates between poststructuralism and structural 
Marxism on the question of the nature of ideology. Butler’s critique of Althusser 
argues that the process of ideological interpellation of subjects nonetheless requires 
as a prerequisite some sort of subject or conscience, which itself can be imagined 
not as intrinsically obedient but a site of potential for resistance.
504
 Yet where Butler 
seeks this in a largely abstract register, for decolonising approaches a sense of one’s 
own humanity is already a historically real aspect of political consciousness, lived 
and experienced under various conditions of socially differentiated domination. Its 
sociogenic approach can be seen to pre-empt Butler’s critique in beginning from a 
position of a historically-existing and self-aware double consciousness.  
 
Related to this, the framework of a non-unitary political consciousness 
problematizes the attempt to represent the political subject through analytic 
simplification or reductionism. On the one hand, this challenges what Mac Ginty 
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identifies as a “‘last native syndrome’”505 in analyses of the liberal peace – that is, 
the search for a non-modern, culturally-defined subject who has not been polluted or 
co-opted by the liberal peace and who can speak authentically against it. As argued 
in Chapter Two, this tendency can be found within the work of Richmond who 
counterposes the liberal peace with non-liberal or local ‘custom’, ‘tradition’, 
‘kinship’ and ‘community’.506 On the other hand, it also problematizes the portrayal 
of those engaging with the liberal peace as necessarily participating in a ‘Western-
induced artifice’.507 The notion of an ‘artifice’ here strongly inscribes a sense that 
there is an otherwise ‘authentic’ and non-contemporary political space, which is 
implicitly more real. Both of these constructions of the political imply that true 
political consciousness amongst the recipients of the liberal peace is both unitary 
and non-Western. Yet the analysis here of historically meaningful, critical and 
strategically creative plural forms of consciousness also renders this move dubious. 
This analysis is based on the idea that there will likely be important differences of 
framing, content and perspective that emerge from the interaction of political 
subjects who are grounded in different kinds of experience, but not one which 
asserts what kinds of differences will be important prior to engagement. 
 
 In a different way, the analytic of hybridity in the liberal peace debate 
discussed in Chapter Two is also extended and subverted through the recognition of 
double consciousness. Although Mac Ginty recognises that various entities are 
always already ‘hybrid’ by virtue of contact, co-operation and co-existence over a 
long period of time, the analytic framework and dynamics proposed re-establish the 
conceptual separation between ‘liberal’ and ‘local’ as a means of understanding the 
dynamics between them.
508
 In this sense, the analyst’s gaze is conceived of as being 
lateral to the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ dynamics which characterise hybridity in 
the liberal peace. By contrast, a double consciousness approach can extend the 
recognition of ‘already-existing’ hybridity but relocate its epistemic perspective 
with regard to political consciousness, while also recognising that this multiplicity 
operates at various ‘levels’ and reflects ‘internal’ struggles as well as external ones.   
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 It is with this question of struggle that the framework of double 
consciousness opens up the liberal peace as a site of living and lived political 
experience. For Du Bois and Fanon, it was the increasing awareness of 
contradictions between the ideas of humanity proclaimed by the West and the 
inhumanity of the colonial/racial order on which it depended that drove the desire 
for a different way of thinking and a form of revolt against those structures.  In 
contemporary Mozambique what we see is an resurgent awareness of contradictions 
between the ideas of self-determination, development, democracy and good 
governance, and the ways in which domestic and international political 
arrangements may structurally inhibit this.  In the next chapter, I will explore the 
material politics of the liberal peace as a means of engaging more concretely with its 
significance and effects.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 Political consciousness is perhaps not only double but plural in significant 
ways. This chapter picks out two of these strands as a way of thinking through some 
of the implications of non-unitary subjecthood for critiques of the liberal peace. 
They are in no sense exhaustive of the kinds of issues and considerations that could 
be brought to bear on the topic of governance and corruption: not only are the 
various conversations much richer than could be captured in a single narrative, but it 
is also clear that the focus of this analysis has been on commentary by particularly 
visible commentators.
509
 
 
 Nonetheless, the framework of double consciousness and a re-centred 
subjecthood also makes critiquing the liberal peace in some senses much more 
difficult, insofar as commitments to a ‘critical’ agenda may pull in different 
directions and must deal with a plurality of live assenting and dissenting voices. It 
fragments the simpler narratives of West-capitalist-liberal-hegemonic against the 
non-Western-non-liberal-dependent-local-other that have guided much critical 
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thinking on the liberal peace. In particular, it seems to highlight the very 
contemporary, rather than anachronistic, character of the tensions between various 
political ideals, as well as the exclusion hitherto of the moral space from critical 
deliberations.  
 
 But beyond this, the understanding of political consciousness as historically-
embedded and non-unitary also calls into question the transcendental aims of both a 
liberal developmental end-state and an ‘authentic’ space beyond the liberal that are 
the underlying utopias of supporters and critics of the liberal peace respectively. 
Rather, it is the immediate and immanent character of political being and change 
that becomes the focus of analysis and concern. In Chapter Seven, a focus on the 
immediate and manifest dimensions of intervention offers a distinctive account of its 
experience, and in particular the political economy dimensions of this experience. In 
addressing such dimensions, we move towards a critique which is alive to important 
aspects of alienation within intervention, and the political and ethical questions 
these raise.  
226 
 
Chapter Seven 
Consuming the liberal peace: situating accounts of 
the political economy of co-operation 
 
  
 Recovering an understanding of the experiences of those subject to the 
liberal peace is crucial in re-framing the terms of debate in an anti-colonial manner: 
that is, articulating political subjects as embodied and situated, developing a multi-
dimensional account of the political and basing a critical response within an ethical 
humanism. The previous two chapters sought to recover a grounded understanding 
of Mozambique as a historically significant entity and as having plural forms of 
political consciousness. These chapters spoke to the implicit narrative in critiques 
that the ideas and discourses of the liberal peace were ‘Western’ and therefore 
‘alien’ in a place like Mozambique. The next two chapters elaborate the experience 
of the liberal peace from the perspective of its material significance, emphasising 
the concrete ways in which highly unequal economic relations underpin and are 
reproduced by relations of intervention, leading to various forms of alienation. This 
contributes to the reconstruction of subjecthood through the reconstruction of its 
experiential dimensions. 
 
 In doing so, the approach further calls into question those approaches to the 
liberal peace that have attempted to deal with its political ethics only in a political-
theoretical dimension, such as Richmond and Chandler. Although these thinkers 
may come to different conclusions regarding the nature of the political subject, 
methodologically, they both approach a critique of the politics of intervention via 
the ontological stakes that they have defined; for Richmond this is the liberal-local 
divide
510
 and for Chandler it is the necessity of something like a liberal modern 
subject.
511
 For both these accounts, the relative economic position of the parties and 
the nature of these relations is totally epiphenomenal to how they judge the political 
ethics of intervention.  
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 This is not the case for the approaches of Pugh and Duffield, who much 
more strongly emphasise the role that the liberal peace plays in supporting and 
stabilising a neoliberal capitalist world order – as such, the political economy of the 
relationship is brought much more into focus as a grounds for assessing and judging 
interventions. In particular, the distinction between ‘insured’ and ‘uninsured’ 
populations developed by Duffield is important in articulating this order as 
differentiated in crucial ways, an issue which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Also important are Mac Ginty’s observations that economic policies in post-conflict 
environments may profess a free-market line of thought but rarely live up to such in 
practice.
512
 However, the ways in which these dynamics feed into the conscious 
experiences of intervention is largely bypassed in the narrative. By contrast, the 
approach outlined for this study will seek to re-ground critique in these dimensions 
of conscious experience.   
 
In this re-grounding, the argument will look at the politics of consumption. 
Bayart has famously argued that the politics of the African state is the ‘politics of 
the belly’ – that is, the idea that access to and desire for political power is based on 
its close association with access to economic wealth on the continent, often derived 
from external connections.
513
 Mbembe’s contrasting but related understanding and 
use of ‘the belly’, along with the mouth and phallus, in framing the politics of the 
postcolony alternatively emphasises the significance of personal corporeality and 
eating in the banal and ubiquitous manifestations of power in public spaces.
514
  
 
In a rather different way, the World Bank and other donors are also 
concerned with the ‘bellies’ of Africa – in particular their status as they pertain to 
poverty reduction strategies and economic indices of household consumption of 
various goods. It is on such consumption-based statistics that economic policies 
seek to evaluate themselves and their successes. In particular, recent trends in 
international development policy around the issue of ‘food security’, involving a 
broad swathe of governments, IGOs and NGOs, can be framed as the latest 
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reflection of a long-standing humanitarian and developmental moral and political 
imperative to ‘feed the world’. As such, there is a large extent to which we can 
consider the international aid industry as also responding to a ‘politics of the belly’, 
albeit one which shifts between the politics of emergency and the politics of 
development. 
 
In another context, West argues that the idiom of consumption is an 
important framework for making sense of social and political power amongst 
Makonde communities on the Muedan plateau in northern Mozambique. Here, 
powerful people are understood to use destructive sorcery to literally ‘feed on’ 
others, be they enemies whom they wish to destroy, or weaker people whose 
strength they want to absorb. In this sense, the powerful are often understood as 
very literally ‘predatory’, having a craving for power which is bound up with a 
physical appetite.
515
   
 
‘Consumption’, then, must be understood as an importantly polysemic term 
for thinking about politics, or indeed political economy, in Africa, for a wide range 
of audiences.
516
 Whilst Bayart and Mbembe seek to refer principally to its internal 
politics via metaphors of resource capture, satiation, intimacy and appetite, there are 
clear ways in which aspects of its external politics are strongly shaped by images of 
famine and dearth as well as economistic assessments of ‘consumption’ in the 
creation of market demand. Moreover, consumption appears in vernacular 
conceptions of power to explain otherwise opaque disparities within it. Put simply, 
the logic of consumption and eating is variously understood in all these framings to 
be an important logic of social life itself.  
 
In thinking about ‘who consumes’, or indeed ‘who can consume’, it is 
possible to move towards integrating the kinds of phenomenological analysis that 
Césaire stipulated in the Discourse on Colonialism into an understanding of the 
broader political economy of intervention. As discussed in Chapter Three, this kind 
of critique of the concrete experiences of colonialism, particularly in terms of its 
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supposed goals and accomplishments, was a powerful analytic weapon which 
supported an ethical and political critique of the colonial order.
517
  It was able to do 
so by attempting to grasp some concrete dynamics of colonialism and show how 
these inverted its particular claims to be fostering development. Such inversions also 
supported a critique of colonialism as being hypocritical and anti-humanist, which 
changed the terms of debate regarding its justification. Chapter Four argued that an 
important strategy towards this kind of critique was a re-evaluation of material 
dimensions in society via an engagement with its experiential content.
518
  
 
In this chapter, building on widespread critiques made within Mozambique 
about the structures of international co-operation, and engaging with the liberal 
peace on a experiential level, it is possible to read the liberal peace as itself 
representing a ‘politics of the belly’519 on three connected fronts. First, I read the 
engagement with the liberal peace in Mozambique as driven by conscious 
transactionality and informed by a widespread consciousness of dependency. 
Second, I argue that the liberal peace depletes rather than transforms the public 
sector through salary inequalities and aid resource expenditure. Finally, I argue that 
the high differentials between expatriate and national conditions drive a sense of 
social exclusion and alienation into the operation of the system as a whole. I argue 
that this reading of the concrete political economies of intervention both 
complements and exceeds the structural critiques of the neoliberal economic policy 
that have dominated the narratives of the political economy of peacebuilding. In 
doing so, such a picture emphasises the broader social implications of these 
dynamics and the ethical questions that these raise for critical engagement.  
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I. Conscious transactionality in the liberal peace 
 
Césaire’s demand to ‘see clearly, think clearly’ about the nature of the 
system is an onerous one in the case of the liberal peace, and the closer one gets to 
its actual practices in a particular place, the more difficult it can be to do. As 
discussed in Chapter One, the ‘liberal peace’ is understood as a construct which 
comprises the activities of a wide range of Western or Northern organisations and 
their partners undertaking an array of projects and programmes to produce or fund 
the production of peace, statebuilding and development in the global South, through 
political, economic and social activities. There are many modalities through which 
this takes place – either through or around host government budgets, within bilateral 
or multilateral accords, and many without the authorisation or even knowledge of 
the host government. Programmes and projects vary hugely in scale, budget, scope, 
intention, execution and impact. They exist in every sector of public life – both 
governmental and non-governmental – exerting various levels of influence.  For 
many of the critiques it is the accumulation of these interventions and programmes, 
transformative in intent and underpinned by a particular ideology, that represents 
‘the liberal peace’. As noted earlier, they have by and large tended to understand the 
liberal peace at the level of its aggregate structure, which is understood as 
programmatic in character.  
 
Normally, this liberal project is understood as being propagated through 
either ‘conditionality’, or, for Harrison and Duffield’s later work, ‘post-
conditionality’. Both narratives emphasise the power and effectiveness of liberal 
transformations and Western agencies, either through the imposition of strict 
macroeconomic frameworks or through the broadening of the sovereign frontier to 
incorporate liberal governance into the structures of the state. For Duffield (2001),  
 
Liberal peace is a system of carrots and sticks where cooperation paves 
the way for development assistance and access to the wider networks of 
global governance, while non-cooperation risks varying degrees of 
conditionality and isolation.
520
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For Harrison, the post-conditionality regime is very similar to conditionality, but 
less coercive and more diffuse: 
 
Donor-state relations within the post-conditionality regime are not 
defined by conditionality in its directly coercive sense: ‘do what the IFIs 
say because the costs of doing so are not as great as the costs of not 
doing so’. Rather, IFIs employ the disbursement of funds to promote 
further changes – mainly to state institutions through administrative 
reform programmes. Post-conditionality politics requires more carrots 
than sticks. 
521
 
 
There is much truth to both of these important narratives, and they capture important 
aspects of the ways in which aid operates in practice. But it is here where particular 
dynamics of the experience can be obscured in service of the grand narrative of the 
(neo)liberal project. Yet, as Césaire made clear understanding the experience of 
interventions is particularly important from the perspective and experience of those 
inhabiting its structure. This is especially the case where those experiences 
emphasise different aspects to the narratives offered by the political structures.  
 
This section will argue that in its concrete manifestations and effects in 
Mozambique, the liberal peace is usefully interpreted as a system of conscious 
transactionality based on a very conscious appreciation of economic needs. When 
looking at the various ways in which people who are the targets of intervention 
understand their motives and options when engaging with interveners, there is a 
widespread understanding of what dependency means and entails. As such, on this 
reading, the liberal peace may have its primary significance in Mozambique as a 
source of income and resources for diverse objectives, for the government and for 
others including public sector workers and expatriate aid workers. Within this, 
various ideological themes and directions are somewhat evident but not necessarily 
coherently or robustly pursued. As such, the exposure or preparation of subjects for 
either the global market or liberal governmentality seems to be heavily mediated 
through the reproduction of a particular transactional hierarchy of finance, 
compensation, power and privilege which has its own logic. Whilst this does not 
necessarily undermine the broad usefulness of the structural analysis of 
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neoliberalism, it concretises it in a way which connects with the experience and 
consciousness of being subject to transformation, as well as pointing to other factors 
which are themselves under political control.  
 
However, it is first worthwhile demonstrating the salience of a transactional 
interpretation of the liberal peace in Mozambique as a crucial dynamic of its politics 
and political economy. This is an important theme which was in evidence across the 
interviews and observations which were conducted for this project as well as in a 
wider set of analyses and commentaries about international co-operation. It is also 
an interpretation which fits well with the behaviour of the donors, government and 
other aid-receiving bodies. Prima facie it may seem like an obvious point but it is 
one that perhaps has important consequences for how we think about the system as a 
whole, particularly regarding the ethics of engagement, empowerment, ‘ownership’ 
and so forth, and particularly from the perspective of significantly less wealthy 
participants in the relationship. I will argue below that we can see that at each level 
at which the liberal peace operates, it is made substantive precisely only at the point 
at which it can be realised transactionally.
522
  
 
Since 1978, Mozambique has received an estimated $36bn in official 
development aid from OECD countries,
 523
 and much more via non-official 
donations. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Mozambique’s economic experiences 
during the 1980s are an important grounding for its present situation vis-à-vis the 
donors. Yussuf Adam, academic and former Frelimo intellectual, has argued that the 
combination of war, destabilisation, emergency and the debt crisis were all 
contributing factors in forcing the decision to seek more external aid.
524
 However, 
its traditional partners in the COMECON bloc had decided to turn down its 
application for membership in 1981, which led to its eventual applications to join 
the Bretton Woods Institutions, which were accepted in 1984.
525
  It became 
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increasingly clear over this time that the urgently needed financial support would be 
dependent on Mozambique undertaking a programme of rapid structural adjustment, 
which it eventually did in 1987.
526
 The stringent structural adjustment policies laid 
out in the Economic Rehabilitation Programme were clearly to have a large impact 
on public expenditure and incomes, as is well discussed in the literature.
527
 There 
was a wide consensus at the time, which is to some extent ongoing, that 
Mozambique had ceded important aspects of its ability to determine its own social 
and economic policies in this deal and thereafter.  
 
Yet, in this deal, the government had also made concrete gains of another 
kind. Official aid from DAC countries virtually doubled in response from $698m in 
1986 to $1.01bn in 1987 (2007 prices).
528
 At its peak in 1988, foreign aid 
constituted 81.2% of GDP, and has continued to constitute a major proportion of 
government income.
529
 From the outset of its post-independence economic 
trajectory then, the government consciously understood itself to be in a position of 
trading and bargaining for financial support, whilst trying to resist particular 
political pressures such as the devaluation of the currency and the depression of 
minimum wages.
530
  The intense economic pressure it was under at the time of the 
turn to the IFIs for aid was very apparent to its political leadership at the time. It was 
also publicly obvious. As Bertíl Egëro describes, from the beginning of the 1980s 
there was widespread malnutrition and even a lack of clothing for many people.
531
 
By the end of the decade up to three million people had been displaced by war,
532
 
which had also deliberately destroyed much of the state infrastructure. This had also 
virtually paralysed economic activity within the country, with agricultural and 
industrial production at extremely low levels. A deep consciousness of this collapse 
is evident from Frelimo’s Central Committee report to the Fifth Congress in 1989, 
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in which a frank, sober and arresting analysis of the economic and social situation 
explains and justifies the introduction of reforms to central aspects of economic 
policy.
533
  
 
What happened resulted in a high influx of aid and a substantive 
rescheduling of public debt. In the short term, this allowed more imports of food aid 
and other emergency assistance upon which the survival of many rested. As such, 
the adoption of structural adjustment policies can be understood as a conscious 
trade-off made by the Mozambican government under the pressure of a growing and 
long-term economic crisis, in return for specific forms of assistance to the state. 
However, it was articulated and pursued in terms of the government’s historic 
developmental mission, which included the expansion of public services such as 
education and health, and a promotion of the central role of the Frelimo party in 
political life. The Fifth Congress Report of the Central Committee, entitled ‘For the 
Normalisation of Life’ understands the reforms as the necessary price for the 
continuation of the government’s own project. 534 
 
Therefore, when ONUMOZ, the official peacebuilding mission of the UN – 
one of Roland Paris’ ‘successful’ agents of liberal peacebuilding535 – arrived in 
October 1992, Mozambique’s political elite across party lines had already been 
engaged in a complex game of transactional politics with ‘new’ Western donors for 
some time. This was to alleviate the emergency, which had involved acceding to 
various aspects of structural adjustment. The negotiation of the Rome Accords from 
1989-1992 followed this logic remarkably closely, with Renamo in particular using 
the talks to elicit concrete flows of cash and equipment in return for running for 
election.
536
 ONUMOZ itself relied on continuing this strategy of direct bargaining 
for particular concessions and forms of co-operation with both Renamo and 
Frelimo, and paid out large sums of money throughout the process of electoral 
preparation in order to keep its momentum going. This involved a $16m trust fund 
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for Renamo and other parties.
537
 This is not to say that there was not a genuine 
desire for peace from within political parties, but rather that they used their 
interactions with third party donors as means of securing a financial package to 
support the installation of a multiparty electoral system. Ajello, head of the UN 
mission, quite openly endorsed the idea that people would essentially have to be 
bought off in order for multiparty elections to take place.
538
 Fifteen years on, 
wrangling over the question of elections between the government and donors, such 
as over the general election in 2009, have only been brought to a head by more 
donor strikes on disbursing central government funding. This has again reinforced 
the centrality of the financial aspect of the relationship, even around the basic 
question of elections in a liberal peace framework.
539
 Despite the move to a 
multiparty electoral system, however, the government has managed to successfully 
contain any political challenges to Frelimo dominance and has increasingly 
instituted what Luis de Brito has called an ‘elected single-party state’.540  
 
Successive and continued negotiations over the implementation of the 
‘liberal peace’ via financial aid and fiscal policy over the next years can also be 
interpreted as being substantially transactional in character from the perspective of 
the government. For example, it is clear that the production of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PARPAs in the Portuguese acronym) – understood by 
many as a primary contemporary instrument of neoliberal economic transformation 
– was first undertaken specifically in order to qualify for over a billion dollars of 
debt relief.
541
 Furthermore, it continues to be renewed in order for new tranches of 
money to be forthcoming from both the IFIs and the European donors. One 
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interviewee described it as a “cut-and-paste” by the government542, although more 
recent iterations have been understood to more closely follow the government’s own 
political programme in its Five Year Plans.
543
 The PRSP is now a substantial 
political centrepiece of the relationship with important implications for policy. 
However, even this has stemmed from the foundation of a large financial transaction 
with the donors which resulted in substantial immediate and tangible financial 
benefits, as noted by economist José Negrão.
544
  
 
Tellingly, sources within government and donors are of the view that 
although the PRSP is elaborated and worked on extensively with the multilateral 
donors, it may actually have a relatively limited impact on concrete sectoral policy. 
For example, one government source noted: 
 
There is an issue between the PARPA and the sectoral strategies – the 
link is weak. PARPA was really a fund-raising document; the donors 
needed it. But the sectors don’t really follow PARPA – it’s quite vague 
anyway. It’s all done according to the sectoral plan and policies, but the 
links between plans, budgets and policies is also weak.
545
  
 
The PARPA is now associated with an extensive ‘participatory’ policy structure, 
comprising a wide range of planning and monitoring activities undertaken by a large 
number of institutional participants – for many it is the hallmark of a progressive 
and inclusive aid architecture. As such, the admission that it has a relatively limited 
impact on sectoral policy is a very interesting one. What it suggests is that the 
successive PRSPs do not necessarily represent a commitment on the part of the 
government to its specific content, nor the clear ability of the donors to impose a 
particular programme of policies upon the government. Rather, if this is the case, its 
significance appears more symbolic and politically functional for managing the co-
operation process than as the platform for a committed programme of ideological or 
political transformation. Where it does seem to have a clear and continuing effect is 
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in the limitation of public expenditure via macroeconomic policy, although there are 
signs of emerging IFI flexibility on this front.
 546
 This is an issue which will be 
returned to below. 
 
The consciously transactional reading of the liberal peace at the 
governmental level is also supported by looking at its longstanding practices of 
‘donor shopping’ for aspects of policy considered risky, unimportant or counter-
productive by powerful multilateral donors such as the World Bank or IMF. This 
largely involves looking around for a donor willing to support projects or policies 
that others will not, or to step in when others pull out. The director of a national civil 
society fund also noted that this tended to make attempts at co-ordinated 
conditionality much weaker: ‘anyway, if one goes, there will be another to fill their 
place – Swiss, American, Dutch – there is no common agenda. It is all an industry of 
competition.’547  
 
Amongst numerous examples of this over recent years is the launching of a 
national development bank for private sector credit, which the government were 
unable to persuade the large multilateral donors to underwrite.
548
 However, in the 
following years, they signed accords with the Portuguese government
549
 to do 
precisely this for US$500m.
550
 This move importantly undercut an apparent plank of 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy which sought to liberalise the financial industry and 
allow the market to set interest rates and repayment schedules. Instead, it offers 
subsidised interest rates for longer term investments.  This is understood in the light 
of a more recent general trend in increased co-operation with Brazil, India and 
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China where much larger sums of investment funding have been made available for 
the government’s projects than that from the World Bank. This greatly accelerated 
the ability of the government to make choices about the character of transactions:  
 
One of the reasons is the rise of other sources of finance e.g. India – 
access is much easier…We will go for that with or without World Bank 
permission. The Bank has to reform itself – that will give some fresh 
air.
551
 
 
From the perspective of the government, it might be said that co-operation with 
various interventions extends generally as far as they are tied to significant sources 
of funding, and even then that commitment may not be very strong in practice. A 
large part of the reason why the IFIs have had such influence in Mozambique has 
precisely been the large proportion of funds that they control and the leadership that 
they can exercise over the bilateral donors’ disbursements. The formation of the 
Group of Like-Minded Donors, now the G19 – a co-ordinated grouping of donors 
from primarily European countries – has tried to offset the power of the IFIs and the 
US government through the institution of a common policy dialogue and 
disbursement mechanism to pool funds. To some extent this has succeeded, as 
suggested in recent cables released through Wikileaks.
552
 On the other hand, the 
UN’s influence has been increasingly waning over the last two decades as its budget 
has shrunk relative to those of other donors and organisations.
553
  
 
This line of interpretation suggests that it is the money that the liberal peace 
has historically brought with it which has been its principal force in Mozambique. 
Although this ability to choose between funding sources has been accentuated much 
more recently with alternative sources of foreign finance, the transactional quality of 
aid has been evident from the beginnings of dealings with multilateral and bilateral 
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donors.
554
 This dynamic is mirrored in the relationships with national NGOs, who 
also seem to approach the relationship transactionally. One director argued that:  
 
It works like this: In this sphere, partners enter everywhere. Normally 
each partner has an agenda. They don’t impose it, but to get help, it’s 
necessary to align with their agendas. We have some who say they want 
to do HIV/AIDS, if you want our money, it’s A+B, even if it is 
nonsense… the influence is subtle, that comes with money.555 
 
Whilst this conclusion is not exactly surprising, it is nonetheless interesting how 
prominent the question of funding was in discussions with governmental and non-
governmental organisations, and how perspectives towards the liberal peace were 
strongly conditioned by a strategic approach. In Mozambique, this seemed to stem 
from a very broad and publicly shared consciousness of economic dependency, 
which was deeply ingrained as a feature of political life. The following are excerpts 
selected from the interviews which reflect this underlying narrative, which was 
more broadly present in the sources used from the media:  
 
First, Mozambique alone cannot do anything. It is not a financially 
viable state. This concept of sustainability must be thought through in 
terms of system over the years. Mozambique cannot live without help. 
Being in that position, you cannot do whatever you want: if you borrow 
from a bank, you have responsibilities.
556
  
 
Mozambique is sovereign because it has laws, it makes laws, but it is 
economically dependent on others. NGOs are very influential – they 
influence decision-making. This is because we are a poor country.
557
 
 
Of course, they [the partners] have a big influence. We are a very poor 
country, where 50-60% of the budget is paid for by them. It’s 
indisputable – they always put conditions.558 
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The partners at the moment have a heavy weight in Mozambique. This 
derives from the financial aid to the budget of the state – I don’t know 
exactly how much it is. But it gives them a great power, from those that 
give a small amount, to a big amount – it gives them disproportionate 
weight. But Mozambique, during many years Mozambique has lived off 
this. It has created a certain dependency – like a drug addict, it does not 
think whether it can live without the drug or with less of the drug.
559
 
 
These interviewees were from quite different walks of life, based in different 
sectors, jobs and cities. Although they had different ideas about what was entailed 
by Mozambique’s position as a ‘poor country’, it was an article of basic common 
sense that its economic and social situation was still defined first and foremost by its 
permanent lack of resources and the perceived need to get external funding. As 
such, this involved various kinds of responsibilities and conditionalities which 
would qualify it for this financial assistance. Seen in this light and from this 
perspective, the liberal peace’s biggest significance in concrete terms remains as a 
source of hard money in a context defined by a lack of money. It is this reality of 
financial dependency that weighs heavily and openly on the conscious experience of 
the liberal peace in Mozambique.  
 
 This reality poses interesting questions to the liberal peace literature, which 
has perhaps not seriously considered this as a fundamental aspect of the experience. 
Firstly, it raises questions as to whether the liberal peace has in fact mainly operated 
through the regulation of subjectivity and conduct, as suggested in Foucaultian 
interpretations of the relationship.
560
 From the interviews, it seemed relatively 
obvious that both political elites and others outside this elite were conscious of the 
strategic and transactional quality of many of the relationships, engendered first and 
foremost by the relations of economic inequality.  Whilst the subtlety of the 
influence and its constraints were acknowledged, as noted, the very act of conscious 
acknowledgement seemed to demarcate the limits of this power, which was 
nonetheless ebbing.  
 
 Secondly, it also seemed to raise questions for the diagnosis of ‘post-
conditionality’ that Harrison and others have made about ‘governance states’ such 
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as Mozambique.  In this narrative, as Duffield notes, states have essentially 
internalised and taken on the pursuit of the liberal project by themselves. Yet, as 
suggested by this closer narrative engagement, there is not just ‘post’-conditionality 
but often plain ‘old-fashioned’ explicit conditionality on many key issues – the 
donor strike over the elections in 2009 representing an important case in point. It 
may be that the conversation after the Paris Accords has become more respectful, 
and is undertaken through the idioms of ‘partnership’ and ‘co-operation’, but the 
relationship is not necessarily less contested than in the past. 
 
 Thirdly, the accusation of ‘co-optation’ that underpins Richmond’s and 
Chandler’s approach to ‘civil society’ in particular seems to require re-thinking in 
the light of what would constitute an ‘authentic’ political relationship in this context. 
There is evidence of creative and strategic alignment around funding sources – but 
in the context of relative economic disempowerment, are there other options? At 
very least to make this kind of judgement, it would be necessary to reflect on the 
plural nature of political consciousness as argued in the previous chapter, and to 
make a case for how more ‘authentic’ political goals should be articulated or 
pursued. 
 
The inversion of perspective in the narrative of the transactionality of the liberal 
peace is therefore an important corrective to the Euro- and Western-centric terms of 
debate that have been established so far which tend to overstate the ideological 
irresistibility of a ‘Western’ political and economic paradigm under conditions of 
globalisation. Such a perspective makes sense only when our understanding of 
politics is disembedded from its material expressions and lived experience. From the 
perspective of a widespread consciousness of national poverty and insecure finance 
on the other hand, the liberal peace has been engaged primarily as a way of meeting 
economic needs whilst also resonating with some general political preoccupations.  
 
II.  Salary inequalities and capacity un-building 
 
 Where the last section dealt with transactionality at the level of the grand 
bargains struck between Mozambican political entities and international donors, this 
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section suggests that transactionality is also significant at personal and operational 
levels.  Within the lived realities of the liberal peace, the inequalities of salaries, 
resourcing and compensation are of key importance in understanding the dynamics 
of its impact and significance. Here there are strong, marked differentials between 
those who work within the orbit of the aid industry and those who do not. Put 
crudely, salaries and benefits are both absolutely and relatively high when working 
for donor governments, multilateral organisations, their various agencies and 
projects. However, they are comparatively and absolutely low within the public 
sector, including central government and within society more broadly, where many 
who work with projects and programmes are volunteers who incur personal costs.  
This persistent disequilibrium results in a number of problems such as the ‘brain 
drain’, short-termism, insularity and fragmentation, as well as wider problems of 
divisiveness, demoralisation and alienation within public service. This 
disequilibrium means that there is a revolving door of skills and money across the 
public sector which prevents the accumulation of either within it, and in fact 
contributes to the overall dispossession of these resources. This aspect of the 
experience of intervention exceeds the structural account of neoliberal marketization 
that has dominated the critical accounts of the political economy of the liberal 
peace, but is nonetheless worthy of critical attention in the judgement and evaluation 
of intervention.  
 
 These dynamics can be illustrated effectively with reference to 
Mozambique’s health sector over the last twenty years or so. Public health is a 
particularly totemic aspect of the liberal peace’s development platform, seemingly 
representing the most urgent and ‘least political’ site of international aid 
interventions in the post-colonial world. It is one around which much fundraising 
and awareness raising takes place, and one which seems to transcend the messy 
politics of choosing between ideologies or interest groups. Rather, public health is 
understood to be a universal right and a key element of human welfare, an element 
emphasised as lacking in critiques such as that of Pugh. For Foucaultian critiques, 
public health is one of the most important instruments of biopower, which in 
modern society is the capacity to regulate life chances and bodies at the level of the 
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masses.
561
 In the context of understanding the character and significance of the 
liberal peace then, its effect on public health is of keen importance. 
 
The health sector in Mozambique is also understood as one of its biggest 
areas of need which is associated with its poverty. The WHO reports that  
 
The country’s burden of disease is largely a consequence of the high 
levels of poverty and a result of infectious and communicable diseases. 
Poor access to primary health care facilities has made it difficult for 
government efforts to deal effectively with the health situation. 
According to the Mozambique Poverty Reduction Strategic Program 
(PARPAII), only 36% of people have access to a health facility within 
30 minutes of their homes. About 30% of the population are not able to 
access health services and only 50% have access to an acceptable level 
of health care.
562
 
 
Accordingly, the health sector is one of the biggest targets of aid across all channels, 
including bilateral and multilateral aid, NGO funding and large vertical funds, such 
as the President’s Emergency Plan For Aids Relief (PEPFAR), the President’s 
Malaria Initiative, the Clinton Foundation and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (hereafter, the Global Fund). An estimated 73% of the 
health budget is provided by foreign partners.
563
 Whilst the state is a major deliverer 
of core and primary services, various other providers also exist, often funded by 
charitable donations or vertical funds for organisations working outside government, 
such as ICAP, a US-based provider of HIV/AIDS-specific treatment.  
 
At the same time, however, the health sector has been exposed to heavy 
fiscal tightening in the wake of Mozambique’s structural adjustment programme, 
with one study arguing that government spending on the health sector was halved in 
real terms between 1980 and 1990.
564
 Similar commitments to “prudent” 
macroeconomic policy have been maintained through Mozambique’s PARPAs 
(Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers). In real terms, this has meant a fall in salaries 
for doctors and nurses working for the public sector, and a lack of investment in 
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university capacity to train more doctors.
565
 At the same time, however, the growth 
of other, better remunerated programmes and projects has attracted health workers 
out of the sector or away from their core duties, which has the effect of precisely 
inverting the stated goals of ‘capacity building’. An old joke told within government 
in Mozambique capturing this practice goes as follows: 
 
The Minister of Health says, I was walking in the hospital, and one of 
my doctors says to me ‘do you have a secretary’s position’? I ask ‘do 
you need one’, and the doctor says ‘I would like to apply’.566 
 
In the joke, which presumably rings true for those familiar with the system, it is 
suggested that even secretaries in Ministries are better paid than doctors.  This is due 
to a combination of public spending tightening within sectors and the relatively 
privileged position of those who work alongside international co-operation, which 
creates perverse incentives and absurd outcomes. The respondent who told it to me 
did so stating that the inability to pay salaries of staff was ‘corrupting the system’.567 
This reading is corroborated by Pavignani and Durão, both former senior health 
sector workers, who have argued that the inability to pay salaries is one of the most 
critical weaknesses of the Mozambican health system.
568
 Former civil servants and 
doctors who had walked away from their government jobs to jobs in European 
development agencies and donor programmes argued, implicitly in their defence, 
that they were ultimately doing their same jobs but with another organisation, with 
better conditions.
569
 More alarmingly, large numbers of doctors have also left the 
country altogether in search of better salaries, with one estimate putting this rate at 
75% of all doctors for Mozambique in the years 1999-2001.
570
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Pfeiffer’s ethnographic study on the impact of international co-operation in 
the health sector in central Mozambique illustrates the interaction dynamics in 
greater detail.
571
 He argues that due to the tightening of state health budgets, and the 
willingness of external projects to set up broad systems of incentives, including per 
diem payments and other benefits for participation well in excess of standard 
salaries, the provincial health system became significantly fragmented and 
incoherent, whilst remaining understaffed.
572
 This fragmentation led to public 
servants spending a high volume of their time managing co-operation programmes 
and projects or being at workshops, rather than managing the affairs of the health 
service, for those who stayed within it. For health professionals who managed to 
leave and join an NGO, however, Pfeiffer calculates that the value of the salary and 
benefits could be up to twenty times what could be earned within the state, meaning 
that even this short term work could easily become more attractive than long-term 
work with job security in the state.
573
 Although many donors signed up to the ‘Kaya 
Kwanga’ commitments promising to align remuneration with the state and not hire 
qualified people out of the Ministry in 2000,
574
 this practice was still widespread in 
2009 at the time of the author’s visits, when in one instance eight senior people were 
hired simultaneously out of the Ministry of Health by a single donor to run a new 
health programme.
575
  
 
Similar dynamics could also be seen in the agricultural sector, where a large 
proportion of the staff who had been trained with donors’ pooled funding under the 
first capacity-building ProAgri scheme
576
 subsequently left the Ministry to work for 
donor programmes or in the Ministry of Planning and Development.
577
 As such, any 
benefit or subsidy which had arisen out of Ministry staff being better trained was 
often soon transferred out of the Ministry, and towards the donor agencies, as it had 
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been in health. Good technicians also found work better remunerated with the 
regional offices of development agencies.
578
 These dynamics suggest that despite 
seeming to successfully spend money on ‘capacity building’ within the state, donor 
agencies and state employees were simultaneously transferring this capacity away 
from the state once ‘built’. 
 
This is to assume that ‘capacity building’ exercises are successful in building 
capacity, around which there is a reasonable degree of scepticism both within 
government and outside it. In particular, concerns are articulated over the 
imbalances between ‘training’ and actually carrying out any work. A recent Minister 
of Health, known for his combative attitude with donors as well as his populist 
politics, tapped into this scepticism when he effectively banned Ministry officials 
from participating in various donor seminars and workshops as part of a broader 
crackdown on corruption in the sector.
579
 The student who reported this argued that 
these workshops did not have any benefit but ‘they were just happening to pay the 
teachers, to pay the organisers, to buy some water, but they didn’t add anything’.580 
This reading particularly resonated with my own interpretation of a five-day health 
leadership training workshop in Maputo funded by USAID which I attended part of, 
in which religious leaders from around the country were taught how to prioritise 
activities using a flipchart by American management scientists, as part of leadership 
skills which could be used to spread messages about malaria. As part of this 
workshop, a short video of a dog walking with only two legs appearing on The 
Oprah Winfrey Show was used to convey the idea that problems were simply 
‘challenges’ to be understood and overcome with the right approach.581 Yet when I 
followed up with one of the leaders who attended in the weeks after the programme 
in their home town in another province, it emerged that the lack of basic transport 
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for their network of priests was a major factor preventing the spreading of anti-
malaria messages, let alone distributing mosquito nets, which was not provided for 
in the programme.
582
 The priest wryly noted that he might use the ‘challenge model’ 
to re-deploy some of the training funds accordingly. In Maputo, another leader of a 
governance-focused NGO also problematized the value of capacity building 
workshops more generally, arguing: 
 
So of course, when they do the evaluations of these projects and 
programmes, everyone is satisfied… Everyone talks about doing 
‘capacitação’ – but what have they done in the last 20-30 years? People 
that come to deliver this are not appropriate – can you imagine taking a 
Mozambican to the UK to teach them? This is not capacity… And still 
people lack the resources to implement the programmes.
583
 
 
Whilst it is difficult to generalise definitively about the value that is added 
by the multiple and different ‘knowledge transfer’ programmes which are laid on by 
the liberal peace, there are clear examples of them being perceived and experienced 
at times as resource intensive, under-implemented and not always necessarily 
appropriate. In particular, the weighting given to resources for conducting the 
training rather than actually carrying out the work seemed particularly mysterious to 
many. Similar questions were raised about the value of scoping studies:  
 
I feel that donors don’t really want to reduce poverty. We started with 
PROAGRI in 1995. There were millions spent on consultant studies – 
four studies, but if you see how much is going to the farmer, it’s just 
25% - I say why? Each donor wants to do the study, and to use the 
money of PROAGRI. And the amount of money they pay for the study 
is unacceptable. They always want the evaluation, and they contract out 
– and how much do they support? But the support for the farmers itself, 
they are not getting a lot. With one study, you can buy ten tractors, can 
really solve some problems.
584
 
 
The inequalities in salaries, the dubious character of many capacity building 
mechanisms and the lack of implementation resources are particularly interesting in 
terms of reflecting on the liberal peace as a supposed vector of social and political 
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transformation, or ‘mission civilisatrice’.585 In particular, they indicate the ultimate 
fragility of these transformation endeavours – rather than leading to the 
accumulation of human resources, they can lead to their depletion, of course 
necessitating further capacity building. This dynamic of competition between 
interveners and the host state not just for personnel and their time but for aid 
resource spending power means that in practice ‘transformation’ is itself deferred 
infinitely into the future. In Césaire’s frame of reference, colonialism’s tendencies 
towards inhuman behaviour in the name of humanity was a key characteristic of its 
alienating nature. Analogously, the active depletion of human resources by a liberal 
peace which legitimates itself in the name of improving them can be seen as a 
source of alienation in Mozambique. 
 
III. Consumption and alienation  
 
 Of the money that does arrive with the liberal peace, however, it is clear that 
a significant quantity of it is consumed within the boundaries of the expatriate 
community itself.
586
 Although this is in many ways an obvious point to make, these 
patterns of consumption are important in thinking about the way in which the liberal 
peace is experienced and its effect on the politics of intervention, particularly if, as I 
have suggested, the liberal peace is characterised by conscious transactionality in 
significant ways. It matters if academic supporters of the liberal peace, such as 
Paris, contend that an important aspect of it is that resources flow from rich 
countries to poor ones. It is also important from the perspective of thinking about 
the liberal peace’s own legitimating narratives of benefiting the poorest and 
improving the quality of their government in order to secure the future.  In terms of 
thinking about the experiential dimensions of the political economy then, these are 
crucial dynamics for critique to consider.  
 
 It is difficult to measure the quantitative extent of this ‘internal’ industry 
consumption in any accurate way for a number of reasons. In the first place, these 
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issues are rarely addressed by the industry, even within the range of monitoring and 
evaluation reports produced to assess the effectiveness of programmes and projects. 
It seems to be a starting assumption that whatever is spent within the context of the 
programme does in fact contribute to achieving its objectives, although when this 
expenditure is broken down even slightly it is less clearly the case.
587
 There seems 
to be a substantial degree of variation in internal consumption rates as a proportion 
of the resource, as well as the proportion which is ‘tied’ explicitly to the use of 
goods or services from donor countries. It is also a subject which can be socially 
awkward to bring up in the context of an environment where personal compensation 
and lifestyles are acutely implicated in the discussion. Furthermore, there is a 
common interest of donors and recipients to avoid critical public discussion on this 
front, even if that only consists in protecting co-operation funding in general rather 
than particular careers and organisations.  
 
High expatriate staff costs and salaries feature heavily in the landscape of the 
liberal peace in Mozambique. Indeed, they are now a highly visible and universal 
cultural cliché of the contemporary aid environment, although they are rarely 
interpreted in terms of their impact on the system as a whole. Pfeiffer offers a neat 
example of conditions in the health sector in Mozambique for many expatriates: 
 
With the exception of two agencies, expatriates were paid from 
US$1000 to US$6000 per month, usually tax-free. Most agencies 
provided housing, private access to project cars, and funding for 
personal vacations. One engineer working for a European agency 
calculated that at the end of his four-year contract he would have saved 
nearly US$300,000.
588
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Of course, there are important variations in this package between permanent, 
consultant and volunteer staff,
589
 the ability of various organisations to pay salaries, 
and there is increasing awareness within the aid community about the use of project 
or programme funds as personal subsidies. Nonetheless, there is a relatively 
common standard of remuneration, and of living, which is likely in excess of what 
these workers would be able to achieve in their countries of origin. In project-based 
assistance, costs associated with supporting expatriates through salaries, housing 
and transport can consume up to 50% of the budget, although in programme aid it is 
likely to be less. Rentals in the neighbourhoods in Maputo where expatriate workers 
generally live are high, pushed up by the large numbers of aid workers and their 
respective housing allowances.
590
 As an example, the US State Department’s 
published 2011 housing allowance for each worker based in Maputo is between 
$28700 and $39500 per year.
591
 For temporary visiting staff in Mozambique, there 
is a per diem allowance of up to $238 for hotels and accommodation in Maputo and 
$220 elsewhere.
592
 Salaries, beginning at $27431, rising to $129517, are also subject 
to a 25% hardship boost and a 35% cost of living allowance.
593
 Published data on 
UN pay scales indicates similar levels of pay and benefits.
594
 This compares to a 
2010 national average annual income of $410 USD in Mozambique, or $34 per 
month.
595
 The average annual income in Maputo City can however be over ten times 
higher ($1,109) than in the poorest provinces ($96), where the majority are well 
below the international poverty line.
596
 A doctor working for the government can 
expect to receive $330 per month which works out as $3960 per year.
597
 As noted 
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above, Mozambican nationals who work within the aid industry can earn much more 
than their governmental counterparts, although nowhere near as much as their 
expatriate counterparts.
598
  Pfeiffer notes that in various locations in Mozambique, 
these economic disparities are physically manifested by the construction of housing 
and social compounds for aid workers which keep them separated from host 
societies.
599
 
 
 One effect of the vast differentials in rewards, beyond the obvious 
constraints it puts on project and programme resources, is the demoralisation and 
alienation experienced by workers within and others outside the aid industry in 
response to this. This was made explicit in a number of the interviews conducted for 
this study, although was not discussed in others. In many cases, these sharp and 
seemingly arbitrary inequalities were treated as part of the unspoken social and 
visual landscape – the terrain upon which aid relationships simply occurred. Yet 
elsewhere it is articulated. One of the more open indications of this alienation 
emerged in discussion with a well-qualified and experienced technician working for 
a European development agency in Sofala province: 
 
Another thing is that local workers and international workers for an 
organisation have a big difference in contractual conditions. They treat 
people as nationals and internationals – and what is the justification? 
They say we base the pay on what is in Europe, and of course there are 
differences between the European countries, but that is nothing 
compared to the difference here… they treat people differently[…] 
 
MS: Do you sense any resentment amongst national workers for this 
differentiation? 
 
[Interviewee]: No. What happens… well, yes, they do give a lot of 
money… I just want them to justify it, to give clear rules about roles, 
boundaries. When basic needs are met, it’s ok… of course I am going to 
do my job, but if I ask, between me and you, what’s the difference?  
 
And then, that is the way that [my employer] looks at me, but then my 
other colleagues elsewhere are also looking at me to see what benefits 
they can get from me… but this distances me from other colleagues. 
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They only want to work with me for benefits, for trips… to Europe, they 
ask…600  
 
Another interviewee within an NGO reflected  
 
on the meaning of corruption. As an example, he talks about the costs 
spent on assistance projects in keeping workers in cars and houses. He 
says he knew a Norwegian project, which was something like 3.5m 
euros, which had ten cars. As another example, he says that he knows a 
couple, who run an HIV/AIDS organisation in Maputo, whose place is 
worth $7000 per month. So what is corruption, he asks. Who are the 
criminals?   He says that the problem of wasted money is a very big one 
– people are buying the most expensive models when lesser ones would 
do.
601
 
 
In a recent long-term research project sponsored by DfID and the ESRC, 
organisational psychologists Carr, McWha, Maclachlan and Furnham explored the 
impact of the dual pay structure within the aid industry in six different international 
locations, finding that the socially unacceptable
602
 discrepancies between expatriate 
and national staff in aid organisations led to a sense of injustice and demotivation, 
which could lead to high staff turnover and emigration.
603
 In terms of capacity 
building, they interpret this as an inhibitor to capacity development, although it 
might also be interpreted as an active drain on organisational capacity when it is 
understood that aid resources are poured into training these staff. From the above 
discussion, it is suggested that the demotivation emerging from the dual pay 
structure is just one aspect of the deeper dynamics of alienation relating to the 
workings of the liberal peace.  
 
These expenditure patterns, which seem to indicate how the aid industry 
values itself in comparison to its host society, reflect the very opposite of the stated 
intentions of international aid as being in favour of poverty reduction and 
democratisation. The expatriate-local distinction maintained in pay and conditions 
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maintain a boundary of social exclusion and alienation, which is strongly policed on 
grounds of nationality, which in this context often corresponds to race. On these 
terms and conditions, expatriates are reckoned to be worth around fifty or more 
times as much as national workers to the success of the liberal peace project.  This 
sharp division in entitlements and reward clearly reinforces rather than undermines a 
differentiated understanding of human life in the practices of intervention – what 
Duffield calls the ‘insured’ and ‘uninsured’ populations. Yet these are differences 
which are not necessarily considered legitimate by those deemed ‘uninsured’. 
Indeed they are a cause for resentment amongst those who know themselves – as 
professionals and as humans – to be the equals of those who are instituted as their 
superiors. In line with Césaire’s critique of colonialism, this very obvious kind of 
hypocrisy needs to be articulated as a key part of an anti-colonial critical project. 
 
IV. Public responses to dependency 
 
Reflecting on the changing donor environment, journalist Marcelo Mosse 
has written an open letter to the Chinese President, in which the meaning of 
Mozambique’s financial situation are spelled out: 
 
We are poor but we are not blind, and we like ourselves! Because of this, 
over the years, we have criticized the Western donors for the negative 
aspects that their "cooperation" implied; we criticized the destruction of 
the cashew industry; the re-indebtedness of ‘technical assistance’’; the 
excessively rigorous controls on public spending; the (disastrous) 
imposed privatisations; inappropriate technologies; the so-called "tied 
aid" (which China promotes today); the project implementation units;  
the disempowerment of the state, the inefficient and unending capacity 
building etc… 
 
A lot of money, credit and donations have been spent on these processes. 
We could be better, of course. We're not. However, the country has 
changed its face, we have more schools, hospitals, better 
communications, roads, maturing institutions, etc.. In short, despite the 
negative aspects of such cooperation, there are many visible gains. Yet 
despite this, we remain dependent.604 
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Returning to Césaire’s critique of colonialism, which emphasised the ways in which 
the colonial world materialises for the colonised, in Mosse’s letter we see emergent 
in the experience of the liberal peace an acute sense of both the structural conditions 
of poverty which set the terrain of engagement, as well as the various disjunctures 
between propaganda and practice which produce forms of alienation from the 
system. In particular, the patterns of incentives and remuneration around which the 
system is built appear to encourage the exact opposite of donors’ own discourses of 
sustainable development and social change; instead encouraging waste, 
introspection and capacity removal in the public sector. A central dynamic 
underpinning this is a hierarchy of how people and their labour are valued in terms 
of the central ideas, projects and living conditions between expatriate and national 
workers. 
 
The consciousness of unequal transactionality that underpins the engagement 
of Mozambique with its donors open up the issue of the political significance of the 
liberal peace to a deeper re-examination. In the critical debates thus far, the principal 
framings have focused on the character of Western ideology, engagement with its 
cultural ‘others’, the issue of state sovereignty and the structures of development. 
These centre the political questions around the extent to which intervened societies 
do or do not match up to ‘European’ expectations of politics – specifically whether 
it represents an ideological transformation, the denial of sovereignty, a form of neo-
imperialism or liberal governmentality.  
 
Carlos Castel-Branco observes that this kind of preoccupation has given rise 
to a debate about the ‘ownership’ of development, which he argues could mean one 
of a number of things, from the formulation of policy to the predictability of 
finance. Yet, as he notes, none of the conceptions of ‘ownership’ – or, for our 
purposes, ‘sovereignty’ in the liberal peace debate – sufficiently engage with 
historical realities nor the political economy of multi-dimensional aid 
dependency.
605
 These conditions foreground the myriad relations of long-term debt, 
dispossession and historical inequality that underpin relations between Mozambique 
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and the rest of the world. On this reading, it is not so much that sovereignty is now 
‘re-interpreted’ under neoliberal doctrine – it is perhaps that it was always 
problematic under these extremes of material inequality. These are the limits of the 
political-theory approaches of Richmond and Chandler which try to recapture inter-
personal ‘empathy’ or inter-state ‘sovereignty’ without attention to the material 
grounds of these relations. Yet these grounds are abundantly obvious from the 
perspective of those who operate within them from the less wealthy side of the 
relationship. They are also grounds which critiques need to reflect on seriously in 
terms of thinking about the ethics of the global distributions of wealth. 
 
This is not to suggest a materially deterministic account of the politics of the 
liberal peace. It is to re-assert the usefulness of the material context of engagement 
as a basis for critical understanding, and in particular to highlight the political 
strategies that might be pursued under these conditions. That said, it also asks us to 
re-evaluate the ways in which the wealthy also participate politically and attempt 
to manage the epistemic terrain of engagement, particularly regarding what are 
understood as the ‘appropriate expectations’ of reward and regard for Africans and 
Europeans respectively.  
 
Further, the chapter highlights the precariousness of the ‘ethics’ of the liberal 
peace under conditions of personal enrichment and state capacity evacuation: that is, 
the hypocrisy and counter-productive character of practices. This allows us to take a 
step back from the emptiness of technical policy discussions about governance, as 
well as the debate about ‘Westernisation’, when it is obvious that rules and norms 
may not really apply. This is not to say that discourse is merely cynical – indeed this 
is not at all the case as many interveners are themselves convinced of its value. But 
it suggests that there is an alternative level upon which we can make ethical 
judgements about intervention which are not conditioned by an acceptance of its 
initial set-up or frame of reference.  
 
Taken together these are levels upon which indignation and even anger – 
important dimensions of anti-colonial critique – are part of the appropriate critical 
responses to intervention. To avoid talking about these dysfunctional aspects of 
intervention in favour of cultural difference or the production of liberal subjectivity 
256 
 
is to miss some central critical dynamics of the human experiences of intervention 
as well as its structural dysfunctions – it is perhaps analogous to a discussion of 
colonialism without racism. To reconstruct subjecthood is precisely to bring the 
discussion of intervention towards the experiences of its subjects, and to make it 
legitimate to ask these kinds of questions and raise these kinds of objections.  That 
they have been raised more broadly, and in a variety of times and places including 
in donor-requested and funded project evaluations does not diminish their 
importance from an anti-colonial perspective. Again, analogously, many colonial 
administrators themselves made notes about the various dysfunctions of 
colonialism, including the negative effects of its policies and disciplinary practices. 
In reconstructing the subjecthood of the colonised as a site of political engagement 
however, anti-colonial thought argued that these were forms of violation that should 
be appropriate grounds for critical anger. In reconstructing subjecthood in the 
critiques of contemporary interventions, albeit around issues that have been long-
acknowledged as problems, it is possible to argue that these issues of vastly 
differentiated distributions and entitlements of wealth are legitimate grounds for 
questioning. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Césaire’s framework underpins the importance of identifying and 
articulating hypocrisy in the world system as a means of deconstructing problematic 
forms of authority and order, and reconstructing subjecthood.
606
 In looking at the 
stark contradictions embedded in the liberal peace – for example between health 
service provision and the suppression of public sector wages – critics are able to 
challenge not just its status as a ‘liberal’ or ‘Western’ project but its undeserving 
claim to superior bureaucratic and political functioning. From the perspective of 
economic activity in Mozambique, much of this dysfunctionality seems to be 
facilitated by the personal and institutional conditions of economic and political 
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inequality that shapes the experience of the liberal peace, which naturalises and 
routinizes repetition, overlap, insularity; particular forms of accumulation and auto-
consumption, and the differentiation between types of human worth. The multi-
dimensional and situated approach to critique pursued here exposes these issues 
particularly clearly and articulates them as sites of alienation. 
 
In the next chapter, the question of ‘who consumes’, in a literal sense will be 
posed again to think about the realities of agriculture and food production under the 
liberal peace, where peasant farmers and their representatives have aimed to endorse 
and maintain multiple strategies for protecting the production of foodstuffs, against 
the vicissitudes of agricultural policies of both donors and government. As such, an 
account of the distinctive historical, political and economic relations of the 
peasantry points towards the potential inadequacy of social insurance responses to 
the problems of the liberal peace.  
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Chapter Eight 
Peasant ambivalence and the liberal peace 
 
 
 
 The politics of the belly takes on a different focus when we turn to looking at 
the lives of the peasantry under the liberal peace, for the majority of whom 
consumption qua eating has not been made much easier. For critiques of the liberal 
peace that attach blame to neoliberal economic policy, this is of course to be 
expected as the result of the predatory capitalism it promotes. In particular, this is 
blamed for disrupting the interventions of the developmental state in the Third 
World.
607
 
 
 At the root of these approaches is the insight that the liberal peace is 
systemic in impact and structural in its origins, being closely bound up with the 
smoother functioning of capitalism as a whole. For critical approaches such as those 
of Duffield and Pugh, one of the systemic failures associated with neoliberalism is 
identified as the general failure to provide social insurance, welfare and safety nets 
for the masses of the poor.
608
 Duffield argues that as a result in many cases NGOs 
have been sub-contracted and governmentalized to represent the interests of donors, 
as in northern Mozambique.
609
 In their projects, Duffield argues that these NGOs 
maintain a framing of the African peasantry as being undifferentiated and self-
reliant. By seeming to operate at the level of population, they are thus understood to 
‘render it visible’ for capture by the global market.610 This fits with the idea of the 
liberal peace as a political ‘project’ with particular ends, and driven to meet the 
needs of a broader capitalist system.
611
 For Pugh, the liberal peace also represents 
the attempt to extend and integrate poorer economies into the system of global 
capitalism, underpinned by the neoliberal orthodoxy of the Washington and post-
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Washington consensuses.
612
 He builds on Duffield’s argument that the liberal peace 
is a particular system of trusteeship for containing and regulating the ‘surplus’ 
populations that capitalism produces in order to reproduce itself.
613
 Importantly, 
both argue – Pugh explicitly and Duffield implicitly – that forms of social insurance 
provided by the state are the primary alternative on offer to neoliberalism.   
 
Whilst these approaches are highly insightful, the structural critique of the 
liberal peace as the instrument of neoliberalism nonetheless misses several 
important parts of the picture, which would be important to capture when 
developing an anti-colonial critique.  In the first place, as discussed in Chapter 
Three, the framing tends to exclude, by narrative omission, consideration of those 
‘governed’ as subjects with historical experience, particular social conditions and 
agency. As such it sustains a Eurocentric framing of world politics which, as 
previously argued, is a problematic analytic and ethical platform for anti-imperial 
critical approaches to adopt. Second, it obscures what might emerge from these 
experiences to complement and/or disrupt our understanding of political order under 
the liberal peace.  In the previous chapter, an engagement with the details of the 
political economy of the liberal peace pointed towards a different kind of 
understanding of the politics of intervention – one which appreciated the conscious 
but alienating character of the transactional relationship. 
 
Looking back to the discussion in Chapter Three, whereas Césaire pursued a 
strategy of political inversion to discredit and challenge the grand narratives of 
colonialism, Cabral emphasised the need to look beyond this and towards the 
experiences of society as a whole, in order to grasp the most important aspects of 
the colonial political economy.
614
 This chapter pursues a situated engagement with 
the historical experiences of the peasantry in Mozambique as a means of exploring 
the significance of the liberal peace for living conditions and political engagement 
amongst the majority. As such, this is a way of reconstructing the subjecthood of the 
peasantry within our discussions. The narrative suggests that many of the issues 
relating to the strategies and conditions of the peasantry have a longer tradition than 
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the advent of neoliberal economic policy – to some extent they revolve around more 
basic contestations of political authority and well-being.  The reminder then that the 
liberal peace is a particular mode of governance embedded in longer-standing 
relationships is useful for reflection on its overall significance when reconstructing 
the peasantry as historical and political subjects. Most critically, this problematizes 
the imagination of a more interventionist state as the necessary response to the 
liberal peace given its contested history in Mozambique. As will be discussed 
towards the end of the chapter, peasant representatives have themselves articulated 
alternative visions of political and market relations which are more closely 
connected to their experiences of political being and conditions of production. These 
may constitute a better point of departure for a critical alternative.  
 
In the chapter, much of the primary research and some of the other sources 
on which I draw relate to the northern province of Nampula, which contains a 
sizeable proportion of the country’s rural smallholders, although relevant secondary 
sources relating to other parts of the country are also used. As such, although the 
analysis is broadly relevant to rural experiences within Mozambique, it has been 
impossible to capture the full diversity of this experience, both regionally and in 
terms of socioeconomic differentiation within the peasantry. What follows is still a 
useful illustration of some of the relations between peasants and the state in terms of 
the overall argument, but with an acknowledgement that some of the specific details 
may not resonate everywhere. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of why an 
account of the peasantry has been an important site of debate in the politics of 
intervention. I then go on to explore aspects of the pre- and post-war rural political 
economy and discuss the ways in which these reflect ambivalent relations between 
the state and peasantry, expressed recently in the ‘food sovereignty’ movement. 
Finally, the relevance of this discussion for the critical debate on the liberal peace is 
further elaborated.  
 
 
 
 
261 
 
I. The significance of the peasantry in political debate 
 
The majority of people in Mozambique – around 70-80% – are defined 
academically and administratively as being ‘rural’ populations. Of this population, 
99% are defined as being agricultural ‘smallholders’ in state surveys, meaning they 
own less than ten hectares of land, ten cattle, fifty goats, pigs or sheep, and 5000 
chickens.
615
 Whilst any substantive account of social and political life in 
Mozambique must, surely, somehow account for the fate of the 
camponeses/peasantry, a decolonising account of the same must emphasise the 
distinctive quantitative and qualitative significance of this for our understanding of 
the system as a totality. Quantitatively, the peasantry constitute a majority in 
Mozambique in terms of the overall population and citizenry, and as such their 
significance should not be understood as marginal but fundamental to the societal 
experience of the liberal peace.
616
  
 
In reflecting on the liberal peace in Mozambique in particular, the tense and 
complex history between the modernising state elites over time and the peasantry 
must problematise any nostalgia for a ‘return’ to the statist paradigm as implied in 
critiques of the liberal peace such as those of Duffield and Pugh. Moreover, this 
form of provision has itself often been contradictory in its practices and effects. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, there are important continuities as well as changes in the 
structures of rule from the colonial through to the present period. For the peasantry, 
these have given rise over time to diverse strategies of organisation, production and 
being, some of which involve and implicate the representatives of the liberal peace. 
Indeed, like previous forms of rule, the state in the liberal peace has also shown 
some limited signs of responsiveness (or retrenchment) when faced with the realities 
of trying to actually effect particular kinds of social transformation. Yet, an often 
overlooked feature of the relationship are the tensions associated with its 
interventions into the rural economy, as well as its tendencies to reinforce particular 
distributions of wealth and power, without which the responses and strategies that 
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have emerged cannot be well understood. As will be expanded upon below, these 
are well-documented in the various social histories and ethnographic studies of rural 
populations in Mozambique over the years.
617
  
 
 Before this, it is worth noting that the peasantry in Mozambique are of broad 
and substantial political importance to many parties within the liberal peace debate. 
Mozambique’s major political ‘success’ with the donor community is often 
represented through the ubiquitously-cited statistic showing a fall in absolute 
poverty from 69% to 54% from 1996-7 to 2003-4.
618
 This number became 
emblematic of the potential of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers as a ‘post-
Washington’ policy instrument to a much wider global audience, re-legitimising the 
role of the IFIs, UN organisations and European/North American donors both within 
sub-Saharan Africa and further afield after criticisms had been levelled at the impact 
of development policy.
619
  
 
In addition, recent moves towards providing aid as direct Budget Support to 
the Government and away from project aid have been closely tied to the successful 
implementation of the PRSP, which is summarised by the statistical drop in absolute 
poverty. Furthermore, the statistics on absolute poverty reduction have been an 
increasingly important part of the Government’s own electoral manifesto in recent 
years as its post-independence and post-war popularity has started to wane.
620
 
Constituting the majority of the ‘absolutely poor’, the fate of the peasantry in 
Mozambique is thus intimately tied to the political standing of the post-war aid 
architecture and government ‘performance’ as a whole.  This is not least because 
recent studies have suggested that much of Mozambique’s feted growth and poverty 
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reduction in the post-war period has been revealed to be the result of increased 
consumption and production in rural areas.
621
 
 
On the other hand, the experience of rural populations has also played an 
important role in galvanising and generating much opposition to the liberal peace in 
general and the IFIs in particular. This mainly emerged around the notorious World 
Bank intervention into the cashew processing industry in the late 1990s, which led 
to the losses of thousands of jobs on the basis of a weakly formulated but heavily 
enforced policy of raw cashew export liberalisation.
622
 The episode became a ‘cause 
celebre’ in the campaign against the enforcement of neoliberal ideology on the 
international stage. It also became an important episode in the ongoing national 
debate within Mozambique about economic policy and the role of the IFIs in the 
country as a whole, which had a clear influence on the bilateral and multilateral 
relationships between donors and government.
623
 In these global debates, 
Mozambican peasants have been repeatedly invoked as silent witnesses to the 
strengths and weakness of neoliberal policy. 
 
However, these headlines have not always lent themselves to a wider 
appreciation of how Mozambican peasants over time have seen and managed their 
embedded relationships within the state and the market, and what the implications 
are of this for thinking about the liberal peace. In particular, the various 
contradictions, accommodations and conflicts surrounding the politics of agriculture 
suggest that a more interventionist state is not the only or obvious answer to the 
problems laid at the door of the liberal peace. Below I will suggest that there are 
important historic dynamics of alienation which put into context the ways in which 
the peasantry have responded to the liberal peace, with a mixture of enthusiasm, 
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ambivalence and instrumentalisation, as well as with alternative possible responses 
to the problems of risk and reward. 
 
II. Who eats? Historical relations between peasants and the state 
 
The complex and tense relations between rural people and the colonial state 
are well explored in Isaacman’s detailed social history of cotton production.624  In 
colonial times, the regime forced large numbers of peasants – officially 750,000, but 
likely involving more
625
 – to cultivate quotas of cotton for the large concessionary 
companies to feed the Portuguese textiles industry. This regime was policed by 
colonial officials, company officials and native policemen (sipais), as well as senior 
members of various communities wishing to avoid punishment. Although all forms 
of colonial labour relations encountered some degree of resistance, cotton 
production was particularly unpopular with much the peasantry for a number of 
reasons. In the first place, it was a non-edible monocrop, meaning that land could 
not be simultaneously used for food or other crop production. Secondly, it was 
deeply labour intensive, requiring around 140-180 days per year per hectare.
626
 
Sowing and harvesting periods often clashed with food production cycles, leading to 
widespread famine and food insecurity in many regions.
627
 In order to deal with this, 
many began to switch their food sources to manioc (cassava), which required less 
tending but was less nutritious. Eventually, some colonial officials required peasants 
to grow manioc in order to allow them to survive long enough to grow cotton.
628
 
Other forms of wage labour were also disrupted. Beyond these particular issues, 
more general problems prevailed: prices to African producers were persistently 
depressed at the market compared to settler producers
629
 and the land on which it 
was to be grown was often far from homes and food-growing plots.
630
 Nonetheless, 
in many cases further economic differentiation occurred as a result of the colonial 
structures of labour and exchange, and as such a small minority of farmers who had 
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escaped forced labour and accumulated capital abroad were able to run relatively 
successful cotton and other enterprises on their return.
631
 Yet, for the majority, 
argues Isaacman, cotton was “the mother of poverty”.632 
 
Despite the pressing needs of the metropolitan economy, and the attempts to 
police the production of cotton closely with law readily backed up by physical force 
in both fields and markets, many peasants sought and found strategies of evading 
the forced production of cotton at all its stages. These included simulating poor soils 
by roasting the cotton seeds so they would not grow, delaying planting and sowing 
to reduce yield, refusing to sow, throwing the crop away once harvested, selling it 
over the border for higher prices, adding foreign objects to the marketed bags, 
temporarily hiding, migrating out of the country and so on.
633
 This risky sabotage 
was often carried out collectively and collaboratively amongst communities, 
constituting deliberate strategies of subversion. Isaacman argues that it is likely that 
these acts of defiance were an important factor in bringing down the forced cotton 
regime in 1961.
634
 These were acts which from the perspectives of the peasants were 
ways both of minimising the disruption that cotton growing caused to personal 
survival and social life, and of more broadly disrupting and rejecting the role of the 
Portuguese and their representatives in their lives. However, there is no way of 
accurately measuring or estimating the extent of such resistance as much would 
have gone unreported. Nonetheless, he argues that the marked difference in 
productivity levels between cotton production in Mozambique and elsewhere in the 
region may be an indication of this.
635
 
 
Isaacman’s fascinating study, drawn from a range of non-elite life histories 
and colonial documents, is particularly important in terms of developing an 
understanding of the experience of governance of rural populations through the 
agricultural economy. The core tension in the political economy, between producing 
crops for food or producing non-food surpluses for exchange is an important theme. 
Cotton’s disruption of the food supply was a major cause of peasant resistance. Yet 
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also important is the discussion of peasants’ consciousness of the nature of their 
exploitation, made explicit through subversive songs sung in front of colonial agents 
who could not understand them.
636
 Within these songs are shared accounts of the 
effect of cotton growing on one’s life, including the loneliness brought on by cotton-
related desertion or the migration of a spouse for wage labour.
637
  
 
The analysis of peasant strategies and agency is especially revealing. In 
particular, the narrative emphasises the fact that many of these strategies of coping 
and subversion were made possible through the sheer absence, lack of knowledge 
and under-resourcing of the colonial administration in the vast countryside, even 
with a system of more knowledgeable sipais and some authoritative régulos 
undertaking the actual work of enforcement.  As such, even forced labour relations 
and political structures were necessarily embedded in and constrained by the 
physical terrain of the environment and its sparse infrastructure, which to a certain 
extent limited the ability of central structures to project their authority and will. This 
was simultaneously a political and a practical problem for the state brought on by 
distance and ‘illegibility’, as well as the creative agency of the peasantry. This 
distance was well understood by both the peasantry and by the state, who had 
increasingly sought to bring rural figures of authority onto the payroll.
638
  
 
The attempts of the Frelimo state to govern and produce in the countryside in 
the post-independence period (1975-) suggested that they had both learned and not 
learned from the colonial experience. As mentioned in Chapter Five, in the later 
years of the colonial regime, officials had attempted to villagise the rural 
populations in order to frustrate the pro-independence guerrillas and govern the 
recalcitrant peasants more closely – a tactic also used by the colonial government 
during the war for independence.
639
 Frelimo’s mass programmes of post-
independence villagisation suggested that they had also understood the need to 
render the peasantry governable in order to make it produce the surpluses necessary 
to gain foreign exchange, as well as to ‘modernise’ living conditions through 
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providing local health and education facilities.
640
 This need for control and visibility 
was of course heightened by the war and fear of peasant infiltration by Renamo 
rebels. However, it also played into the grand visions discussed in Chapter Five of 
the ‘New Man’ projected by Frelimo as the model citizen – literate, productive, 
healthy, and unencumbered by backward superstition and sorcery.
641
 Producer and 
consumer co-operatives were also widely encouraged and established in order to 
collectivise production.
642
 This was matched by a hierarchical and ‘gigantist’643 
approach to agricultural planning which operated through the setting of ambitious 
mass production targets for designated products to be produced on collective farms 
as cash crops. This most often (but not always) required forced resettlement of the 
peasantry on land selected by administrative convenience and that was less valuable 
to the state, often severing the links between people and ancestral land, as well as 
patterns of food production and social order. This was highly disruptive to the 
régulos in particular as they were vilified and de-recognised in the first waves of 
collectivisation for being colonial collaborators.  
 
Yet, the state was, ultimately, simply unable to impose its large political and 
economic programme onto the peasantry in a coherent and consistent way, despite 
having won considerable support for the campaign against the colonial regime, and 
despite a number of ‘successes’ in the modernisation programme. Whilst 
understandably there are some controversies about the extent, causes and character 
of peasant alienation and resistance to collectivisation in this period, there is 
nonetheless consensus that it was relatively widespread across different regions and 
amongst different groups, and resulted in the broad undermining of the popularity 
and legitimacy of the Frelimo government in rural areas.
644
 This was not least 
because in many cases, the ‘socialist’ modes and directives of production were 
sometimes not particularly different to the colonial ones: peasants were also forced 
to move to strategic villages, produce particular crops and sell them at fixed low 
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prices, yet needed to produce their own food for which there was little support. 
Machel himself ordered the production of cotton and cashew as a state duty.
645
 
Perhaps ironically, given the various critiques of colonialism, this was undertaken 
against the discursive backdrop of an assumed homogenous subsistent peasantry, 
whose prior production relations were themselves de-historicised. The collapse in 
food production that resulted from these policies, along with war and drought, has 
led to this time being popularly remembered as o tempo de fome (the time of 
hunger).
646
 
 
Cahen’s reading of the relationship between the state and the peasantry after 
independence perhaps emphasises this alienation the most, noting that in many cases 
peasants quietly neglected or deserted collective villages and state farms in order to 
tend their own fields and sell to the rapidly expanding black market.
647
 This was 
often simply in order to avoid starvation in the face of a lack of food on collective 
farms. Beyond the longer established traditions of migrating out of the reach of the 
government, such as into Malawi or more often South Africa, Hermele further notes 
that in cases in Gaza workers would themselves destroy the government’s costly 
imported equipment as an act of resistance to forms of production for which no 
benefit could be realised.
648
 This was an expression of resentment and 
disappointment, particularly by the middle peasantry who were asked to give up 
animals and tools for the purposes of collective production, which totally negated 
the meaning of independence for them.
649
 The collapse of the government’s grand 
visions for collective production was thus not simply the result of poor planning, 
mismanagement and lack of technical skills and Renamo disruption, as is often 
suggested,
650
 but also included the active alienation of the peasantry from the new 
structures of production and their maintenance of alternative sources of sustenance 
where possible.  
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Under this pressure, the state began to devolve more autonomy to collective 
enterprises and private farmers from the early 1980s onwards.
651
 It also began to 
involve European donors and agencies more extensively in this period, beginning 
with short-lived intervention projects sponsored by the Nordic donors to support co-
operatives at the provincial level.
652
 Where this supported projects in realising 
tangible goods for rural populations, this improved their general viability. For 
example, Bowen’s study of co-operatives on Ilha Josina Machel argues that the 
peasantry engaged with them in the main as a means of accessing equipment, 
consumer goods and other subsidies which were not available to them otherwise.
653
 
However, this co-operation and legitimacy was fragile, and ebbed away once 
benefits were less forthcoming. Moreover, this equipment was often forthcoming 
from wealthier peasants via the state rather than the state itself. Although it may be 
dangerous to generalise overly on this point, studies suggest that the complex 
relationship between the state and peasantry was often closely related to the extent 
to which the structures of governance could be responsive to the demands of the 
peasantry, and in particular the extent to which they helped meet, or at least did not 
overly hinder meeting, family production needs.
654
 Cahen argues strongly on this 
point that the peasantry was not reactionary and conservative for the sake of it – it 
might be added that neither was it a particularly revolutionary force; rather it did not 
follow policies and processes which were actively inimical to the diversity of its 
sources of income and survival.
655
 In this sense, the wartime sabotage tactics of 
Renamo were not mindless but deliberately targeted the ability of the state to win 
the loyalty of the peasantry via the delivery of material gains, social goods and 
improved consumption.
656
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III. The peasantry and the liberal peace: post-war relations 
 
In the wake of the war and the peace accords after 1992, and the ongoing 
emergence of the ‘liberal peace’, the social relations between the state and the 
peasantry show elements of both continuity and change with the past, although the 
continuities are often under-emphasised by some critics of neoliberalism. 
Importantly, there are similarities in experience, including dynamics of peasant 
negotiation, engagement and alienation in evidence with later interventions. Taken 
together these points indicate the inadequacy of a statist conception of social 
insurance for the majority in the particular historical conditions of Mozambique. 
Finally, the particular dynamics of rising food and fuel prices have crucially 
accelerated points of antagonism between state strategies and the general 
population, expressed through the rise in peasant farmer demands for ‘food 
sovereignty’ and urban riots. 
 
The major ostensible shift in agricultural policy in this period was towards 
encouraging smallholder production and participation in the market, involving, as 
Duffield notes, many interventions by NGOs working directly at the level of the 
population for the first time.
657
 This involved a wide range of programmes, 
including agricultural extension, the promotion of irrigation and roads, health and 
education and so on. At the same time, there were policy commitments by the 
government to the general privatisation of state farms, a number of which became 
joint ventures between former colonial companies and the state, and others which 
became more or less entirely private.  State subsidies to the agricultural sector were 
increasingly restricted overall in agreements with the international financial 
institutions, and it was anticipated that motivated by market prices, smallholder 
producers would improve their incomes.  
 
Yet, as Pitcher strongly argues, the narrative of the break between the 
socialist and post-socialist periods in the recent political history of Mozambique has 
often been overdrawn.
658
 In particular, she notes that the socialist period was itself 
characterised by shifting and contradictory policies, with many of the trends in 
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privatisation and liberalisation already underway in the early and mid-1980s as 
noted in Chapter Five. These moves were not simply under the direct pressure of the 
IFIs but reflected decisions made by the Frelimo leadership who were beginning to 
respond to the production crises of the early 1980s. Furthermore, she argues, this 
mix of strategies has been continued into the neoliberal period. The significant 
difference is that more of the large enterprises are now in the possession of a narrow 
group of Frelimo-connected elites partnered with international companies and 
domestic investors than owned by colonial companies or the state.
659
 In this, she 
argues that state power is better understood as having been reconstituted and re-
configured rather than simply eroded in the post-war period.
660
 Certainly the state 
has not completely liberalised agricultural commodity prices either, and in recent 
years more minimum prices for crops have become a more frequent feature of the 
market.
661
  
 
I suggest that we can extend Pitcher’s interpretations of state policy to 
thinking about the situation of the peasantry in the post-war period, particularly in 
the light of the tensions discussed in the earlier periods. From the point of view of 
the living conditions and survival strategies in rural areas, it was not the different 
directions in policy and emphasis but the end of the war itself that had the biggest 
impact on peasant livelihoods. The war had forced many to migrate to cities and 
towns for protection from the violence, leaving fields untended and often 
landmined. Although some attempted to maintain connections with land and tend it 
for an hour or two in the daytime, this was highly risky. Given that state services 
and employees in rural areas had been targets during the war, in many areas of 
heavy violence these became virtually, but not totally, absent.  
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Yet the simple fact of being able to plant and harvest again without the 
immediate threat of violence was enough to bring back people in large numbers who 
had fled to the cities, in mostly spontaneous and self-organised forms of rural 
repatriation.
662
 Hanlon argues that the growth in rural income seen after the end of 
the war can largely be attributed to the re-opening up of fallow land and increases in 
volumes of commercialisation, although not necessarily because of productivity 
increases brought about by developmental interventions.
663
 A widescale quantitative 
study by the Ministry of Agriculture, supported by Michigan State University, based 
on national surveys from 1995-6 and 2001-2 supports this conclusion that 
productivity has not shown significant changes during the post-war era.  It further 
argues that much of the apparent income growth has come about through a growth 
in real prices for staple foods including maize. This is problematic for the majority 
of peasants who are net buyers rather than producers of staple foods, indicating a net 
loss in welfare and a rise in inequality.
664
 Later studies about the character of rural 
poverty reduction have thrown into question the appropriateness of the ‘success 
statistic’ cited between the two Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, noting that the 
consumption metrics are based on a less nutritious basket of goods because the 
poorest had switched away from maize consumption towards cassava.
665
 
 
The broad lack of change in ‘productivity’, defined as crop yield per 
acreage, is a particularly important one in terms of reading the liberal peace and the 
responses of the peasantry.  In the previous section, we also noted that Isaacman 
read low peasant productivity in the cotton industry as part of a strategy of 
resistance to colonial state targets. Given the stated strategies of the state and donor 
agencies over the last twenty years to promote smallholder agriculture, and the 
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myriad project-based interventions that have taken place in Mozambique, one might 
have expected productivity to increase over this period of time in general. This is, 
after all, the added-value of external ‘expertise’ in the agricultural sector – the 
knowledge of how to fertilise, sow, tend and harvest in such a way and with such 
equipment as to render higher yields. Since independence, this has been the task for 
the Ministry of Agriculture’s extensionists and technicians, as well as numerous 
interventions sponsored by a wide range of donor agencies. Yet the uptake of more 
efficient technologies and techniques has remained absolutely and proportionately 
low across Mozambique.
666
 The result is that despite the numerous interventions 
into the agricultural sector, for many, techniques of crop production have not 
changed very much over decades. Rather, the principal modes of improving 
earnings are through use of wage labour markets, either in South Africa as is 
common in southern provinces, or in the informal sectors in Mozambique.
667
  
 
Using surveys of northern Mozambique, Bozzoli and Brück have argued that 
this is because household consumption (as opposed to income) is not significantly 
affected by participation in the market in the way that subsistence farming is, and as 
such the peasant requirements for increased productivity are not particularly high. 
In fact, farming more productively for the market is a decidedly riskier strategy, 
with some cash crops such as cotton having an overall negative impact on household 
welfare.
668
 This corresponded with farmers’ own accounts of their market situation: 
 
This year, we tried to do cotton – we were being told by everyone that 
this is ‘white gold’, so we all were making, planting, harvesting… but 
for this ‘white gold’, we were getting 6MT per kilo! We couldn’t buy 
anything.
669
  
 
The basic insecurity of the market is one that the peasantry in Mozambique have 
chosen to negotiate in a number of different ways, including working with ‘partner’ 
NGOs to form savings and credit associations. In Nampula province, this has been 
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supported for a few groups with a more substantial collectivisation of marketing 
through Ikuru, a fair trade co-operative for cashew and peanuts subsidised by a 
number of US-sponsored NGOs.
670
 The ability to consistently pay a fixed higher 
price for crops has made it popular amongst producers, although technicians have 
their own doubts about its sustainability, noting that co-operatives under socialism 
faced many of these problems.
671
 Yet this is a minority strategy amongst those that 
have managed to collect the resources to build their own infrastructure for safely 
keeping money
672
 – the vast majority of those in Nampula and elsewhere in 
Mozambique have not formed associations.
673
 
 
Part of the risk involved with investment in such strategies is because the 
different parties working in agriculture over the last two decades have been pursuing 
distinct and contradictory strategies simultaneously. For example, a recent 
European-funded multi-year project in the district of Búzi sought to promote the 
growth and sale of sesame as a cash crop, with interventions along the entire supply 
chain from growing to marketing. In the short term, incomes increased, the price of 
sesame was rising and farmers were able to collectively purchase and save, although 
productivity slowed once pests arrived. However, a short time after the project 
ended, for standard bureaucratic reasons, the state allowed a colonial-era sugar 
company to re-assert control over land in the district that it had abandoned three 
decades earlier. Farmers were forced to either grow sugar for the company at fixed 
prices or give up the land. As the land had to be used for sugar growing, women and 
children were often displaced to other, distant land in order to produce food for 
themselves. This had led to considerable despair and disgruntlement amongst the 
community, who felt let down and disempowered.
674
 These dynamics are not 
entirely dissimilar to the contradictions experienced under the socialist government 
of the 1980s – although importantly without the elements of openly violent 
compulsion. The economic imperative to produce to external demands at the 
expense of one’s well-being is however comparable. For others, whereas the 
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colonial or postcolonial state used to depress prices for export crops, now it was the 
result of  monopsony power of traders in collusion with the state.
675
 
 
Reading between the lines, it is in the contribution to immediate income 
where NGO interventions at the level of the population may have their most 
important, albeit inadvertent, impact in rural populations under the liberal peace: as 
a source of irregular wage income, either through direct employment of people, 
distribution of goods or through the per diem system of benefits for participation in 
various programmes. It was a frequent complaint in the research amongst the NGOs 
themselves that it was impossible to run programmes anywhere without offering a 
per diem to participants,
 676
 or that populations were easily swayed by the offers of t-
shirts and caps. NGOs tended to interpret the insistence upon the per diem as a sign 
of cynical engagement by populations, some explicitly arguing that it was 
systematic: “Now the foundation of the country is the per diem”.677  
 
However, an alternative way of understanding this trend is as a kind of 
commentary on the perceived value of development projects to participants – more 
specifically, that at least for some people their primary value is as a source of 
income, with the long-term objectives of the project itself as being of less 
importance. Indeed, one project employee in a sparsely populated district in 
Nampula province, when asked what he thought of the project he was working on, 
responded quite openly and simply, “Well, it’s my job”, venturing nothing more, 
and indicating that there was nothing more to be said.
678
 The realisation of concrete 
benefits in the actual conduct of the project clearly became a key incentive for 
participation. This resonates with recent findings in a CMI study elsewhere in the 
province, where people on low incomes claimed that their horizons were necessarily 
short-termist when it came to economic issues.
679
 Participating in development 
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projects also incurred costs of time, labour and transport, and as such was often not 
open to the poorest.
680
  
 
Yet, peasants have been able to modify, instrumentalise or creatively re-use 
intervention projects to further ends of risk spreading and income generation. In 
particular, projects initially designed to promote non-edible cash crops have been 
asked and agreed to promote vegetables and horticulture, in order to diversify food 
sources and have something useful if it is unsold.
681
 In this sense, peasants have 
been able to demand modified terms of engagement with the market. Perhaps more 
laterally, insecticide-treated malaria nets – distributed with great cost, training and 
expertise – are now regularly used for fishing in communities on the coast.682 For 
project designers, these immediate and instrumental uses directly counteract the 
‘developmental’ purposes for which they are intended. On the other hand, for the 
peasantry this feeds into a logic of managing needs, well-being and risk according to 
what is present and available, in the knowledge that external attempts to meet these 
are historically fragile and extraverted. 
 
IV.  Alternative responses to neoliberalism? 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, many existing critiques of the 
liberal peace, including those of Duffield and Pugh, have suggested that social 
insurance supplied by the state constitutes the major alternative to neoliberal 
exposure to the global market. However, as this chapter has shown, interventions by 
the state in the rural economy have often exacerbated the instability and insecurity 
faced by peasant producers. In this section, we will look at the alternatives 
suggested by peasant representatives and discuss the significance of these issues for 
critiques of the liberal peace.    
 
Looking at the historical relations between the state and the peasantry, we 
might say that these strategies of survival and disengagement with the ends of 
‘development’ on the part of the peasantry are vindicated by the experiences of 
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being courted and ruled in contradictory and sometimes damaging ways by wielders 
of official authority. In the light of the frequent historical tendencies of planners to 
focus on generating long-term surpluses to feed into global markets, with little 
respect or comprehension for more immediate needs for food supplies, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that peasants in Mozambique have not enthusiastically embraced 
strategies of economic extraversion via higher productivity. Whilst the liberal peace, 
through the endorsement of various forms of economic liberalisation, has 
contributed to reinforcing and modifying these dynamics, it is important to stipulate 
that they have long characterised the contested relationship between the peasantry 
and forms of central authority in Mozambique. Throughout this period, it has been 
the access to land which represents the primary form of social insurance for the 
majority in Mozambique,
683
 and for many Frelimo supporters represented a primary 
gain of political independence from the Portuguese. The government, recognising 
this, have consistently blocked any attempt to privatise land by the donors, which is 
a central symbolic political link to the peasantry.
684
 In substantive terms, this means 
that the availability of land essentially acts as a buffer against the risks of 
marketization strategies as well as the fallout from land re-appropriation by the 
state.  
 
The ‘food sovereignty’ campaign endorsed by the National Union of Peasant 
Farmers (UNAC) in Mozambique articulates more clearly the connections between 
the central endorsement of particular production strategies in agriculture and the 
exclusion of the peasantry from their formulation. In particular, UNAC and other 
coalition partners attack politically fashionable plans such as the Green Revolution 
for Africa, publicly endorsed by the President as a means of ensuring ‘food 
security’, for the failure to engage with the existing modes of production and needs 
of peasant farmers. They argue that these would be better served by a more 
supportive market for locally produced goods rather than imports, and more 
attention to land access.
685
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Within this ‘food sovereignty’ campaign is an alternative articulation of how 
Mozambique should engage with the world, and how the state should engage with 
the peasantry. In short, they call for a substantial re-orientation of Mozambique’s 
development strategies around consumer and producer meetings, community co-
ordination and non-intensive agriculture as ways of connecting peasant autonomy 
with economic survival.
686
 As UNAC argue, rising food prices in particular have 
contributed not just to rural poverty but broader patterns of alienation in 
Mozambique’s cities. In particular, a reliance on wheat imports has rendered urban 
populations susceptible to world food price and currency fluctuations, contributing, 
along with fuel prices, to increased social unrest and rioting in recent years.
687
 It is 
perhaps therefore not a little ironic that some of the money that funds development 
interventions in Mozambique derives directly from the sale of US wheat surpluses 
into this market.
688
 
 
Although the food sovereignty movement is currently politically marginal in 
Mozambique, it is interesting as a way of reframing the problems of the 
contemporary economic system through lenses which speak to the economic 
strategies and needs of the majority. As noted in CMI’s studies of rural poverty, 
these strategies very rarely depend on the state or NGOs for income or social 
insurance.
689
 Although the food sovereignty movement does not rule out a role for 
state intervention, the vision of the state is not one based on historic European 
models of social welfare but rather more decentralised in a way which would reflect 
extant modes of social organisation. This system is not envisaged as being 
dependent on maximising productivity and surpluses, or on providing guaranteed 
safety nets but on more fundamentally reconfiguring the relations between people, 
the state and the market. This constitutes a different critical alternative to those 
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articulated in the critiques of the liberal peace, and one which is more specifically 
connected to peasant ways of living. 
 
However, the recently-released PARPA III (2011-2014), the third Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper released by the government to continue the flow of donor 
funds, re-affirms the state’s historic preoccupation with improving peasant 
productivity as its main economic priority.
690
 This seemingly wilful refusal to 
engage with and comprehend both the extensive research and the political messages 
about the well-being and aspirations of the majority poorer peasantry may be seen as 
connected with the social and political disengagement of the state (and of many 
donors) from the substance of personal and communal well-being, in favour of 
deferred promises of development and improvement. Returning to Cabral’s 
emphasis on the need to approach social change from an embedded and situated 
understanding of the nature of the problems facing the majority, this strategy of 
occlusion, disengagement and deferral on the part of the state and other agents of 
‘development’ is particularly worrying.  
 
V. Discussion 
 
In his critiques, Cabral’s emphasis on the tangible and concrete effects of 
dispossession, and the specific and distinctive conditions of the African peasantry 
was a useful way of articulating a more democratic and more specific critical 
project. In pursuing this framework with regards to the liberal peace in 
Mozambique, this chapter has aimed to articulate better the conditions of the 
majority, and as such to think about the problems of liberal intervention from a more 
historical, political economy perspective. In this section, I will further elaborate on 
what such a perspective contributes to an anti-colonial critique of the liberal peace, 
and how this departs in content and perspective from existing accounts of the 
political economy. 
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Duffield’s incisive analysis of the interveners’ conception of the 
Mozambican peasantry in Zambezia is compelling. In particular, he argues that in 
terms of the gaze of interveners, the peasantry were widely understood and 
represented as undifferentiated, culturally and historical dislocated bare life – and as 
such ideally prepared for developmental trusteeship.
691
 The cleansing fire of war 
created the blank slate upon which interveners could write and experiment upon. 
However, he simultaneously argues that this is supported by an image of the 
population as ‘self-reliant’, thus excusing government and interveners from the need 
to provide social security.
692
 He seems to take exception to the view of the peasantry 
as ‘self-reliant’, criticising interveners for not challenging the feasibility of this 
paradigm.  
 
In the terms of the critique I am developing here, I have much sympathy 
with Duffield’s reading, and would broadly agree that from the perspective of 
interveners, greater ignorance about the communities in which they aim to intervene 
certainly facilitates intervention and lowers levels of responsibility for failure. 
However, through the historical engagement with peasant survival strategies and 
political projects detailed above, it would seem that ‘self-reliance’ has been an 
important part of peasant reality for a long time, and in particular in managing the 
vicissitudes of the market and the state under conditions of instability and 
unevenness. Whilst there is certainly scope to argue about whether this should have 
been the case or whether people would have had preferences for different relations 
with the state, it is similarly difficult to dismiss this aspect of life. Duffield argues 
that the ‘natural economy’ model has replaced the ‘political economy’ model of 
liberation, and as such has de-politicised North-South relations.
693
 Whilst there is 
much truth to this, I would also note that such a model also regarded the peasantry 
as ‘backward’ and caused much hardship in the attempt to forcibly integrate it into 
more ‘advanced’ modes of production. By contrast, in the ‘food sovereignty’ 
movement, we see an attempt to preserve some of the autonomy that has been 
developed within peasant life rather than develop a more comprehensive system of 
social security and market integration.  
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Importantly, unless the analytic gaze deliberately attempts to reconstruct the 
subjecthood of the majority – in this case the peasantry – through an even partial 
engagement with their specific historical experiences and political protests, we are 
stuck in the critical paradigm whereby European experiences of social democracy 
serve as the appropriate benchmark for thinking about the failings of intervention. 
Whilst this can tell us many important and useful things about the ways in which 
intervention operates, it does not articulate or engage with alternative visions of 
well-being which might resonate more deeply with the particular situation. As noted 
in the Introduction, the critical perspective developed in this thesis aims to be more 
inclusive through beginning with such experiences and perspectives.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The ambiguous legacy of the developmental state in Mozambique as a 
guarantor of well-being for the majority poses genuinely difficult questions for 
critiques of the liberal peace, which have overwhelmingly pointed the finger at 
Bretton Woods-endorsed neoliberalism as the primary cause of poverty and 
hardship in post-war environments. On the one hand, the argument that economic 
liberalisation has exposed poorer countries to particular forms of economic risk and 
insecurity is certainly an important one and not to be dismissed or denied.  
However, the longer-term situation of the Mozambican peasantry suggests that at 
least some of the problematic relations which inhibit survival and well-being relate 
to unresolved tensions of the legacies of modern colonialism – most obviously the 
extraverted character of the economy and the dynamics of dispossession that these 
continue to entail. However, they also include the legacies of the political mindset of 
authorities which seek to simultaneously ‘improve’ and control populations 
according to templates derived from a particular image of the world. As this chapter 
has endeavoured to show, these conceptions of production and political being are 
not necessarily shared by the majority who live under them. Furthermore, the 
proposed remedies in line with a more interventionist social security state do not 
necessarily reflect the aspirations or living conditions of the peasantry. 
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In the previous chapter it was argued that in reflecting on the realities of the 
liberal peace, we could not ignore the inequalities of wealth and consumption which 
underpinned relations of dependency and produced various forms of alienation 
amongst those within the system. In looking at the conditions of the peasantry, we 
might say that complex dimensions of economic inequality and structures of 
production also interact with political problems of distant authority and different 
priorities. These are historically embedded in relations that cannot be reduced to the 
effect of a particular neoliberal ideology of state but are in some sense more long-
standing problems of rule. Clearly, these shorthands cannot capture the complexities 
of social and political relations that need to be understood in a more representative 
account of the liberal peace. Yet, they provoke greater reflection on the relationship 
between democracy, autonomy, production and consumption, and specifically the 
possible drivers of alienation in these circumstances. For anti-colonial approaches to 
analysis, these reflections are indispensable. In the concluding chapter, we will 
explore further how the reconstruction of subjecthood in this thesis has contributed 
to developing an anti-colonial mode of critical thought, and what this means for our 
understanding of liberal peace interventions and the study of world politics more 
broadly.  
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Conclusions: From alien to alienating forms of rule 
 
 
 
Brother from the West - 
(How can we explain that you are our brother?) 
the world does not end at the threshold of your house 
nor at the stream which marks the border of your country 
nor in the sea 
in whose vastness you sometimes think 
that you have discovered the meaning of the infinite. 
Beyond your threshold, beyond the sea 
the great struggle continues. 
Men with warm eyes and hands as hard as the earth 
at night embrace their children 
and depart before the dawn. 
Many will not return. 
What does it matter? 
We are men tired of shackles. For us 
freedom is worth more than life. 
 
From you, brother, we expect 
and to you we offer 
not the hand of charity 
which misleads and humiliates 
but the hand of comradeship 
committed, conscious, 
How can you refuse, brother from the West?
694
 
 
 
Poetry was an important weapon of the African anti-colonial movements. 
Largely lacking the material firepower and wealth of their colonial counterparts, the 
political movement for change courted and cultivated international political 
consciousness on the issue, understanding that its objectives would need to be 
achieved through a widespread change in mentality towards colonialism and the 
colonised. This desired change in mentality was not however only instrumental; it 
was constitutive of the aspiration for a new kind of post-colonial world order based 
on a sense of equality of human regard. This poem, from Frelimo’s pre-
independence canon, captures these aspirations neatly, yet simultaneously contains 
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within it a set of rebukes to some of its would-be allies. Indeed, it is impossible not 
to detect a sense of frustration, despondency and exasperation in its tone. 
 
Its first two lines affirm both the unity and differentiation of human 
existence, and yet carefully note that a consciousness of this unity may be lacking, 
inhibiting the realisation of deeper relations (“(How can we explain that you are our 
brother?)”). The interpellation of the reader as a ‘Brother’ pointedly undermines the 
assumption of Otherness that underpinned divisive colonial thought. Its next lines 
attack the closure and exclusion within the mental horizons of the imagined Brother 
from the West, who sees only Europe’s own borders, or else the infinity of abstract 
thinking. He does not see the real live political tumult taking place further off, 
which is suggestively connected to a broader battle for human freedom (“the great 
struggle”) in which he is no doubt implicated.  This is a rebuke to his blinkered 
vision that excludes the significance of the world beyond his shores; indeed there is 
a suggestion that this is a sting at his intellectual narcissism (“beyond the sea // in 
whose vastness you sometimes think // that you have discovered the meaning of the 
infinite”).  
 
The poem asks the Brother to see and to relate to this world beyond the sea, 
which is populated by people he would recognise as fellow humans – men with 
‘warm eyes’ and children – who take themselves off to fight out of weariness and 
desperation, with the probable result of death.
695
 The Brother is not asked to fix the 
problem, or to come and fight in the struggle, nor for a charitable gaze. Rather, the 
poem asks the Brother for something less tangible – a relationship of mutual 
reciprocity which is ‘committed’ and ‘conscious’.  The elements of reciprocity and 
mutuality are important – they demand and expect an equality of regard rather than 
the gaze of condescension.  Yet the last line ambiguously suggests this solicitation 
may yet be futile – the question ‘how can you refuse?’ being not necessarily 
optimistic and forward-looking, but perhaps reflecting disappointment or disillusion 
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at the likely limits of solidarity. The poem nicely captures the tendency for ‘refusal’ 
in contemporary modes of critical thinking that have often ignored the subjecthood 
and humanity of those otherwise understood as disempowered in world politics.  
 
* 
 
The central goal of this thesis has been to contribute to and take forward the 
project of decolonising critical thought in IR, via a detailed engagement with the 
liberal peace debate, answering the question set in the Introduction, ‘what can an 
anti-colonial perspective contribute to critiques of the liberal peace?’ In this 
concluding discussion, I will re-state and discuss the ways in which the perspective 
developed disrupts and re-draws the fault-lines for critiques of intervention, and 
impels a different kind of ethical engagement.  
 
It is first important to remind ourselves how and why the liberal peace 
debate, both the technical and the critical, has been so important both in world-
political terms and in the disciplinary conversations of International Relations and 
the wider academy. As Chapter One argued, the ascendance of the ‘liberal peace’ 
reflected a particular epoch in recent history where a broad coalition of warmakers 
and peacemakers from North America, Europe and other regions were able to 
collectively envision and go about the world promoting particular models of peace, 
development and security that were highly interlinked and mutually supportive.  
Politically, it was enabled through a unique kind of consensus between left and right 
politics in the North about doing what was both right and necessary for the Third 
World, which was, providentially, also right and necessary for the First World. Thus 
was the liberal peace consolidated as a framework for intervention with a set of 
common discursive cornerstones, through the merging of development and 
security.
696
 
 
One side of the academic debate on the liberal peace followed one of the 
supposed ‘founding aims’ of IR as an academic discipline in the British and 
American academies – namely, the question of war and how to avoid it. Yet the 
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other debates – at least some realist and critical strands – moved in the other 
tradition of thinking about power and how it was exercised. These strands were fully 
conscious that the practices of liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding reflected a 
complex instantiation of world political power, in which the hegemonic West had 
sought to institutionalise particular ideological norms in ostensibly global and 
universal frameworks. If the technical debate was concerned with the promotion of 
‘peace’, then, the critical debate was concerned with the conduct of its ‘politics’.  
 
Yet, as Robert Vitalis and others have convincingly argued, these were not 
the only founding traditions of the discipline of International Relations. Although 
the history has been ‘gracefully’ disappeared from the textbooks, IR and other 
modern social sciences such as anthropology were founded as colonial disciplines, 
intended to help civilised nations understand how they were to rule over less 
civilised ones.
697
 Thus some important re-labelling was done across the study of 
world politics as colonialism became increasingly de-legitimised early in the 
twentieth century – realism edged away from social Darwinism,698 the Journal of 
Race Development became Foreign Affairs, and Colonial Administration was 
dropped as a branch of political science as defined by APSA.
699
 Yet its legacies 
have perhaps not all been overturned. 
 
As Hobson nearly pointed out,
700
 critical theory has in general failed to 
grapple with the Eurocentric origins of the discipline. Thus, in the development of 
its framings, it continued to operate under imaginaries which underscored Western 
historical and ideological exceptionalism as well as Western agency, even if it was 
vocally critical of the politics to which imperial practices gave rise. In Shilliam’s 
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phrase, a form of ‘institutional narcissism’ has remained in the academy.701 In 
Chapter Two, I argued that in some cases this had left critical responses to the 
liberal peace trapped within very Eurocentric horizons. In these critiques, the 
‘liberal peace’ project is to be condemned for being imposed, imperious, culturally 
insensitive or hypocritical, yet the more supposedly emancipatory alternatives to the 
liberal peace seem either to reinforce a West/Other divide (Richmond), imply a 
‘return’ to sovereignty-as-self-determination (Chandler), the honouring of a liberal 
social contract (Pugh) or a system of state-provided social insurance (Duffield).  
Largely missing from these accounts are substantive engagements with the subjects 
and intended beneficiaries of the liberal peace. Although endorsing a critical anti-
imperial politics, these critiques do so in a way which echoes the blinkered vision of 
Frelimo’s ‘Brother from the West’. Indeed, the ‘refusal’ discussed in the poem 
seems to resonate with Ortner’s articulation of interpretive ‘refusal’ outlined in 
Chapter Four – an extreme hesitation to offer some concrete engagement in the fear 
that it may itself perform interpretive violence. 
 
Historically, the twentieth century anti-colonial project was intellectually 
committed to recovering a sense of subjecthood for non-Western peoples, which it 
understood as a constitutive part of an anti-imperial politics.
702
 It was not simply 
about criticising Western domination – it was about understanding the deeper 
connections between the ontological, epistemological and ethical aspects of a 
Eurocentric gaze, and aiming to effect a repositioning of that viewpoint. In Chapter 
Three, these conceptual links were explored and developed more substantively as an 
orientation for political thought and analysis in the context of an emerging 
decolonising approach within the discipline of International Relations. Overall, this 
turn and this approach has sought ways of bringing alternative ‘subjects’ of world 
politics to the forefront of analysis. Yet in order to realise this orientation more 
coherently within research, different concrete analytic strategies for articulating and 
engaging with non-Western subjecthood were needed. As elaborated in Chapter 
Four, these strategies lead to a different kind of engagement with the practices of the 
liberal peace as a form of international relations by refracting it through the 
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historical narratives, consciousnesses and strategies of its intended subjects. These 
narratives aim to reconstruct people in Mozambique as the major protagonists or 
subjects of the story of intervention. 
 
I. Re-thinking subjecthood in critique 
 
It is not unusual, within IR or other branches of the study of politics, to be 
asked what the ‘policy implications’ of one’s work are. This is such a standard 
question that many pieces of research will routinely finish with a summary of 
‘policy recommendations’. Moreover, many pieces of research will be specifically 
designed to produce ‘policy recommendations’ of some form or another. 
Underpinning this widespread practice is a set of unspoken shared understandings 
about the identity of the agent or subject of ‘policy’ – wealthy North American or 
European governments, the multilateral agencies with which they identify or 
support, and some other bodies. One is rarely asked or asks for whom these policy 
recommendations are generated, or why they are so: rather it is assumed that one 
naturally identifies with or works within the framework of this official, regional and 
state-focused subject-position, even if in the nominally independent framework of 
the public academy.  
 
One of the major contributions of post-Coxian critical theory within IR over 
the last thirty years has been to de-naturalise this policy-focused orientation in 
research and to question the purposes that our theoretical gazes serve. In the 1980s 
and 1990s this played out via largely theoretical attacks on positivism, rationalism, 
realism, and variants thereof.  Important statements were made regarding the 
character of knowledge, the role of values and norms, and the structure of 
capitalism, all of which disrupted the security of a state-centric, policy-oriented 
gaze. These nonetheless had a limited impact in terms of really pluralising the 
understanding of world politics and engaging with it via other subjects. In part, this 
related to the nature of scepticism about the character of discursively-rendered 
knowledge and the perceived danger of essentialising or colonising the non-Western 
Other through one’s engagement or representations. Thus the conversation 
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continued to focus on the Western subjects of politics – governments and their 
affiliates – although the conversation contained more dissidence than previously.  
 
Feminist and decolonising approaches in many senses continue to present 
more radical and democratic challenges to IR than many forms of critical theory, 
asking not only about the stability of knowledge but more bluntly questioning the 
general exclusion of most of the world’s population from the study of politics. A 
crucial part of this broader project has been not simply about critique but a reflexive 
reconstruction of non-state, non-male, and/or non-European subjects as historical 
and contemporary protagonists of, agents in and commentators on world politics. 
These approaches seek to pluralise the points of departure for understanding the 
world, in order to reflect, articulate and bring into being this more plural world.  The 
analytic and epistemological circumscription performed by a fixation on hegemonic 
forms of subjecthood is thus challenged in the name of a more democratic and 
inclusive account of world politics, which began from the starting point of needing 
to recognise and reckon with humanity as more broadly understood. 
 
II. Reconstructing subjecthood in the liberal peace debate  
 
In the context of the thesis, the decolonising approach adopted pushes 
against the analytic circumscription of relations in the liberal peace as being mainly 
concerned with the behaviour and agency of interveners, through engaging and 
articulating forms of subjecthood in Mozambique. In the empirical chapters, this 
cashes out as a narrative reconstruction of Mozambican society as a historical 
subject, and its people as politically conscious, purposeful and strategic subjects of 
social relations. In this story, the ‘encounter’ staged by recent intervention in post-
conflict countries is not a ‘new’ meeting between the liberal West on one hand and 
silent ciphers of difference, overwhelmed by the novel wonders of market 
capitalism and democracy on the other. Rather, these relations are embedded in the 
connected histories of colonialism, anti-colonialism and post-colonialism that have 
linked Europe and southern Africa for centuries. In this light, it is possible to revisit 
some of the themes that have characterised the liberal peace debate, and ask what 
the reconstruction of Mozambique as a subject brings to the discussion.   
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In the first place, it breaks open the ‘paradox of liberalism’, in which the 
struggle for political freedom, equality or empowerment is implicitly understood as 
the historical intellectual property of the liberal West and part of the promise of the 
liberal peace. Mozambique’s recent histories of political freedom through the anti-
colonial struggle is one in which Western and Eastern powers and intellectuals 
played important supporting roles, but the primary agents of it were from 
Mozambique and working within a pan-African idiom, often against the interests of 
wealthier governments. The point is not to argue that post-colonial freedom or 
emancipatory ideas are ‘really’ African – this is a reversal of the same problem. It is 
simply to point out that historically speaking, and particularly in recent history in 
southern Africa, struggles for political freedom or empowerment have not been a 
gift of the liberal West, and there is little point in understanding them as such in 
thinking about the last five hundred years of history, and even within the last two 
decades.  
 
Indeed, adopting a situated and contextualist approach to political analysis, 
as advocated by the theoretical approach of the thesis, suggests that finding out the 
genealogical origins of the ideas themselves are not intrinsic to determining their 
validity – rather it is the contexts and ends towards which they have been directed. 
In this spirit, the issue with the critiques of the liberal peace as they stand is not that 
because they depend on ostensibly European traditions of thought that these are 
therefore invalid ways of engaging with post-war and post-colonial contexts. The 
issue is that they are insufficiently engaged with or alive to the particular pluralities 
of political consciousness and contestation, and specifically the content of this 
politics. In particular, in Mozambique many of these relate to the position of the 
central party-state elite and their control over much of the economy, as well as 
historical patterns of dispossession and economic sabotage. As such, the ‘new’ 
discursive framework of the liberal peace did not really enable these problems to be 
addressed, and enabled a kind of retrenchment of power. However, as shown, it has 
been possible to mobilise and subvert various aspects of it in order to develop 
deeper critiques of the power structures it enables.  
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Within these pluralities of contestation, lines of political, social and 
economic cohesion do not, largely, run along the international-local axis upon which 
much of the critique turns.  What we see are a combination of different forms of 
solidarity that are not static and bounded constituencies for a particular political 
programme. Rather, they tend to be dynamic and reconstitute themselves around 
different issues areas in ways which reflect political claims, interests, funding and 
political pressure. In this sense, perhaps all political agencies under the liberal peace 
are ‘opportunistic’ – as much those of rich donor governments and NGOs as the 
civil society groups which accept their funding. Yet this does not mean that they are 
therefore not ‘political’ subjects with political consciousness – such a view could 
only be coherent if ‘politics’ was the preserve of only the financially independent 
and economically indifferent, which is clearly not the case. Whilst political framings 
are influenced by aspects of financing, this may be less the case with the substance 
of contestation. 
 
One of the reasons that the ‘liberal-local’ understanding of political 
dynamics has endured in the debate is due to the understanding of the political 
subject as being constituted in particular ways. Chandler’s critique of Duffield’s 
Foucaultian approach is that it lacks a clear account of an autonomous liberal 
modern rights-bearing political subject and a political process which connects the 
subject to a bounded community.
703
 For Chandler, contemporary liberal democratic 
politics is only possible under the presupposition of an autonomous liberal subject. 
For Richmond, the problem is precisely that the liberal peace cannot presume and 
will into being the existence of a modern liberal subject, which is why he endorses 
an approach based on empathy, for fear of doing violence to a culturally diverse 
local, non-liberal subject.  
 
The plural consciousness analysis developed in Chapter Six exposes the 
limitations of these unitary approaches to political subjecthood as a basis for 
political theory and political analysis. Chandler’s conceptualisation of politics 
proper as requiring an autonomous modern liberal rights-bearing subject seems to 
require that in the absence of this, contemporary politics does not really exist. Yet, 
                                                 
703
 Chandler, ‘Critiquing liberal cosmopolitanism’ 
292 
 
under the double consciousness problematic, one’s sense of one’s being in the world 
as a human is the basis for politics. One’s subjecthood is necessarily prior to the 
granting of substantive rights, which may be deferred by whichever external 
authority, and which is not necessarily unitary, depending on the socio-historical 
conditions of one’s existence.  Chandler’s vision of politics is one that does not bear 
much relationship to the lived experience of political struggle nor the constitution of 
political subjects, both in the postcolony and elsewhere. 
 
Richmond’s analysis, on the other hand, seems to derive its conception of 
non-liberal subjecthood from an archetype of a speechless and culturally illegible 
subaltern rather than the complex, articulate and pluralistically conscious embodied 
anti-colonial subject. In researching the effects of post-war intervention in such a 
contemporary setting, it seems strange to do this, given the many possibilities for 
communication, discussion and hermeneutic engagement, which would immediately 
problematise such assumptions. To the extent that caution should always be 
exercised in interpretive research, and in particular where it is produced under 
inequalities of wealth, power and status between researcher and subject, Richmond 
is right to be wary. But this might be as true of conducting interpretive research in 
the boroughs of inner London or the Ministry of Defence – all require forms of 
respect and care.  
 
This characterisation of subjecthood as unitary, abstract or culturally 
bounded is not however a minor methodological problem – it feeds into the 
Occidentalist shaping of the entire debate as being between the Western advocates 
of a project of liberal transformation and the non-Western targets of this 
transformation without really engaging with the concrete qualities, effects, points of 
contestation and perceived injustices within the relationship. Not least, this tends to 
re-affirm the dubious self-image of the West as being liberal and democratic when 
the actual practices of intervention can run directly in the other direction, as 
Chandler has pointed out.
704
 On the other hand the double/plural consciousness 
problematic forces a more careful engagement with the specificities of contestation, 
emancipation and dispossession engendered by various interventions.  
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The re-conceptualisation of subjecthood as pluralistically constituted also 
makes a contribution to the discussions around the ‘post-intervention’ environment 
as articulated by Graham Harrison, and the ‘hybrid peace’ as developed by Roger 
Mac Ginty.  Harrison’s analysis makes a series of important points about the 
distinctive aspects of bureaucratic influence, shaping and convergence in states 
which receive high amounts of IFI aid through budget support, as do Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Uganda.  Mac Ginty’s analysis also highlights the elements of 
strategic and ideological crossover that emerge in intervention, noting that the 
combined agency of ‘liberals’ and ‘locals’ produces hybrid forms of order which 
vary from context to context.  An understanding of the pluralistic constitution of 
political subjecthood helps interpret the emergence of these political forms and 
order – not as violations of the pristine autonomous subject of rights and thus 
inauthentic, as they might be in Chandler’s formulation – but as a substantive 
expression of the particular dynamics and fluidities of politics and political 
consciousness in the contemporary world. 
 
Chapters Seven and Eight reconstruct subjecthood by exploring conscious 
contestations and strategies in more depth and detail, and in doing so ask more 
difficult questions of critics. In Chapter Seven the interpretive engagement with the 
intimate political economy of interventions articulates the issues of a consciousness 
of extreme impoverishment and dependency as key factors of importance in 
underpinning the decisions to begin and to continue relationships with donors, but 
notes how racialised systems of differential entitlement within intervention can be 
divisive and alienating. In the chapter, I suggest that if we are to take the 
experiences of intervention seriously then these are legitimate grounds for critical 
engagement and anger which are more relevant than the difference problematic or 
the production of liberal subjectivity.  
 
To put the point more sharply, following the conclusions of Chapters Seven 
and Eight, perhaps there should also be more open critical contestation of the ways 
in which societies targeted by intervention are treated as a kind of experimentation 
ground for ill-informed and under-specified vanity projects by many donors, in 
sectors which are important to the lives and livelihoods of many people. If we 
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understand subjecthood as multi-dimensional, embodied, and ultimately deserving 
of recognition and respect, then the character of many conflict and post-conflict 
interventions is an important transgression of this ethic. But such a line of analysis 
seems to cross over into the polemical, and to lose the distant tenor in which 
existing critiques have discussed violations of sovereignty and cultural autonomy as 
the main problems with intervention.
705
 Whilst Duffield occasionally mentions such 
issues, they generally take a back-seat to the account of neoliberal governmentality. 
Yet, for the critical perspective developed here, it is important to keep in mind the 
concrete human experiences of intervention and to articulate these as also political 
in their own right. Chapter Eight particularly concluded that critics need to maintain 
an open mind and a spirit of engagement with the peoples targeted by intervention 
in order to think about the issues raised and the imagination of possible futures. 
 
One ultimate consequence, perhaps, of fully re-thinking the liberal peace 
debate by re-thinking the ‘subject’ in analysis, is that it may be desirable to put aside 
the liberal peace framework itself as it exists for the moment, and to pursue different 
frames of analysis for understanding social and political relations between 
interveners and targets of intervention.  In the following part of this discussion, I 
look at two themes which have been particularly relevant to the anti-colonial 
critique developed, which might usefully serve as organising devices for critical 
thinking more generally. These themes are ‘alienation’ and ‘accumulation’. 
 
III.  Alienation and accumulation in decolonising critique 
 
Although political consciousness is fluid and pluralistic, this does not mean 
that it is constituted in an arbitrary manner. Rather, as the analysis of the thesis has 
suggested, it is connected to concrete dynamics of alienation and accumulation 
within political order which do not always fit neatly into structural narratives and 
remedies. In this section I will sketch out how these can be useful concepts around 
which to organise our understanding of the social world in a way which is multi-
foundational, humanist and situated in shared experiences of it. 
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As the previous discussion has implied, political consciousness is not 
exogenous to social relations but endogenous to them – that is to say that forms of 
political consciousness express and help constitute relations of power and status. 
Yet people are also reflexive about these relations and often become aware of 
disjunctures between particular values and practices.  This is particularly the case 
where these disjunctures become very stark. The empirical chapters of the thesis 
have all tended to concentrate on and deliberately draw out the experiences of these 
disjunctures as forms of alienation, expressed through conscious critique, irritation, 
apathy and withdrawal. I have not intended to suggest that the liberal peace is only 
constituted by relations of alienation – rather that recognising alienation is 
intrinsically and instrumentally important in an anti-colonial account of politics.  
 
Alienation becomes instrumentally important in analysis because it speaks to 
the limits of the collective frames in which social and political life grounds and 
interpellates people. Indeed, it is significant that many of the first sociologists were 
fixated by this phenomenon.
706
 Yet the reasons for being concerned with alienation 
often spoke to the interests of states and ruling classes – early criminologists for 
example were tasked with understanding alienation in order to make society 
function more smoothly and with fewer infringements of its rules. In anti-colonial 
critique on the other hand, alienation is a productive force insofar as it pertains to 
the rejection of ideas and practices that negatively impact or violate one’s sense of 
self and well-being, or one’s ideas of justice. Political struggles can thus be read as 
strategies of disalienation – the attempt to overcome the disjuncture between 
conflicting social realities. Understanding and engaging with the character of 
alienation is one way of better understanding forms of social fragmentation and 
conflict – in short with dimensions of human plurality in the world. 
 
However, for an anti-colonial analytic there is also an intrinsic value to 
analysing alienation which derives from its explicitly ‘humanist’ framework. Insofar 
as alienation is often intimately linked to concrete forms of human suffering brought 
about by various structures / agents, it is a major point of concern. This is not to 
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argue that all forms of alienation are intrinsically of interest to decolonising 
analyses, nor to argue that analysis should limit itself thus – after all, solidarity has 
been an interesting frame for decolonising thought as well.  Yet it is to note that 
there are particular ethical and political drivers for looking at alienation which do 
not derive from its instrumental purposes.  
 
In the narrative of the thesis, one of the major drivers of alienation has been 
patterns and processes of wealth accumulation. In terms of understanding the 
political subject as embodied in particular historical and social relations, as well as 
the actual human body, the relationship of the subject to forms of accumulation is a 
critical part of its political being. The framing of ‘accumulation’ here is greatly 
preferred to ‘development’, which implies a more stagist trajectory of wealth 
accumulation over time, which has long been understood as problematic.
707
 Rather, 
in the thesis the liberal peace can be understood as a particular set of accumulation 
processes, or ‘politics of the belly’. Alienation often results from the concentration 
of such accumulation processes, and indeed the role of ‘poverty reduction’ in 
accelerating and consolidating such processes. Looking at the forms of critique and 
alienation discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, these are often associated with the 
dynamics of profit from the intervention regime and the concrete unevenness it itself 
generates.  In terms of Mozambique as a polity, for some time now the disjunctures 
between the post-independence egalitarian rhetoric of the ruling elites and the very 
visible, embodied manifestation of their wealth has been a cause of increasing 
disaffectedness and resentment, as indicated in this recent caricature: 
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 9.1: “Where were you, father, when the other fathers went to the armed 
struggle?” (2010) 708 
 
This emphasis on accumulation is not to suggest a reductive ontology of politics; as 
argued in Chapter Three the domains of political being are not reducible to one 
                                                 
708
 Nhatugueja, N., (2010), ‘Cartoon de Neivaldo Nhatugueja’, Cartoons de Moçambique, 
http://cartoonsdemocambique.blogspot.com/ Accessed May 27
th
 2011. Efforts have been made to 
contact the author as far as possible regarding copyright for this image. 
298 
 
another. Yet, it is to argue that neither can these be ignored in a decolonising 
account, particularly in contexts where political rule by both national and 
international actors is persistently legitimised by recourse to an apparent economic 
competence in the generation of development, macroeconomic stability and poverty 
reduction. Yet a focus on the accumulation processes actually engendered by this 
political arrangement is an important critical tool within anti-colonial critique. This 
would also highlight the structures of differential expectation and treatment outlined 
in Chapter Seven, which itself reflects and reproduces wealth distributions at a 
global level. 
 
Moreover, an appreciation of the deep economic crisis during which the 
‘liberal peace’ was introduced in Mozambique helps explain its apparent ‘success’ 
as a case of intervention, in terms of both its adherence to various reform 
programmes, and its apparently high GDP growth rates. A growth rate of 9%, as 
Mozambique had through much of the late 1990s, was not a great deal in absolute 
terms given the starting point. Yet in terms of the donor metrics of ‘success’ it has 
been important, validating the intervention.  These initial conditions of 
impoverishment are crucial in understanding the ‘success’ of its ‘progress’. They 
also illuminate what a senior IFI official may have meant by the comment that the 
problem with Angola was that the government had ‘too much money’709 - insulating 
the government from the need to co-operate with the donors in the same way.   
 
The dynamics of accumulation and alienation are offered as useful 
groundings for a decolonising account of world politics. With a humanist and 
pluralist impulse, they provide us with ways for re-focusing analysis around the 
embodied subjecthood of figures otherwise marginalised by Occidentalist frames of 
reference. They are doubtlessly ‘biased’ in this way towards such dynamics. I 
certainly cannot suggest that my presentation of Mozambique as a subject of politics 
and history is anything other than located within these concerns and problems. In 
this sense, the project of reconstructing subjecthood is always unstable and open to 
challenge. It does not argue that it is how people in Mozambique all see themselves 
and their relations to contemporary donors, and other narratives could certainly be 
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developed – indeed, they must be developed in order to deepen the engagement with 
the experiences and intended subjects of intervention. Yet, it makes some important 
steps in establishing a less restrictive basis for the analytic imagination.  
 
Closing thoughts and questions 
 
Many things remain unsaid, and some of these things are very important. 
One of the expected questions for this ‘anti-colonial’ analytic framework is its 
potential association with romanticisation and nostalgia – much anti-colonial 
thought is now regarded, not least in the postcolony itself, as utopian and unrealistic. 
Moreover, it has been characterised as conveniently backward-looking; overly 
fixated with a totalising vision of colonialism and too inclined to blame imperialism 
for contemporary problems – the Mugabe effect, as it were.  The use of anti-colonial 
thought in the thesis has endeavoured to avoid these effects – most of all it endorses 
using the ideas of the thinkers as intellectual strategies for thinking about the 
present state of world politics rather than an anachronistic diagnosis of the same. 
Indeed, if it is to be effective as a way of seeing through and identifying alternatives 
to the discursive frameworks of established power, critical theory must be 
consistently forward looking and contemporaneously engaged. David Scott puts the 
point well in arguing that for the purposes of anti-colonial critique “reconceiving 
alternatives depends in significant part on reconceiving the object of discontent”.710 
This is not to suggest that sentimentality or ‘romance’ is altogether dispensable – as 
Chapter Three argued, research which is humanistically and democratically oriented 
cannot do without a sense of affect and connection, particularly insofar as this asks 
us to listen to and understand experiences of alienation. I understand this to be a 
kind of necessary ‘romance’ – not for the subaltern or Other but for a notion of a 
broader humanity that is the general subject of scholarly work such as this. 
 
Returning to some of the initial concerns of the liberal peace debate, then, 
new ethical and political questions emerge when the object of discontent is re-
conceived through the lenses of alienation and accumulation and the subjects of 
intervention. First, as argued in Chapter Two, critics of the liberal peace raised 
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concerns about the extent to which its forms of intervention could be understood to 
be politically and ethically legitimate. Looking at the ways in which intervention in 
Mozambique is shaped under such vast inequalities of wealth and entitlement, 
however, one might well ask whether any kinds of ethical and political relations 
could not be highly uneven and strained under such conditions, given that they 
effect and institutionalise a particularly undemocratic hierarchy. In this sense, the 
underlying global distribution of wealth seems inseparable from being able to 
understand dynamics of legitimacy and alienation in world political relations. This 
kind of analytic question seems rather more pertinent than the question of mediating 
relations between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘local’ as defined by culture or ideology.  
 
Secondly, the epistemological terrain of the liberal peace is seen to be 
crucially bound up with other imaginaries of ‘modern’ statehood, which for 
contemporary sub-Saharan Africa is frequently lensed as ‘development’. 
Increasingly, it seems that to really engage with the political dynamics of post-
colonial international relations, critical approaches need to tackle the discursive 
construction of ‘development’ urgently and in its many manifestations across 
research and policy. This bigger question is very intimately tied to the exercise of 
power and ultimately facilitates the activities of the liberal peace. However, as a 
different literature has begun to argue, it is a historically peculiar discourse bound 
up with a de-politicising colonial and racial imaginary regarding the character of 
human progress.
711
 As such, it is an important dimension of global power that has 
generally been left out of the recent discussions in critical international relations 
about liberal imperialism and its continuities. 
 
Ultimately, however, reconstructing the ‘subject’ of inquiry in IR is a long 
process which will raise many more questions about the purposes and conduct of 
research, which will hopefully both prompt humility about the limits of research, as 
well as more ambition in terms of the possible directions of its critical 
consciousness. These new avenues are opened up and reflected in the changing 
patterns of world politics, but substantive engagement needs critical scholars to 
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leave their desks more often and try to see the world differently. Whilst 
decolonisation is often understood as a historical project of the past, it might 
otherwise be understood as an intellectual project for the future.  
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